

SYNTHESIS REPORT



Moving Further On Civil Service Reforms in Ethiopia

Findings and Implications from a Civil
Service Survey and Qualitative Analysis



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Acknowledgements

Ethiopia's Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development (MPSHRD) requested this analysis, and the team wishes to especially thank H.E. Ato Tagesse Chaffo, Minister; H.E. Ato Adamu Ayana, State Minister; and Ato Tesfaye Atire, Director of the Federal Reform Program Monitoring and Support Directorate, for their guidance. The team also appreciates the engagement of members of the special task force formed to support the process: Tesfaye Belachew, Melaku Bizualem, Taye Wakuma, Jemila Ahmed, and Mekonen Gashu.

We also wish to thank Berhanu Legesse, Stefan Dercon, and Jaydeep Biswas for their support during the development of the survey instrument as well as the survey team members who collected the data for this project: Girma Shegute, Seife Fekade, Molla Tedla, Sileshi Seneshaw, Habtu GebreHiwot, Abiy Tessema, Mandefro Bekele, Mohammed Umer, Eskinder Tesfaye, Gashaw Yetwale, Naga Tesfaye, Wubliker Teklu, Mitselal Gebre, Hailu Alemselassie, Yared Abraham, and Tesfakiros Arefe, as well as data encoders Fikir Temtem, Kidist Tesfasilassie, and Haimanot Zeleke. Administrative support was provided by Hanna Ketselamaryam Hailu, and document editing and formatting support was provided by Candace Gebre and Cybil Maradza, respectively.

We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the World Bank, UK Department for International Development, and International Growth Center.

Abbreviations

ATA	Agricultural Transformation Agency
BA	Bachelor of Art
BPR	Business Process Reengineering
BSC	Balanced Scorecard
CSR	Civil Service Reform
CSRP	Civil Service Reform Program
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Director General
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ERCA	Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Growth Domestic Product
GTP	Growth and Transformation Plan
HRM	Human Resource Management
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IT	Information and Technology
KII	Key Informant Interviews
MAB	Ministries, Agencies and Bureaus
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MOH	Ministry of Health
MOT	Ministry of Trade
MPRSHRD	Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development
NCBP	National Capacity Building Program
NPM	New Public Management
SWOT	Strength, Weakness Opportunity and Thereat
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
UK	United Kingdom
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar

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Executive Summary

1. This report identifies key challenges facing the Ethiopian civil service today and suggests avenues for further reforms. Ethiopia's civil service has so far developed at a rapid pace and faces a number of constraints, challenges, and new or expanding demands. Continuing reform efforts and building on past achievements is critical for the successful implementation of Ethiopia's Growth and Transformation Program (GTP II).

While the past two decades have seen important achievements made, the government seeks to further strengthen its economic governance and service delivery.

2. The analytic effort that this report reflects was triggered by a request from the Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development (MPSHRD). The Ministry sought to identify

challenges and options to target and pursue further reforms and efforts to strengthen the civil service and its contributions to service delivery. The report is based on several sources: (i) the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey (ECSS), which was undertaken in June through September 2016 and targeted professional level staff and directors or heads of federal ministries or agencies, regional bureaus, and woreda offices; (ii) a series of key informant interviews with officials and stakeholders, as well as focus group discussions with members of 'Public Wings'; and (iii) administrative data and information, e.g.

concerning the number of civil servants, as well as salaries and benefits.

3. The focus is on five key service delivery sectors: agriculture, education, health, revenue collection, and trade—all critical areas for state activity. The analysis encompasses an assessment of previous and ongoing reforms, and takes a look at the constraints and overall quality of current management practices. Where possible, the report also compares the civil service in Ethiopia to that of other countries, based on information gathered from similar surveys and other comparative information.

Recent evolution of the civil service

4. The civil service has expanded rapidly, with an annual average growth rate of over 7 percent in the number of employees during the five-year period between 2008/09 and 2013/14. This was motivated by the government's decentralization, and its fast-tracked approach to enhancing service delivery as part of its pursuit of the MDGs. A swift expansion of post-secondary education that aimed to increase the number of qualified entrants to the civil service also underpinned its growth.

and expenditures, wages account for about 25 percent of overall spending. This is in line with regional comparators and signals limited room for expansion, at least prior to an increase in the level of revenue collected. Civil service wages have been adjusted at irregular intervals for inflation, and remain among the lowest in the region. Non-wage benefits (pensions, travel allowances) exist, but are relatively small, and in the case of travel allowances, tend to be below actual costs for regular civil servants.

5. Ethiopia has managed to expand civil service numbers without an excessive expansion of the overall wage bill. The wage bill has been contained at around 5 percent of GDP, which is at the low end observed internationally. At the same time, given the country's still low overall revenue collection

6. Surveyed civil servants and key informants (including directors) indicate that salaries are an important issue of concern. About 70-80 percent of respondents are dissatisfied with their salaries; and wages and benefits are among the most frequently cited reasons for wanting to change



jobs. Managers in ministries and agencies in turn are concerned about their ability to attract qualified staff, especially in sectors where pay is comparatively lower.

7. Comparisons with average private sector wages suggest that Ethiopia, as many other countries, has a public-sector wage premium, but this has narrowed or even reversed over

time. While public sector staff earn more than private sector employees on average, the difference is limited and has been shrinking when comparing government and permanent private sector employees. Moreover, when controlling for job characteristics, the private sector has surpassed public sector pay in recent years. It is also important to consider that both public and private sector wages in Ethiopia are among the lowest globally.

Civil service reform efforts and perceptions of current management practices

8. Since the 1990s, the Government of Ethiopia has deployed a series of reform tools, aimed at improving the civil service and service delivery performance. In particular, these include the Business Process Reengineering (BPR), the introduction of a Balanced Scorecard (BSC) system to set targets and monitor performance, and the roll-out of a Change Army.¹ The government has also directed all public sector institutions to adopt and publish Citizens Charters. These tools have been embedded into the wider Civil Service Reform Program pursued since the mid-1990s.

9. Among low income countries, Ethiopia stands out as having followed civil service reforms intensively over the past two decades, and with some success. The wide-ranging changes carried out include the large-scale decentralization and strengthening of sub-national levels of government, as well as the successive roll out of reforms across all levels of government. Governance indicators suggest that government effectiveness – as a proxy measure of civil service performance – improved between the late 1990s and the early 2000s; however, since then, further progress on this measure appears to have stalled.

10. Among the reform tools deployed, the Change Army – which was first established at local levels in the health care sector – is perceived, relatively, as the most successful, in particular at woreda and regional levels (during qualitative discussions, however, it was noted that it may be politicized.) At the federal level, the BSC registers as the most successful reform tool. Among sectors, the Change Army is particularly utilized by health sector staff, and relatively less so by staff working with the Ministry or Bureaus of Trade. However, Citizens Charters are seen as relatively less successful thus far. Citizens Charters are more frequently raised as a successful reform by staff in the trade and revenue organizations, which interface with citizens and businesses around specific ‘business processes’, such as paying taxes or issuing a license.

11. The active participation of high-level political leadership has made a major contribution in driving the reform agenda throughout the civil service in a relatively short period, while also posing challenges. The urgency with which the government has pursued reform has at times overloaded the civil service with reform tools. Furthermore, reforms have tended to be rolled-

¹ Please refer to Chapter 3 for a detailed description of each reform.

out in a uniform manner, with limited means for flexibility, adaptation, and integration. Reforms were not complemented with the greater involvement of professional staff; use of incentives to encourage performance improvements; and strong demand-side pressure for reforms or improvements.

12. As a complement to tracing the public sector reform efforts that have been made, the survey gauged staff perceptions of current management practices. Management practices are methods that

enable civil service organizations to achieve their objectives. The two stronger performing areas are monitoring and targeting (on average rated 3.5 and 3 (on a scale from 1 as the weakest, to 5 as the best), while 'staffing'² is intermediate (2.7), and other scores – 'roles',³ 'flexibility'⁴ (2.5), and 'staff involvement'⁵ (2) are all assessed as relatively low. While just a snapshot in time, these survey results suggest that the BSC reforms have had traction, while those aspects of the BPR reforms aiming to strengthen autonomy and flexibility for staff have had less impact.

State of the civil service today

13. This analysis sets out to assess the degree to which civil service staff perceive performance management and promotions within the civil service to be merit based; feel capable of carrying out their duties; and use databases and client feedback to improve their performance. A merit-based civil service has long been seen as critical to effective public sector performance, while staff capacity and attention to client feedback are other important ingredients for delivering services reliably and effectively.

14. Staff perceived their treatment to be relatively merit and performance based, but not uniformly so. Regional variation exists: While 91 percent of respondents in Tigray consider merit and performance to be the key factor that determines their treatment, only 23 percent of Gambella-based respondents do. Other perceived factors relevant to how staff are treated include their relationship with managers; political, educational, and ethnic connections; and length of service. Notably, while Addis Ababa performs well on most metrics, merit and performance are seen as key

criteria for how staff are treated by only 37 percent of respondents, followed by 26 percent who identify political connections as most important. In general, opportunities for promotion remain relatively scarce, which is one of the factors that drive staff turnover.

15. Whether civil service staff have adequate capacity becomes a notable point of divergence between the perceptions of focus group discussants and key informants, and the self-perceptions of civil servants as captured in the survey. Ethiopia has rapidly expanded post-secondary education, and has also invested in the training of civil service rules and processes. According to survey results, a large majority of bureau and ministry staff see their skills as adequate for their jobs. However, discussions with key informants suggest that the very rapid expansion of higher education has resulted in shallower education received, including a lack of practical training, e.g. in fields such as agriculture, health, and education. Public Wing members also express concerns that federal ministry staff often do not have strong

² Measuring management attention to attracting and developing talent.

³ Measuring the level of autonomy staff are given in undertaking tasks.

⁴ The ability to confront new demands and/ or ways of working.

⁵ The ability of staff to become involved in operations and contribute towards decisions.

knowledge of their respective fields. Relatively low salaries combined with perceptions of low prestige make it difficult to attract and retain high caliber professional staff in the civil service; while political appointees rotate too frequently and among different technical fields. At the implementation level, competency assessments have been deployed for some front-line service staff, and these also indicate challenges.

16. Regarding the importance of feedback mechanisms and information on service delivery performance, civil servants emphasize the importance of feedback from clients, while the

use and usefulness of management information systems (MISs) is still very uneven. Civil servants report that the three most important sources of feedback are colleagues, citizens, and supervisors (all above 90 percent). Information from MIS systems is more widely available at the federal and regional levels than for woreda level offices. Importantly, for agriculture and education sectors, staff observe that the data captured in the systems is not useful. A further challenge is that even in offices with MISs, network problems often disrupt access (this is especially noted by health sector staff at the regional level).

Constraints to working effectively

17. The analysis further explored the current constraints to effective service delivery from the perspective of civil servants and managers, and several findings stand out. Firstly, staff struggle with inadequate resources to do their work. Secondly, staff are demotivated to a significant extent. Demotivation is more widespread in Ethiopia than in other countries where similar surveys have been carried out, while it is unevenly distributed across organizations. A third obstacle is inadequate leadership. Further constraints are posed by ad hoc work requests and staff having to wait for inputs from others.

18. Inadequate resources to carry out assigned tasks are the most frequently identified obstacle by a wide margin. Resources are particularly constrained at the woreda level (48 percent), and somewhat less so at the regional and federal level (23 percent). For the federal level, staff in the agriculture sector more frequently raise resource constraints as an issue, more so than health sector staff. The survey provides a drill down, in particular into the degree to which IT systems are available and function as intended. Usage is limited and frequently disrupted, especially at woreda levels.

In addition, phone service is uneven, further limiting the ability of staff to communicate and transmit information and data. Staff perceptions about inadequate resources are consistent with fiscal data, which indicates that operations and maintenance spending in Ethiopia is low.

19. The second main constraint identified is a lack of motivation; and this is particularly pronounced at the federal level (20 percent of staff cite it as the most important constraint). For regional staff, a lack of motivation is the most important constraint (14 percent), as well as at woreda level (18 percent). Responses to an open-ended question about what contributes to declining motivation suggest that contributing factors are dissatisfaction with salaries and benefits, frustration over a lack of operational resources, limited prospects for professional development and promotion, as well as inadequate leadership and a perception of the civil service's low level of prestige (which is also greater at the federal than at the sub-national level). Importantly, levels of motivation vary significantly between organizational units.

20. Inadequate leadership is raised most frequently at the woreda level (by 19 percent),

followed by the federal (15 percent) and then the regional level (9 percent). The issue appeared in both the key informant interviews and survey. At the federal level, inadequate leadership was flagged especially in the trade and education sectors; and at the woreda level also for the revenue sector. It is rarely flagged among regional-level staff. The practice of selecting decision-making staff as political appointees from the director level upwards may play a role in this regard, in particular when incentives are not fully aligned, and managers may be oriented more towards their political roles and opportunities rather than viewing performance as a key criterion for further promotion.

21. Ad hoc work requests, and having to wait for inputs from others pose some burden.

Around 30 percent of civil servants' time is used for ad hoc tasks that are not part of their main job, with variation mainly across regions rather than sectors.

22. Regarding other aspects of time management, meetings appear to not be well planned and used in a targeted way, especially at woreda levels.

At the woreda level, 52 percent of respondents think meetings achieve their goals using the minimum amount of time in less than a quarter of all meetings. Regarding the usefulness of meetings, 37 percent of federal respondents believe meetings are useful in more than 75 percent of cases, but 45 percent of woreda staff believe meetings are useful in less than 25 percent of cases. Meetings that take excessive amounts of time or are not useful to the tasks staff are expected to perform amount to lost resources.

23. A key challenge for the civil service, particularly at the federal level, is the low level of prestige.

Only 8 percent of federal-level civil servants view the civil service as prestigious, increasing to 11 and 14 percent at the regional and woreda level respectively. Ratings are somewhat

higher for the health sector at the federal level (20 percent), and particularly low for the revenue sector. Among the hallmark features of earlier successful developmental states has been a well-regarded civil service, able to attract 'the best and brightest' through competitive entrance assessments. While Ethiopia has been relatively successful in making the civil service merit and performance based, its exceptionally low social status is an issue that needs to be addressed.

24. Most civil servants do not consider rent seeking to be a major constraint to their ability to work effectively, and they point to the Change Army as one of the most effective mechanisms for addressing corruption.

Less than 3 percent of civil servants expressed that corruption or rent seeking hinders their ability to work effectively. The survey did not entail questions about whether civil servants had observed or suspected any corruption in their offices or in other parts of the civil service. The Change Army is considered to be effective in identifying solutions to rent seeking in the civil service by 65 percent of organization heads, and 55 percent of all civil servants. One key exception is the agricultural sector at the federal level, where the Change Army is perceived to be ineffective in this regard. Somewhat disconcertingly, a very low share of civil servants (3 percent) see Federal and Regional Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission investigations as effective for limiting rent-seeking. Furthermore, consultations with Public Wings - i.e. the main interaction between government officers and organized citizens - are not widely seen as addressing corruption. This is consistent with the perceptions of Public Wing members who observe that there seems to be a limited appetite to discuss corruption challenges openly.

25. Additional sector-by-sector findings are presented in Annex 1 of this report, covering the five sectors of focus—agriculture, education, health, revenue, and trade.

Emerging recommendations

26. Based on the discussion in the preceding chapters, Chapter 6 outlines options for pursuing further reforms. The suggestions made are mindful of resource constraints and seek to minimize suggestions that would have a substantial fiscal cost. In moving forward, the Government of Ethiopia, and specifically the Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development in

collaboration with other ministries, can build on the significant reform efforts that have already been made, and that indicate Ethiopia is well prepared to pursue further reforms once their direction has been agreed upon. The proposed implications draw on the results of the undertaken quantitative and qualitative surveys.

Recognize strengths and preserve what works

27. Ethiopia's public sector stands out for two main strengths: (i) it has achieved a lot with very limited resources, and (ii) there is a fairly good alignment between its ability to make and implement decisions, so that its deployment of practices such as targeting and monitoring is relatively effective. These two aspects are

important assets that many other low income countries have struggled with. Thus, in seeking to address challenges such as staff motivation and reducing delivery bottlenecks, attention should also be given to maintaining and further developing these strengths.

Options for addressing the challenge of civil service's low motivation and prestige

28. The survey indicates that low motivation and low prestige are widespread. For a country pursuing a 'developmental state' model, such low motivation is concerning, since the state is

meant to play an important role in the economy and society. The following are potential options for improving motivation:

- i Establishing a system based on competitive entry exams.** Such processes have been used in Asian developmental states such as South Korea and Japan, as well as in parts of continental Europe. They create a greater sense that only the best and brightest can join key positions in the civil service, and hence contribute to greater prestige. Specialized competitive exams can be used for recruitment into sectors.
- ii Allocating greater funds for key operational tasks and systems.** The findings presented in Chapter 5 indicate that having sufficient funds and systems (such as functioning IT systems) are the most important constraint to performance and the effective delivery of expenditures), as it can contribute both to improving motivation as well as strengthening service delivery.

- iii **Leadership selection and leadership training focused on motivating staff.** The importance of good leadership to motivate performance is well recognized. Inadequate leadership appears to be an important constraint, especially in the health and revenue sectors where concerns about leadership are voiced more frequently.
- iv **Seeking to understand further why motivation varies so greatly between organizations within Ethiopia.** As addressed in Chapter 5.1, the dispersion of motivation among staff in different organizational units is very noticeable. This merits further exploration, and a targeting of those organizations within each sector where performance is significantly weaker than the average.

Options to further improve management practices

29. The relatively standardized reforms pursued over the past 10 to 15 years (e.g. BPR, BSC, Change Army) were rolled out across all sectors. With regard to the implemented current management practices, civil service staff tended to rate target setting and monitoring higher, while rating practices that promote flexibility and

staff involvement lower. Going forward, a more specific approach that addresses the particular constraints of sectors and organizational units would be useful, and contribute to empowering/motivating staff without losing the benefits of target setting and monitoring.

- i **Moving from general reform models to identifying and enabling sector and task-specific improvements:** As is described further in Annex 1, the specific challenges faced and the role and functions of staff differ across sectors. Making public service reform efforts more specific can entail at least two avenues: (a) developing further reform efforts in close collaboration between the Ministry of Public Service and specific sector ministries, while at the same time keeping an eye on overall coherence, e.g. in terms of staff grading, pay scales, and recruitment standards; (b) within individual sectors, eliciting ideas from staff of potential organizational improvements could result in valuable contributions to improved service delivery. In addition, this may also contribute to an increased perception of staff involvement. Within sector ministries, Reform Directorates can play a critical role in shaping public sector changes.
- ii **Consider rebranding the Change Army as quality circles:** The case team workers seem comparable to “quality circles” in that they are a formal, institutionalized mechanism for participatory problem solving, peer to peer learning and continuous improvement of performance. However, the qualitative interviews and dissemination discussions indicate that the system is perceived to be politicized and there is too much emphasis on attitudes and not enough on knowledge and constructive problem solving. Rebranding the Change Army will encourage team members to cooperate with one another to focus on finding solutions for improving service delivery and to steer away from fault finding.
- iii **Facilitating learning across organizational units in the same sector/level of government:** The Change Army addresses peer learning and the dissemination of good practices *within* organizational units.

However, to address the issue of the significant Differences that exist between organizational units within the same sector in terms of motivation and management scores, greater learning across units should be facilitated.

iv Consider enhanced staff involvement in policy formulation and monitoring functions.

Greater autonomy and flexibility, as well as greater involvement in policy and monitoring functions can contribute to staff satisfaction, and facilitate the attraction, retainment, and motivation of well-performing staff.

v Better use of staff time should receive attention to improve overall public sector efficiency.

The wage bill pays for a set of staff time, skills, and efforts. As the survey indicates, ad hoc tasks and meetings that are not sufficiently pertinent and efficient reduce public sector efficiency, in particular at woreda levels. Investments in leadership training can include guidance on how to use time and how to conduct meetings efficiently and in a way that supports organizational performance.

Options for incentivizing performance and professional growth

30. Findings both from the survey and the qualitative analysis suggest civil servants perceive limited opportunities for professional growth.

Staff believe that opportunities for promotions are slim, as well as for training and learning. Also,

while a performance management system is in place, it does not offer much in terms of rewards for good performance, and poor performance is not dealt with systematically.

i Provision of more training and learning opportunities for staff should be a primary consideration.

Staff should be more widely encouraged to scale up their skills, knowledge, and competencies. This can take various forms, e.g. class-room based learning, but also temporary assignments of different tasks, as well as on the job mentoring. As the report notes, staff seem to be reluctant to admit to skills gaps, despite these being widely noted by key informants, as well as by Public Wing representatives. An approach that combines competitive entry, stronger assessments of actual skills, and greater opportunities for learning can contribute to an upgrade of staff competencies, as well as contribute to job satisfaction and motivation.

as poor performers, and recognition should be given to good performers.

While the BSC reforms have put in place regular performance assessments, survey responses suggest that follow-up remains limited. A lack of follow up may make staff reluctant to make strong investments in better performance. At the same time, it is important to ensure fairness and objectivity in assessing performance.

ii Action needs to be taken for staff identified

iii Considering some expansion of promotion opportunities.

As is discussed in Chapter 4, while staff believe promotions are largely merit-based, there is also a perception that promotion opportunities are extremely limited, and this contributes to declining motivation and turnover. Some broadening of promotion opportunities should be considered in pay and grading exercises.

Ensuring that tools and systems work as intended

- i **Pay attention to deployment and usability of ICT systems.** Staff clearly struggle with systems being available and useable; and the latter includes the ability to reliably make phone calls. Investing in functioning ICT systems may have the greatest pay-off for revenue collection, followed by agriculture as a key productive sector. The required investments are not just in hardware and software, but also in the provision of requisite staff to provide trouble-shooting and updates to software to ensure continuous usability.
- ii **Simplify reform tools.** Interventions that are simple are more likely to be implemented sustainably. The BSC is a good tool in principle, but it seems complex and difficult to use effectively. There appears to be some scope for simplification on the one hand, and for automatization on the other.

Demand-side accountability for reforms and further service delivery improvements

31. Citizens' feedback mechanisms that work are important for strengthening the service delivery orientation of the public sector. As discussed in Chapter 3, Citizens Charters, i.e. the tool that was expected to provide citizens' power to know and ask for their rights, is considered to be a relatively less successful reform tool by implementers. Furthermore, the discussions held as well as

survey results suggest that the level of activity, seriousness of engagement, and usefulness of Public Wing consultations is still variable and not fully developed.

32. The following avenues could be pursued to further strengthen accountability and effective feedback mechanisms:

- i **Surveys of civil servants such as those carried out for this report should be complemented by surveys of service users.** This would be extremely valuable for understanding whether mismatches in perceptions exist. Findings could then be fed back to public sector managers to take action and monitor for future improvements. Such surveys could also serve as an incentive for identifying and rewarding particularly well performing teams. Efforts could be piloted in selected urban areas to limit costs.
- ii **Continuing efforts should be made to develop Citizens Charters and effective complaints mechanisms.** Citizens Charters appear to be less effective than desirable, while some progress appears to have been achieved already on which further efforts can be built. Charters should be clear and realistic, e.g. in terms of processing times. The government can also consider making Citizens Charters legally binding, as has been done in India through the adoption of a 'Rights to Public Services Act'.⁶ Monitoring patterns of complaints and how complaints

⁶ This would require ensuring that resources are available to service delivery units to stay reliably within targets set in Citizens Charters, or else such an approach could trigger substantial litigation.

are addressed can help to strengthen these and to incentivize effective follow-up.

iii Opportunities for greater public-private partnership for effective service delivery.

A number of opportunities for enhanced partnership between public and private sectors exist. This includes opportunities to further strengthen Public Wing consultation mechanisms, including in terms of the agreed upon decisions and their implementation. It may be relevant to consider arrangements that enable more issue-specific discussions, either through the formation of sub-committees (e.g. on cancer care in the health sector), or through the dissemination of agendas for upcoming Public Wing meetings. Moreover, there are areas in which the government can consider to 'do less' or crowd in private sector contributions more, e.g. through involving the private sector in the continual training of specialists. Revisiting earlier BPR efforts towards bureaucratic streamlining and simplification – in consultations with citizens and the private sector – can also enable services to be delivered in a timely

way as prescribed by Citizens' Charters and effectively in terms of costs and benefits.

iv Improved communication: The government may consider the need to communicate more explicitly about what public sector reforms are being pursued, why, how, and with what expected results. This will help stakeholders to be more attentive to what is being done, and to provide feedback and proposals accordingly.

v Broaden opportunities for feedback: The main feedback channel from citizens/service users to specific organizational units currently are complaints mechanisms, e.g. in the form of boxes to collect complaints, and then follow up by staff and managers as appropriate; as well as Public Wing meetings. It may be helpful to broaden the feedback being solicited from 'complaints' to 'suggestions, ideas, and complaints'. This way, service users would feel encouraged to also contribute ideas of what could be done better, and to provide additional channels for 'bottom-up' communication.



1

Introduction





1.1 Motivation for this report

33. This report seeks to identify what factors emerge as obstacles to further service delivery improvements, and how these might be addressed. Ethiopia is pursuing shared growth and poverty reduction through a developmental state model. Accordingly, transforming and building the capacity of the state has been a core development priority of the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) since the mid-1990s. The current development strategy of Ethiopia, the second phase of the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II), aims to propel Ethiopia into a middle-income country by 2025 through a focus on agricultural and rural development, industrial base expansion, government-led infrastructure development, and investment in social and human development. Good governance and state transformation remain

central planks of the development strategy. The public service stands at the center of it, having a major role in how services are delivered to citizens and how growth is accelerated and shared.

34. Much has been achieved over the past two decades. Ethiopia has either met or made significant progress towards all eight MDGs. Access to education has expanded rapidly, with gross enrollment at the primary level reaching 100 percent by 2014. The number of agricultural and health extension workers has significantly increased, and development outcomes have improved. Moreover, Ethiopia has enhanced service delivery while still having very limited fiscal resources at the government's disposal, and while pursuing a significant expansion of infrastructure.

The government has also taken up a number of public sector reform initiatives (discussed in Chapter 3), showing an impressive capacity to translate policies into action, in particular when compared to other neighboring countries where 'implementation gaps' have been diagnosed as very significant.⁷

35. Still, more remains to be done. The reforms and resulting social and economic development have increased the demand for even better service delivery, transparency, and accountability. Furthermore, the rapid scaling up of services has affected quality, such as actual learning outcomes in schools. Thus, while the progress made thus far is impressive in many ways, the government believes that public sector capabilities should continue to strengthen and improve in line with its own expectations and plans for reaching middle-income status. In addition to capabilities, strengthening integrity is a key concern: following the elections in 2015, the GoE has highlighted the fact that rent-seeking attitudes and behavior in the civil service are increasingly becoming binding constraints for its effective delivery of services and the achievement of the country's development goals.

36. The civil service reforms pursued in Ethiopia to date have been wide ranging, and have included the adoption and implementation of a number of tools. Reforms have included significant decentralization, first to regions and then to districts (woredas), alongside core Human Resource Management (HRM) and Public Finance Management (PFM)-focused reforms, and efforts to strengthen leadership as well as orientation towards serving the needs of citizens. The civil service has also seen a rapid expansion to achieve a significant broadening of service delivery. Key reform tools deployed include Business Process

Reengineering (BPR), Balanced Scorecard (BSC), Citizens Charter, and the Development Change Army (hereafter referred to as Change Army).⁸ These have been successively introduced to improve service delivery, and enhance transparency and accountability in the civil service.

37. The Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development (MPSHRD) has been given the mandate to lead further reform efforts. In collaboration with other relevant institutions, it seeks to further develop human resources, strengthen processes and systems, and address rent seeking and corruption risks in the civil service. The MPSHRD, along with others, spearheaded past reform efforts such as the Civil Service Reform Program in 1996, which has now been implemented over a period of twenty years.

38. The MPSHRD requested that the World Bank conduct an independent review of the different civil service reform tools, to assess what has been achieved, and what to consider next. The review will take stock of what has been done, identify remaining and potential new challenges, and draw lessons, as well as suggest recommendations on how to move further ahead in the coming years to foster a fair, responsible, efficient, ethical, and transparent civil service that promotes accelerated and sustained economic development and contributes to the building of democracy and good governance.

39. In response to this request, a World Bank Group team, led by staff from the Governance Practice in collaboration with staff from the Research Department (DEC), have undertaken a multi-pronged analysis. This has included qualitative work, as well as the implementation of a survey of civil servants at federal, regional, and woreda levels. In line with the request from

⁷ See e.g. the SCD for Uganda (2015).

⁸ Another reform being pursued is Kaizen, i.e. the originally Japanese approach to effective production. This is mainly applied to enterprises (private and public) and is not included in the discussions in this report.

MPSHRD, the focus focused on five sectors, namely, agriculture, education, health, revenue administration, and trade. The review involved key informant interviews (KIIs) with relevant

stakeholders, as well as an analysis of primary and secondary data and information, followed by a survey of civil servants, based on a questionnaire developed in close collaboration with the Ministry.

1.2 Methodological approach: qualitative analysis, survey, and administrative data

40. This report is based on the following main sources: (i) a survey of Ethiopian civil servants, undertaken in summer 2016, (ii) interviews with a range of stakeholders - including heads of agencies, officials from the Ministry of Public Service, researchers, and members of Public Wings, and (iii) administrative data and selected secondary sources. The report also highlights some comparative aspects regarding the size of the public service and the current wage bill, as well as on the civil service surveys undertaken in several other countries.

41. As part of the analysis, the report triangulates information from the different sources (for example, the views of civil servants about the availability of working resources, fiscal data on allocations for operations, and maintenance expenditures across all levels of government). Furthermore, as Ethiopia has undertaken extensive civil service reforms over the past 20 years, the analysis focuses on perceptions and views about what these reforms have delivered, and how they contribute to the various objectives of a well performing public service, such as ensuring effective processes, transparency for citizens, and promoting integrity.

42. The purpose of conducting a survey of the Ethiopian civil service has been to gather micro-

data on the perceptions and experiences of civil servants, and on the key obstacles civil servants face as they perform their duties to the best of their abilities, and ultimately on the provision of public services. The survey utilized random sampling techniques at all levels of sample selection to gain a representative sample of officials across the government sectors studied. This type of primary data provides an unfiltered snapshot of the day-to-day operations of the civil service at all three tiers of government. The questionnaire for the survey was developed based on initial discussions and in close collaboration with the Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development. Interviews were carried out in June to September 2016 at the federal level, in all 11 regions, and in a selection of woredas.

43. Survey coverage and limitations. The survey from which this report draws from covers all three levels of government (federal, regional, and woreda). All 11 regions (including Addis Ababa), and 66 woredas were covered.⁹ The focus of the analysis is on five sectors as outlined above, which include two service delivery sectors (education and health), two growth-related sectors (agriculture and trade), and one core institution of the state (revenue administration).¹⁰ The detailed methodology used to develop the questionnaire, woreda selection, and other methodological

⁹ Woredas were sampled for eight regions, but not for Harari, Addis Ababa, or Dire Dawa.

¹⁰ Of course revenue administration can also have important growth implications, but its primary function is to enable a financing of public institutions and tasks - while minimizing the negative impact on growth.

aspects are reflected in Annex 2. In addition to the survey, key informant interviews and focus group discussions were carried out at the federal level and for the city of Addis Ababa.


44. The survey included modules and questions directed at the three types of civil servants sampled: (i) civil servants in non-managerial positions (employee-level track); (ii) civil servants in managerial positions (director-level track); and (iii) organization heads (political appointee-level track). While some modules were administered to all three tracks, some were designed specifically to be administered to one of the three types of civil servants to ensure questions remained relevant to each broad level of staff within the Ethiopian civil service. Throughout the report, it is noted which responses come from the directors and organization heads specifically, and which are responses from the sampled non-managerial staff.

45. Several limitations should be noted: while the survey includes woreda-level sector offices, front-line service delivery staff such as teachers or nurses were not included. An important further limitation is that the survey needed to be limited to civil servants and could not also collect mirror data from service delivery users. Such an approach would be desirable, but carries significant additional costs. Finally, a number of caveats apply to comparative information about civil service dimensions and perceptions in other countries; these are noted in the respective sections.

46. Despite these limitations and caveats, the analysis adds significant new information and insights into service delivery challenges in Ethiopia, which can be utilized for efforts at strengthening civil service performance going forward.

47. Initial consultations on the findings of the report were held with the Minister of Public Service on March 10, 2017. The team will be keen to receive comments on this draft full report. Further consultations and dissemination efforts will be organized in consultation with the Ministry.

48. This report summarized the findings from the work undertaken and proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 covers the overall evolution of the civil service, provides information on the wage bill, as well as individual-level wages and non-wage benefits, and discusses public versus private sector wages. Chapter 3 covers the main civil service reform tools that have been deployed over the past two decades, including the BPR, BSC, Change Army, and Citizens Charters, as well as associated changes, such as the establishment of 'Public Wings'. Section 3.6 then turns to how current management practices are assessed by civil servants. Chapter 4 considers the extent to which treatment, and advancement of staff are perceived to be merit based, as well as issues of turnover, staff capacities, and use made of existing databases and other feedback mechanisms. Chapter 5 discusses key constraints to public service delivery as perceived by civil servants; as well as other issues such as perceptions about how rent-seeking can best be constrained, how well staff-time is managed, as well as levels and aspects of satisfaction. Based on this range of issues discussed, Chapter 6 highlights key implications and options for further reform resulting from the analysis. Annex 1 provides specific sector-by-sector information and results, while Annex 2 provides a detailed overview of the methodological approach for the survey.







2

Recent Evolution of the Civil Service





2.1 Overall staff and wage-bill size

49. Following the enactment of the new Constitution in 1994, the government shifted to a federal state system by sharing powers between the federal government and the ethnically organized regional state governments. This was initiated to promote equity across regional states and rectify the neglect of rural areas relative to


urban areas. As a result, the implementation of a wide range of policies and programs was assigned to the regions. As regionalization and later woreda decentralization were being carried out, it was clear that the capacity to deliver public services varied widely. All regions had huge staffing and communication deficits. The government's strategy

for addressing these issues centered mainly on the Civil Service Reform Program.

50. The adoption of these decentralization policies increased the need to expand the number of civil service staff. As a result, over the past decade the civil service in Ethiopia has seen a significant and rapid expansion in staff numbers, at rates higher than population growth in particular. This follows a decade of relatively more gradual expansion

from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s (see Figure 2.1). This rapid expansion of the civil service was associated with a very large volume of recruitment to support regional and woreda decentralization and the expansion in service delivery. As reflected in Figure 2.4 below, in some recent years, the civil service has absorbed around 150,000 new recruits. While spread across different functional areas and levels of government, this is still a large number of staff to absorb into any civil service.

Figure 2.1: Population growth and civil service expansion




Source	Government of Ethiopia and WDI/World Bank (population).
Note	The red line indicates population growth, with a corresponding axis on the left; the blue line indicates the growth in civil service staffing, with a corresponding axis on the right.

51. While expanding the civil service at a rapid pace, the government has sought to contain the overall wage bill. The overall development model being pursued has strongly emphasized strengthening infrastructure. Doing so has required

focusing available fiscal (and lending) resources on capital expenditures. Despite a period of rapid expansion in the number of civil servants through 2012/13, the wage bill declined but has again increased somewhat in recent years.

Figure 2.2: Wage bill to GDP ratio




Source World Bank staff calculations based on the Government of Ethiopia's fiscal data (data not available for the years 2005 to 2008).

52. The share of the wage bill relative to GDP is at the low end compared to other countries, while relative to total expenditures it is on the higher end due to the low overall levels of spending.

Most countries for which data is available have wage bills exceeding 5 percent of GDP (Figure 2.3 – grey bars), reaching 10 percent of GDP in the African countries for which comparative data is available. For Ethiopia, the share has been below 5

percent of GDP, and most recently just above. This is consistent with the government's intention to use scarce fiscal resources as much as possible to fund investments that can help to propel growth. Given Ethiopia's still rather low revenue collection and overall low ratio of total public expenditures to GDP, the wage bill takes up 25 percent of total public expenditures, which is in line with cross-regional averages (Figure 2.3 – blue bars).

Figure 2.3: Comparative data on wage bills relative to GDP, and general government revenue and expenditures




Source World Bank Database on public sector wage bills (2015).

53. A further important feature is the fact that the rapid expansion of the civil service has been associated with a very large volume of recruitment in recent years. As reflected in Figure 2.4, in recent years the civil service has absorbed around

150,000 new recruits, which is a large number. Furthermore, consistent with the fact that the civil service has seen a recent strong expansion, the age profile is that of a predominantly young civil service, especially at subnational levels.

Figure 2.4: Annual expansion of the civil service in Ethiopia 1992-2014

Number of additional civil servants per year




Source Government of Ethiopia, data on the civil service.

54. At sub-national levels, 61 percent of the civil service are 32 years old or younger, with the largest age group being those in their mid-20s (23 to 27 year olds account for 29 percent of civil servants at sub-national levels). At the federal level, 38 percent of civil servants are below the age of 32. As in many other countries, the single largest cohort of public servants are teachers and health professionals. Across government levels, federal civil servants account for about 125,000, and sub-national civil servants for the remainder of 1,200,000. Just over one third of public sector employees are female.

55. As has been explored in a recent study on urban labor markets, public sector employees tend to be educated at the secondary or post-secondary level to a much higher degree than those working in the private sector. Among urban workers surveyed, 87 percent of those working in the public sector had secondary or post-secondary education, compared to only 39 percent of those working in the private sector (including both formal and informal private sector employment). The educational qualifications of public sector employees have increased over the past decade.

Figure 2.5: Public versus private employees by education levels



Source World Bank staff calculations using UEUS 2014 (WB Urban Labor Market study)

2.1.1 Size and staff composition of the five sectors covered

56. The approximate staff sizes for each of the five sectors covered in this analysis are the following:

- (i) Education - with over 420,000 staff, it is the largest sector in terms of staff size
- (ii) Health - 130,000 staff
- (iii) Agriculture - 80,000 staff
- (iv) Trade - 19,000 staff
- (v) Revenue - 15,000 staff¹¹

57. Each sector comprises of a federal-level ministry or headquarters, as well as regional bureaus and woreda-level offices. At the federal level, organizational size ranges from 441 staff at the Federal Ministry of Trade to 1,401 at the Federal Ministry of Agriculture.¹² As Ethiopia's regions are highly unequal in size, sub-national staffing numbers vary substantially from region to region - with Oromia, SNNPR, Amhara and Tigray

being regions with large staff complements, and the others being much smaller in terms of staff. Public sector reforms are spearheaded at the federal level by dedicated reform directorates.

58. As noted in Section 1.2., the survey undertaken for this report has mainly focused on civil service staff in policy making and supervision functions, but also includes the perspectives of staff from just two sectors who interface directly with clients. The survey covers ERCA and trade staff at regional and woreda bureaus who, in their day-to-day activities, have direct contact with clients. However, the civil servants interviewed from the agriculture, education, and health sectors did not directly engage in frontline activities such as extension services, teaching, or health care. Instead, staff from these sectors played a role in the transmission of policies and the monitoring, supervision, and support of front-line implementation.¹³

¹¹ In addition to staff directly mapped to the federal level ministries and to regional bureaus there are additional staff in sector specific colleges and research institutes (e.g. for agriculture).

¹² As of 2014, the most recent year for which detailed statistics were available.

¹³ For cost reasons, front line staff in distributed service delivery units could not be covered.

59. The survey findings are complemented by qualitative analysis. This has included the review of background materials for each of the five sectors covered, discussions with key informants about

sector issues and challenges related to staff capacity, management, and performance, as well as focus group discussions with 'Public Wing' representatives. The findings, sector-by-sector, are set out in Annex 1.

2.2 Wage and non-wage benefits¹⁴

60. One key implication of rising staff numbers combined with the government's efforts to keep the overall wage bill in check is that remuneration levels have remained low. The minimum salary has been gradually increased from ETB 300 to ETB 615 in recent years, and the maximum salary from ETB 3,000 to ETB 5,780. According to exchange rates as of March 2016, salaries range from USD 30 to around USD 300 per month for civil servants. This presents challenges for civil servants, particularly in urban areas where the cost of living has accelerated more rapidly than salaries have been adjusted. Salary levels are periodically reviewed by the MPSHRD, and any changes have to be decided upon by the Council of Ministers.

the upper single digits, and are projected to stay at around 8 percent annually over the coming years.

61. According to the Civil Service Proclamation, civil servants are eligible for wage increments every two years. However, the government stopped providing such increments in 2003. Since then, the practice has been to announce larger scale wage increases on an occasional basis, sometimes for all civil servants, and sometimes for specific employment categories, such as teachers, who received a specific wage increase in 2016. Relatively high inflation means that without wage increases, civil servants experience a continuous loss in purchasing power. This was particularly pronounced in 2012 when inflation ran at over 30 percent. Inflation rates have declined since then to

62. The government has been cautious about wage increases, out of a concern to (i) contain recurrent expenditures, (ii) avoid fueling inflation, and (iii) contain private sector wage pressures. Recurrent expenditures were reduced in recent years from close to 15 percent of GDP to 7.5 percent of GDP by 2013/14.¹⁵ Most recently, recurrent expenditures re-increased somewhat to 10.8 percent of GDP for 2015/16. The main thrust has been towards capital expenditures to finance infrastructure expansion. To address the fear that wage increases for civil servants can further fuel inflation, the government has explored options for non-wage benefits such as a transport system for civil servants in Addis Ababa (see below).

63. Instead of regular wage increments, the government has provided wage adjustments every couple of years, but these have generally only partially compensated for purchasing power losses due to inflation. Earlier wage increases were approved in 2002 and in 2007, followed by an increase in 2011 (30 percent), in 2014 and again in 2017. However, these increases only (partially) compensate for losses in purchasing power due to inflation, rather than representing a real increase in wage levels. By regional comparison, professional-level civil service salaries in Ethiopia still remain low.

¹⁴ This discussion refers only to staff employed in the civil service, and not to staff employed in state owned enterprises, i.e. the 'wider public sector'.

¹⁵ The concern for private sector wages is to avoid increases ahead of productivity improvements. However, productivity may be affected by a variety of policies such as barriers to entry and exit.

64. Comparisons with average private sector wages suggest that Ethiopia, as with many other countries, has a public sector wage premium, but this has narrowed or even reversed over time.¹⁶

While public sector staff earn more than private sector employees on *average*, the difference between the salaries of government and full time private sector employees is limited and has been shrinking. Moreover, when controlling for job characteristics, private sector pay has surpassed that of the public sector in recent years. It is also important to keep in mind that both public and private sector wages in Ethiopia are among the lowest globally.

65. Worldwide data assembled by the World Bank's Bureaucracy Lab indicates that while there is a wage premium, both public and private sector wages are low in Ethiopia.¹⁷

The data suggests an average public sector wage premium that is sizable in relative terms as measured (65 percent). At the same time, private sector wages in Ethiopia are the fourth lowest of all countries for which data is available;¹⁸ while public sector wages are the fifth lowest globally, and the third lowest in SSA.¹⁹ Furthermore, it is noticeable that Rwanda, which pursues a development model similar to that of Ethiopia and which has similar private sector wage levels, has substantially higher public sector wages (and accordingly a particularly large relative wage premium in favor of the public sector). Differences between data sources and information about public sector wage adjustments suggests that the public sector wage premium in Ethiopia fluctuates over time, as private and public wages adjust to inflation differently over time.²⁰

66. In the survey, a substantial share of staff responded that salaries are better in the private sector than in the public.

For example, for the federal level, around 60 percent of respondents in the agriculture and education sectors thought that wages were an advantage when working in the private sector. Thus, while there may be an *average* premium of public over private sector wages, this may not be true across wage scales and specific professional profiles. For some, income opportunities may be substantially higher outside the public sector - while job security is perceived to be lower in the private sector (see section 5).²¹

67. From the perspective of MDAs and of individual civil servants, low wages are a key issue.

In nearly all interviews with key informants who are heads or directors in MDAs, the issue emerges that low wages hinder attracting and retaining capable and motivated staff. Technically and managerially more highly skilled staff appear to remain rare, as hiring constraints of such staff are also reported in private sector surveys.²² In the 2016 ECSS, 75 percent of staff responded that they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their salaries, with somewhat greater satisfaction at the regional level (about 30 percent satisfied or very satisfied). Poor pay and benefits are also raised as the biggest driver of staff turnover in the civil service survey across levels and sectors, with the exception for ERCA employees at regional levels;²³ and it was by far the most frequent issue raised in response to an open ended question about why staff might feel less motivated currently than when entering the public service (raised by just over 20 percent of respondents).

¹⁶ Based on a 2016 World Bank study on urban labor markets.

¹⁷ The database assembles private and public sector wages as of 2011 in PPP terms for about 90 countries.

¹⁸ Slightly lower private sector wages are recorded for Rwanda, Liberia and Botswana.

¹⁹ Lower public sector wages are recorded for DR Congo, Georgia, Liberia, Tajikistan.

²⁰ Also, different wages paid by institution/ministry make comparisons between public and private sector wages more complex; see Annex 1 for a discussion of sector-by-sector issues.

²¹ In addition to the regular private sector there are at least two other relevant types of employment, in particular for federal level staff: (i) employment with SOEs, and (ii) for some staff categories, employment with regional organizations.

²² World Bank Economic Update IV.

²³ ERCA staff has received a special wage regime to address challenges of spreading corruption and high turnover in this function.

68. While wages and benefits stand out as a clear constraint, operations and maintenance expenditures are also very low, and increasing these selectively may be even more important.

As is discussed further in Chapter 4, staff identify a lack of resources as an important impediment on effectiveness, as well as a source of dissatisfaction. This concern expressed by civil servants is consistent with findings from the 2016 Public Expenditure Review (PER) that raised the low level of Operations and Maintenance (O&M) expenditures as a key constraint. As discussed as part of the recommendations, the GoE will need to consider carefully where to allocate additional fiscal resources, given that there are multiple competing demands. Focused O&M expenditures are potentially very important as they feed both into the quality and timeliness of service delivery, as well as the motivation of public service staff.

69. Civil servants in Ethiopia enjoy some non-wage benefits, but these are rather small in value and limited in nature compared to other countries. The main benefits are (i) a public sector pension scheme that has been in place since 1963, (ii) a transportation system created for civil

servants at the federal level in Addis Ababa, and (iii) some preferential treatment for the 'housing lottery' organized for Addis Ababa.

2.2.1 Pensions²⁴

70. The usual retirement age for public servants and private sector employees is 60 years. The minimum service requirement for an employee to be eligible for pension is 10 years and the pension will be effective when s/he attains retirement age. Public sector pensions for civil servants are managed by the Public Servants Social Security Agency (PSSSA).²⁵ The pension is a defined benefit plan. It is only partially funded from contributions, and given that it has been in existence for several decades, it is facing increasing financial pressures. The conditions of this public sector pension scheme are in line with those common in the region in terms of contribution rates, retirement age, and so on. A private sector pension scheme was introduced much later (only in 2011), but has essentially the same conditions as the public sector pension scheme. Thus, from an employee's perspective, there is no greater benefit associated with being in the public sector scheme.

Table 2.1: Public and private sector pension plans in Ethiopia

Pension fund	Employer	Employer	Replacement rates after 30/40 years	Survivor pension	Normal retirement age
Civil service	11	7	55/68	Widow/er 50%; orphan 20% each	60 (55 with 25 years of service)
Private Employees	11	7	55/68	Widow/er 50%; orphan 20% each	60 (55 with 25 years of service)
Military and Police	25	7	63/80	Spouse 50%; orphan 20% each	Determined by military and police decrees

Source World Bank (2017).

²⁴ This section draws on the report by Palacio on the pension system in Ethiopia.

²⁵ A separate pension scheme is in place for the military and the police.

71. Despite a large (80 percent) increase in the minimum pension in 2014, the level of pensions being paid remains rather low. Based on the reported spending and estimated number of pensioners, the average pension would be ETB 503 or roughly US\$20 per month – less than the absolute poverty line of \$1.25 per day.²⁶

72. The low pensions reflect the historically low wages that have existed (most pensions are based on the wages of employees who had retired during the last few decades), as well as the lack of indexation against inflation – so that pensions lose significant purchasing power over time.²⁷ While the minimum pension is equivalent to 86.4 percent of the minimum wage, the ratio of the average pension to the average wage appears to be much lower. While data are not available, this implies a very flat distribution of pensions, with most of those who retired more than a few years ago receiving the minimum. This is largely due to the lack of automatic indexation, which results in older pensioners receiving the minimum.²⁸ Aside from this effect, the lack of the indexation of pensions means that the relationship between contributions and benefits is very weak. A public sector employee who has contributed twice as much as another employee (because s/he had a higher gross salary) will eventually receive the same minimum pension as the second employee. It also means that many civil servants could have done better saving on their own rather than contributing to the pension scheme.

73. Average pensions paid out from the still new private sector scheme are significantly larger than those paid from the public scheme due to the lack of indexation and higher wages being paid in the (formal) private sector. Since pension accruals are

completely portable between the public and private sector schemes, it is possible that some senior government employees with long contribution histories may leave the public service and join a private firm at a much higher salary. Pensions are calculated based on final wages so that the calculation could yield a much higher pension.

2.2.2 Health insurance

74. Plans have been prepared to introduce social health insurance since 2010 (Proclamation 690/2010). The government sought to introduce this first on a mandatory basis for civil servants with a contribution rate of 3 percent of salaries, combined with a government subsidy. However, civil servants protested that their wages are already so low that they cannot make such an insurance contribution.²⁹ The actual introduction of the scheme has been postponed. Civil servants can access free public health care as other citizens. While such free health care remains of relatively low quality, civil servants appear concerned that making an insurance contribution will not give them access to better quality care. As for the pension system, the social health insurance scheme is also open to formal private sector employees, but again the incentives to use the scheme are limited.

2.2.3 Allowances

75. The main allowances provided are those for domestic travel, but for most staff, these are below actual costs in many instances. The rates have been traditionally (too) low, i.e. insufficient to meet the actual costs of accommodation and meals (NORAD 2012). Per diem rates are differentiated by salary levels, and are particularly inadequate for

²⁶ The average is lower than the minimum pension which is probably due to a relatively high proportion of survivors' pensions which are equivalent to 50 percent of the original pension for spouses and 20 percent for orphans.

²⁷ See for example, <http://ethiopiaobservatory.com/2014/06/08/pensioning-in-ethiopia-no-country-for-old-men/>.

²⁸ In principle, pensions are adjusted every five years. This increment is the fifth since the EPRDF government came into power. In 1992/93, an amendment was made to the lower salary of the civil servants, from 50 Br to 150 Br. There were also further increments in 2000/01, 2006/07 and 2010/11. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201408060369.html>.

²⁹ See e.g.: Getting Better: Is the New Health Reform the Cure? *Ethiopian Business Review* 2014, no. 12.

lower-level staff. As a consequence of low per diems, management routinely allows staff to overstate the number of days needed for a trip. Staff have become more reluctant to undertake any travel since per diem rates are so inadequate. Furthermore, donor and government per diems diverge substantially, and the per diem rates also vary from project to project (under 'Channel 1', i.e. project support). Sitting allowances are not available to most regular civil servants. Neither the government nor development partners pay sitting allowances for work or project-related meetings or reviews.

2.2.4 Transportation

76. A transport benefit was phased in during 2014, based on a plan developed by the MPSHRD, for civil servants in Addis Ababa. It is managed through a Public Service Employees Transport Service Enterprise (PSETSE), which was created as a public enterprise for this purpose. Buses travel along 26 routes all the way to outlying/suburban areas of Addis Ababa. The light blue colored buses became widely visible throughout Addis Ababa in 2015-2016. To provide some funding for this scheme, buses operate on a fee basis during the day for the general public.

2.2.5 Preferential participation in the housing lottery

77. Housing has become a significant challenge in Addis Ababa and other large cities in Ethiopia. In principle, housing constructed with government funds are provided on a lottery basis, i.e. it is not an entitlement or a waiting list with a (more or less) predictable date for receiving housing.

78. The government began registering interested parties for the housing lottery in 2005, setting aside a share of the housing for civil servants. Actual lotteries are held at irregular intervals whenever a batch of housing nears completion. In 2015, the lottery was held in March and allocated 35,000 housing units (from studios to 3-bedroom condos). In the general lottery, 20 percent (i.e. about 7,000 condos at current rates of 'production') are set aside for civil servants, relative to the total number of federal civil servants (100,000, plus 65,000 civil servants working for the Addis Ababa City Government).³⁰ So the chances of winning in the lottery are still quite limited for a civil servant. When being allocated a condo through the lottery, winners must make a 20 percent contribution towards the price of the condo.

79. Benefits and opportunities are significantly better for senior government officials (i.e. political appointees). The benefit package for Ministers and State Ministers includes government provided housing, as well as land to construct housing on. In addition, it is common for ministers and state ministers to be members of the Board for various public enterprises, and significant allowances are paid for this function.

80. There are various plans and considerations to expand the benefit packages for civil servants; e.g. to provide teachers moving to remote areas with a housing option or with land on which housing can be constructed. Generally, the government considers the provision of additional benefits as less prone to stimulating inflation than increasing the monetary wage of civil servants.

³⁰ Most, but not all federal civil servants reside in Addis Ababa. Some may be posted to border offices of ERCA etc.

81. Overall, regular civil servants receive low salaries, as well as rather limited benefits in Ethiopia. In a context of at least 8-10 percent consumer price inflation per year, they also face year-to-year uncertainty with regards to the purchasing power of

wages or pensions. Despite these limited benefits, the civil service by and large has still been able to attract staff, as the large expansion in recent years indicates, although there are resulting challenges to retaining and motivating staff as discussed further below.





82. This chapter uses the Ethiopia Civil Servants Survey (ECSS) 2016, in combination with other public service delivery data and information from interviews, to analyze civil service reforms in Ethiopia. It focuses mainly on past and current reform tools initiated by the Government of Ethiopia to implement the Civil Service Reform Program. In particular, the

chapter focuses on the following reform tools and covers them individually: The Business Process Reengineering (BPR); the Balanced Scorecard (BSC); the Change Army; and the Citizens Charter. It attempts to understand the perceptions that civil servants have of the reform tools, their achievements, how these relate to each other and how successfully they

were implemented. It also includes a review of the impacts of the reforms on management

practices and provides global and regional perspectives on the reforms.

3.1 Brief overview of global and regional experiences with public service reforms to situate Ethiopia's reform approaches

83. Achieving progress with civil service reforms in low income countries has posed major challenges and is perceived as having yielded only mixed results over the past two to three decades (Andrews 2013; Therkildsen 2006). Low government effectiveness and corruption continue to be widely diagnosed in many countries. However, there are also partial indicators of progress (World Bank 2008; DFID, Irish Aid, and Swedish International Development Agency 2013; Blum 2014). On average, government effectiveness in low income countries has slightly declined rather than improved in recent years (see Figure 3.6). However, it has to be kept in mind that a number of countries moved from low- to lower-middle-income status, and hence there has been a slight trend towards improvements among those countries.

84. Against this background, Ethiopia stands out as a country that has undertaken extensive civil service reforms during the last 20 years and with some documented positive impacts. In particular,

Ethiopia has deployed a range of approaches that broadly fall into the category of 'New Public Management'.³¹ The main successive reform tools include Business Process Re-engineering (BPR), Balanced Scorecard (BSC), Citizens Charters, as well as the introduction of a Change Army. While both BPR and BSC are classic 'New Public Management' style reforms, and also widely found in other countries seeking to strengthen civil service performance, the Change Army is a more Ethiopia-specific approach. These reform initiatives were usually centrally planned within the party and rolled-out in accordance to a predetermined plan. They tend to lack strategic communication tools that foster key stakeholder collaboration and network building mechanisms so that civil servants, the private sector, and civil society can support the reform.

85. The reform tools used and their impacts as perceived by civil servants as well as key informant interviewees are discussed in detail below.



³¹ One of the frequently cited concerns in the literature is that NPM-inspired reforms were not successful or even had negative consequences in low income countries because (i) they were undertaken in response to conditionality, and (ii) they induced 'isomorphic mimicry' (i.e. imitating a standard) rather than real reforms (Andrews 2013). However, while reforms in Ethiopia have been externally supported, the selection and pursuit were very much internally decided.

3.2 Initial reform period in Ethiopia

86. The structural adjustment program carried out by the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) included a review of the civil service. The review identified and implemented retrenchment, and supported the design of appropriate structures to eventually devolve functions and personnel to regional administrations. With the enactment of the new Constitution in 1994, the federal government initiated regionalization by devolving powers from the federal government to the ethnically organized regional state governments. The civil service review that took place in the early days of the TGE removed the national civil service elite that had remained from the past regime,³² which meant that most of the systems were either abandoned or couldn't be made functional. Thus, even as regionalization was being carried out, it was clear that the government's capacity to collect revenue and deliver development initiatives across the country varied widely, and that all regions experienced a huge staffing problem.³³ The government's strategy for addressing these issues and the rapid growth of civil service (as discussed in Chapter 2) centered mainly on civil service reform.

87. The Ethiopian government's first major attempt to reform the civil service started in November 1994 with the creation of a task force in the Prime Minister's Office (PMO).³⁴ The task force undertook an in-depth review and identified a number of weaknesses as to how top management set strategic priorities and monitored and evaluated performance in the implementation of development policies, programs, and projects, as well as the manner in which the civil service managed its human and financial resources and

delivered services to the public. It also identified the lack of a proper arrangement to ensure ethical behavior and tackle corruption, embezzlement, and fraud in government.

88. The task force findings and recommendations were reported to the Ethiopian government in January 1996. The Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) was launched with the objective of creating a fair, ethical, effective, efficient, transparent and accountable civil service. This was to be achieved through strengthening institutional and human resource capacity; developing and installing new and improved legislations and working systems; introducing a culture of good governance; and enhancing performance in public service delivery. It comprised of five major program areas: a) Top Management System Reform Sub-Program; b) Human Resources Management System Reform Sub-Program; c) Service Delivery Reform Sub-Program; d) Expenditure Management and Control System Reform Sub-Program; and (e) Ethics Reform Sub-Program.³⁵ The government started to enact legislations, directives, and guidelines to improve the internal processes of the civil service.

89. The internal dissent within the party and subsequent first renewal process of the ruling party in 2001 was a key milestone in setting the country's overall direction. An important ideological decision was made in 2001 in favor of the 'developmental state'. Adopting such a model further emphasized the need for a professional and reliable civil service, consistent with the experience of earlier developmental states in East Asia (Evans 1995, Vu 2007, World Bank 2013³⁶). The wider

³² July 2010, Assessment of the Implementation of the Civil Service Reform Program in Ethiopia, Ministry of Capacity Building.

³³ May 27, 1993; IDA Credit to Support Structural Adjustment in the Ethiopian Economy, World Bank.

³⁴ Reform efforts in the 1990s are elaborated in the annex.

³⁵ May 2004, "Akem" "Capacity", A Quarterly Bilingual Magazine Volume 1 No. 1, Ministry of Capacity Building.

³⁶ International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and World Bank, 2013. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: Ethiopia Public Sector Reform Approach Building the Developmental State - A Review and Assessment of the Ethiopian Approach to Public Sector Reform. AFTP2, Report No: ACS3695. World Bank: Washington DC.

and more critical the role adopted by the state in pursuing social and economic transformation, the more the state apparatus needs to be capable and act with integrity, so as to avoid becoming a source of distortions, unproductive rent-seeking, and 'government failure'. With this in the background, the government, using a "big push" approach, moved to the second phase of decentralization by devolving service delivery to woredas/districts. The need to expand the number of those in civil service and build their capacity, as well as to develop institutions at a sub-national level, became an issue of immense importance in discussions of Ethiopia's social and economic transformation during this time. A new Super Ministry of Capacity Building was established to coordinate all civil service reforms, including the CSRP.

90. Although the CSRP's five components and vision have remained unchanged since its inception, the reform tools used to achieve its objectives and the emphasis given to each component have seen successive evolution. In the early years, following the initiation of the CSRP in 1996, efforts mainly focused on addressing internal administrative issues (legislations, FM, Ethics) with very limited impact on performance and service delivery to citizens. Starting from September 2002, the Ethiopian government launched more outward looking initiatives that initially followed a Civil Service Action Plan comprised of the following elements: i) the development of a *Service Delivery Policy*, in which service providers are encouraged to be more customer focused through the 'Quick Wins' initiative (the Quick Wins approach incorporates short-term actions needed to deliver improved business processes and addresses identified organizational weaknesses with relatively few resources); ii) the implementation of a *Result-Oriented Performance Appraisal*, whereby supervisors and staff are expected to agree on individual work plans and monitor their performance against these; and iii) the introduction of *Strategic Planning and Management*, according to which all public organizations are required to develop a strategic plan that mainly encompasses the development of

the organizations' mission, vision, and strategies.

91. The detailed elements of the CSRP Action Plan include the following:


- Staff awareness of CSRP
- Service delivery policy
- Formulating a mission statement
- Promoting awareness among front-line staff
- Publicizing services to identified users
- Facilitating access for users
- Coordinating related services
- Establishing a complaints procedure
- Consulting with users
- Setting service standards
- Developing cost effective services
- Results-oriented appraisal system
- Ethics and anti-corruption actions
- Organizational assessment
- Self-assessment of strengths and weaknesses
- Stakeholder analysis (including a client survey)
- Analysis of the gap between actual and expected services
- Environmental analysis
- Service Improvement Action Plan

92. The implementation of the CSRP Action Plan, through the above-indicated reform tools, brought a number of new ideas into the civil service. The Quick Wins approach brought about greater customer orientation in government offices through the introduction of name tags, information counters, and suggestion boxes; the appropriate labeling of offices; and the posting of the office's mission, vision, and values in a visible manner. The approach also facilitated the initial efforts to reduce work steps in providing services. The introduction of the employee *Result Oriented Performance Appraisal System* (ROPAS) introduced formal performance targets to be agreed upon by staff and supervisors, while the strategic planning process established higher-level objectives within public organizations, albeit with a weak link between the two (i.e., individual and organizational objectives). While a number of these early improvements have been sustained (e.g., clear labelling of offices, wearing

of name tags), others that did not initially take root were further pursued through subsequent reform efforts, notably with regards to performance management and complaints mechanisms. Anxious

to make a quick impact, in 2005/06, the federal government deepened and accelerated CSRP throughout the civil service with the introduction of the BPR tool.

Figure 3.1: Timeline of reform tools



61. Figure 3.1 illustrates a timeline of the various civil service reform efforts undertaken by the Ethiopian government.

3.3 Reform processes since 2005/2006

3.3.1 Business process reengineering (BPR)


93. Given the Ethiopian civil service's starting point as an overly hierarchical and overly input based institution, the federal government made the sweeping decision to initiate the BPR across all government agencies, to achieve significant change and establish the rapidly expanding civil service on a new footing. From a comparative perspective,

BPR is part of the wave of New Public Management inspired reforms (for a comparative overview, see Pollitt and Bouckaert 2000/2011). Typically, BPR is seen as being at the more 'radical' end of NPM initiatives, pursued by countries especially interested in importing private sector practices into the civil service and in reducing the distinctions between the two, such as New Zealand, Australia, and the UK (Pollit and Bouckaert 2011, 116). Apart

from these core NPM countries, Ethiopia has been one of the most prominent adopters of BPR as a key approach for civil service reforms. Given the diversity of applications globally, there is no comprehensive assessment of how successful BPR reforms have fared in public or in private sectors. In one assessment, Jurisch et al. (2012) note that 60 to 80 percent of BPR efforts fail to achieve their goals, but also note that BPR can be a valuable and much-needed tool for public administrations.

94. The BPR specifically is based on the ideas of Michael Hammer, a US management theorist coming from the field of computer science (see Assefa 2009).³⁷ It was intended to radically and fundamentally transform the business diamond of civil service organizations, which includes process, jobs and structure, management and measurement systems, and values and beliefs.

Figure 3.2: The core functions of the BPR



³⁷ Hammer was a professor of Computer Science at MIT who in 1990 published an influential article 'Reengineering Work: don't automate, obliterate' in the Harvard Business Review; which argued that efficient processes were key to a company's success in the 21st century.

95. The BPR initiated by the Ethiopian federal government identified four stages for the change process- i) planning; ii) understanding; iii) redesigning; and iv) implementation. The planning stage was used to create a shared vision and system of beliefs, values, and attitudes within an organization to initiate the change process. Staff were exhorted to believe that the true job of a public servant was to provide service, and to demonstrate this new and improved attitude to customers. Staff confessed to or accounted for less than acceptable performance. This was followed by an effort to understand the causes, effects, and magnitude of the problems associated with old business processes and systems using inputs from both internal and external stakeholders. During the redesigning stage, staff and management developed new processes and systems (manuals, new and improved legal frameworks, process charters, etc.) and structures (jobs, skills, competency framework, etc.), based on best practices, customers' expectations, and the principles of process-based organizations. The implementation stage basically executed the framework agreed upon during the earlier stages.

96. Given the starting point in Ethiopia, where the civil service was known as overly hierarchical and input based, aspiring to implement BPR was a sweeping decision, seeking to achieve significant change and to establish the rapidly expanding public sector on a new footing. Overall, top leaders across tiers of government and sectors have positive feedback on the implementation and the effects reform tools have had on civil service organizations across the board with only few concerns. Around 80 percent of the interviewed heads of ministries, bureaus and offices agree to some extent that the reform efforts by the government focus on the right things and real problems.

97. Indeed, the BPR reform tool changed the "hard" elements of organizations such as the strategy, structures and system. Some 80-90 percent of surveyed organization heads agree to some extent that the BPR transformed the organizational structure, improved service-delivery standards,

and reduced processing times; 60-70 percent of organization heads have also reported that the BPR increased the use of IT in organizations. Although organization heads agree to some extent that BPR improved workplace attitudes and teamwork, the results in relation to the "soft" elements like shared values, staffing/skills, incentives, and flexibility seem to be less tangible, as discussed in the management practices section (Section 3.6).

98. Around half of the organization heads surveyed suggested that BPR implementation was constrained due to rushed planning; lack of interlinkage with other reform tools; and weak monitoring. Some 35 percent of organization heads disagree to some extent that reforms are customized to the specific nature of the organizations, which was also confirmed by the qualitative interview. Organizations that have direct interface with citizens seemed to benefit more from the BPR. Survey results indicate that BPR reforms had a significant impact for the trade sector, which is consistent with its particular role of issuing licenses and similar tasks. Especially federal- and regional-level staff agree that processes were dissolved or changed, and that processing times were reduced.

99. Similarly, a merger of the three entities responsible for revenue collection as a result of BPR helped to reap efficiencies and streamline processes, including with regards to trade facilitation, i.e. by making the settling of customs and tax obligations and refunds easier. ERCA sustained the structure suggested by the BPR and there is a continuing need for ongoing Business Process improvements. On the other hand, BPR reform is currently seen as not having been a 'good fit' for the education sector, and having resulted in some capacity losses that had to be subsequently recouped. Similarly, the significant cut in staff numbers was associated with a loss of capacity at the Ministry of Agriculture, as well as the creation of some wider resentment and concern about civil service reforms, and the BPR in particular. In health, the application of BPR in the sector mainly focused on analyzing institutional

structures and human resources in health. Survey results indicate that compared to other sectors, the view that BPR reforms achieved its objective of reduced processing times is less common in the health sector and the structures before the reform have now been reinstated in most of the cases.

3.3.2 After the BPR - current reforms

69. Subsequently, efforts evolved towards a greater emphasis on the measurement of public service

Balanced Scorecard (BSC)

100. Building on earlier efforts to establish strategic planning norms and an employee results-oriented performance appraisal system, the federal government introduced the BSC in 2008. The BSC is being used as a planning/target setting, change management, and communication tool, and is also considered as an opportunity to embed strategic management principles into the strategic plan. The BSC incorporates the higher-level goals identified by the country's Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) and tries to operationalize these goals through a cascading process of setting targets and disaggregating them by specific units and roles. As part of this process, public organizations incorporated BSC measures within strategic sector plans.

101. In 2012, the civil service's "Individual Employee Performance Management and Measurement" directive was incorporated into the BSC. The management of individual

performance using the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) tool, which aims to align individual and organizational performance. Performance accountability and transparency are also being sought through the introduction of the Change Army, under which the government seeks to unite the party, state, and society to achieve the GTP, and Citizens Charters, a document that represents a systematic effort to focus on the commitment of public service providers towards their users with respect to standards of service, information, and grievance redress mechanisms.

performance is now being addressed through a system of individual performance agreements that are linked to team and organizational targets derived from the four dimensions of the BSC. These include: i) finance, ii) learning and growth; iii) client/customer satisfaction, and iv) processes (time volume, frequency). The first set of annual performance agreements for individuals were signed in July 2012. Currently 60 percent of the score is allocated towards achieving the agreed upon specific tasks and goals, while 40 percent is dedicated to attitude or behavioral aspects (this can also be seen as a reaction to earlier criticism of assessments introduced by the BPR that were seen as overemphasizing 'attitudes'). Thus, the BSC seeks to create direct links between employees' performance and the strategy of an organization towards its clients/citizens, budget/stewardship, internal processes, and learning and growth. Both employee and organization performance reviews are carried out twice a year, in December and June.

The BSC incorporates the higher goals identified by the country's GTP.

Change Army and the establishment of Public Wings

102. The Change Army aims to mobilize communities and organize their contributions in support of the country's development goals (GTP). Following its pilot in the rural areas, the Change Army has, since 2012, been streamlined into the civil service to bring about national consensus by involving the party, state, and citizens in its three wings, namely the Party Wing, State Wing, and Public Wing.

103. The Party Wing is concerned with building a national consensus on the country's development strategy, and the civil service is one of the key players in this discourse. The Party Wing is responsible for providing orientation programs to enable civil service members to fully grasp and effectively execute government policies and strategies. However, this study did not cover the activities of the Party Wing extensively.

104. The State Wing (civil service) consists of five levels: individual civil servants, 'model' civil servants, lower-level leadership, middle-level leadership, and top leadership. At the lowest level, the '1 to 5' members are grouped together based on their work processes and led by a 'model' civil servant (i.e., someone identified as an effective performer). These model civil servants conduct daily/weekly peer reviews and evaluate the group's performance. This is expected to create a mechanism to coach junior staff and improve attitudes by putting peer pressure on civil servants. The outcomes of these weekly discussions are presented to the lower-level leadership that constitutes of the lead civil servants from the '1 to 5' groups, and/or the middle-level group that constitutes of directors. The highest level, the Council, constitutes of top managers and directors and meets at least monthly. The Council also

meets monthly with all staff members to discuss performance reports and resolve internal issues, and with the Public Wing on a quarterly basis.

105. The Public Wing is a platform that constitutes of clients; associations for youth, women, and professionals; cooperatives; private sector representatives; and others identified as relevant by government ministries, agencies, and bureaus.

On a quarterly basis, Public Wing members meet with the State Wing (typically represented by a minister or state minister at the federal level³⁸) to discuss strategic plans and their implementation, the objectives set, the service standards agreed upon by the Citizens Charter, as well as new policy recommendations and issues related to rent seeking.

106. Focus group discussions with Public Wing representatives in four out of the five sectors covered indicate that while the consultations are overall appreciated, they also still have a number of weaknesses. Public Wing members feel that their potential is not always fully harnessed and their capacity to be an effective partner to the government is constrained by the Charities and Societies Proclamation of 2009 (otherwise known as the CSO law), which restricts professional associations in terms of financing. Contributions from association members are minimal, and they are not allowed to accept more than 10 percent of their budget from foreign organizations. As a result, they have had to return money from non-member sources due to this restriction. When capacitated, a potential role exists for professional associations in re-licensing and continuous professional development issues, as experiences show from other countries.

³⁸ Reform directorates from the respective Ministries and agencies hold a secretariat role.

Citizens' Charters

107. The Citizens Charter enables government institutions to enter agreements with the general public on the roles and responsibilities of the providers and service users, the manner in which public services have to be delivered, and the modalities in which complaints will be resolved. The idea of accountability to citizens is a relatively new concept in the Ethiopian civil service and there was no established system through which this could be strengthened. Despite the government's efforts to establish structures to enhance citizens' engagement, the space for participation as well as the willingness of citizens to be actively involved and demand for better services is limited, although one can say that both have seen some encouraging trends.

108. The basic principles of the Citizens Charter were first embraced by organizations as part of the BPR process. All civil service institutions were encouraged to establish

service standards in consultation with clients. Many organizations started to publicize these standards prominently through noticeboards at the entrance of public offices. However, there was no systematic monitoring of the organization's actual performance against these standards. This led to significant variance downward from the standards set under BPR in 2007/08. The government is now trying to re-institute the service delivery standards under BPR through a formalized Citizens Charter. The Citizens Charter, where it is implemented, is published and disseminated to users using different mechanisms, including notice boards posted where services are provided.

109. An example of taking steps beyond Citizens' Charters and creating a 'right to public services' is summarized in Box 3.1. The Indian experience highlights an effort to further strengthen the rights of citizens vis-à-vis service providers.



Box 3.1: The Indian experience with a 'Right to Public Services Act'

Growing public dissatisfaction with the delivery of essential public services has been a worrying phenomenon in India in the last two decades. Large numbers of citizens often face ad-hoc service rules, denial or delayed action, while applying to government agencies for essential services and documentation. Media reports highlight widespread corruption, harassment of citizens, and lack of public accountability in service design and delivery.

In the last few years, the use of legislative guarantees to ensure citizens receive services in a fair, transparent and time-bound manner has gained tremendous policy momentum and been formalized into strategies, laws and operational guidelines.

Central and state governments in India have sought to plug the gap in "Citizen's Charters", which could not be enforced due to lack of incentives and legal legitimacy, by passing the Right to Public Services Acts. These legal norms, adopted since 2010, codify statutory laws that guarantee time-bound and standardized delivery of various public services rendered by the government to citizens. These acts also provide a mechanism for punishing errant public servants who are proved to be deficient in providing services as stipulated under the statute.

The RTPS law aims to correct the power imbalance between administrators and applicants through two key features. First, by making timeliness of services prominent, the bill allows a standardized and verifiable measure of an administrator's job performance based on citizen experience. The common framework of the legislation in

various states includes granting of the 'right to public services', which are to be provided to the public by designated officials within a stipulated time frame. The public services, which are to be granted as a right under the legislation, are generally notified separately through a gazette notification. Some of the common public services, which are to be provided within a fixed time frame as a right under the Act, include issuing caste, birth, marriage and domicile certificates, electric connections, voter cards, ration cards, copies of land records, and so forth. Second, a notable feature of the legislation is that if the designated officer fails to provide the service within the stipulated time or rejects the service request, the aggrieved person may approach the appellate authorities specified under the Act. These authorities can order the public servant to provide the service to the applicant, and impose a penalty on him/her for failure to provide the required service without any reasonable cause. The penalty may be financial, in the range of Rs. 500 to Rs. 5000, and/or disciplinary proceedings. The applicant may be compensated out of the penalty imposed on the officer. These appellate authorities have been granted certain powers of a civil court. Thus, there is hope that such a codified process of grievance redress imposing disciplinary and pecuniary action for deficient or delayed responses to citizens could herald a more accountable and citizen oriented culture within public administration.

For rolling out the RTPS legislation, a number of factors such as management capacity of the state machinery at different levels, resources, and behavioral factors have played

crucial roles. The discretion of governments in deciding the services covered is also a decisive factor (Raha 2012). Challenges in the implementation of the RTPS Act arise at the time of carrying out preparatory

activities (Mathur 2012). It is important to improve citizen awareness regarding this Act along with proper planning of resources and infrastructure for ensuring compliance and transparency.

Source *Implementation of the Right to Public Services Act in India: A Survey Assessment*, Public Affairs Centre, Bengaluru and the World Bank, 2016.

3.4 Civil servants' perceptions of current reforms

110. The following section discusses the perceptions of civil servants with regard to the implementation of the BSC, Citizens Charter, and Change Army, as measured by the Ethiopia Civil Servant Survey (ECSS). Understanding the perceptions of the civil servants will allow policy makers to better refine the various tools to address gaps in implementation. It's important to note that the results represents a single snapshot in time, i.e. how civil servants currently view these reforms, some of which were initiated sometime in the past, while others are more recent.

111. Successful reforms: Civil servants highlight the Change Army as a reform tool that they feel has been rather successful (55 percent nationally).³⁹ This is most pronounced at regional (59 percent) and woreda (58 percent) levels, as opposed to the federal level (36 percent). During qualitative discussions and consultation workshops, however, participants also noted that they perceived the Change Army to be politicized, as the mechanism tended to evaluate civil servants using subjective measures, such as

whether they had an "appropriate attitude" at work. At the federal level, the BSC registers as the most successful reform tool. Among sectors, the Change Army is particularly utilized by health sector staff, and relatively less so by staff working with the Ministry or Bureaus of Trade. However, Citizens Charters are seen as relatively less successful thus far. Citizens Charters are more frequently raised as a successful reform by staff in the trade and revenue organizations, which interface with citizens and businesses around specific 'business processes', such as paying taxes or issuing a license. Conversely, appreciation for the BSC is especially pronounced at the federal level (48 percent relative to 25 percent at regional levels and 28 percent at woreda levels), where the BSC is likely to be more entrenched. A similar picture is observed across sectors. In the trade sector, appreciation for the Change Army (46 percent) is slightly less pronounced than in other sectors, while the BSC (36 percent) is slightly more. Staff from the revenue agency cite the BSC to be the least successful reform tool.⁴⁰

³⁹ Respondents were asked the question "Is there any one reform that you think has been especially successful, useful, or beneficial? Which?" to which 55 percent responded 'Change Army', 30 percent 'BSC', 8 percent 'Citizens Charter', and 8 percent 'Other'.

⁴⁰ Respondents were asked: "Is there any one reform that you think has been especially unsuccessful, or detrimental? Which?"

Figure 3.3: Perceptions of successful reforms by tier





Figure 3.4: Perceptions of successful reforms by sector



112. Less successful reforms: The Citizens Charter is mentioned the most when respondents are asked to highlight less successful reforms (33 percent nationally). This is highest at the regional level (42 percent), followed by federal (36 percent), and woreda (34 percent) levels. Across sectors, staff

in agriculture and trade express dissatisfaction with the Citizens Charter more frequently, with 46 percent and 43 percent of respondents from each sector, respectively, citing it as an especially unsuccessful reform.

3.4.1 Perceptions of the BSC

113. The ECSS confirms that the BSC is the major planning and evaluation tool in the civil service.


Tasks tend to cascade from the organizational scorecard and evaluations are based on the BSC indicators. The BSC reform appears to be embedded across government tiers, but is most present at the federal level, with civil servants there more likely to say that a higher proportion of their activities are affected by the BSC reform. The distribution of agreement lies relatively constant across both sectors and tiers; however, two outliers stand out—regional-level civil servants have the most positive attitude towards the BSC, while civil servants in the agriculture sector have the least.

114. BSC as a planning tool: In all, 62 percent of organization heads reported that they use BSC as a strategic planning tool. However, the fact that 24 percent of organization heads report limited or no use of the BSC as a strategic planning tool shows there is still a substantial gap in its use. From the perspective of individual civil servants, there is a positive view of the BSC reform. Fifty-nine percent

of civil servants to some extent agree that the BSC reform improved the way that their organization prioritizes activities.

115. BSC as a feedback/evaluation tool: Nationally, some 78 percent of heads consult BSC targets and reports at least every six months. Its highest use, recorded at 100 percent, is by heads at the federal level. However, it is concerning that 30 percent of regional and 19 percent of woreda heads never use BSC targets and reports. Civil servants consider the BSC to be an important feedback tool (21 percent consider it to be very important, while 49 percent say it is quite important), suggesting that individual civil servants do take account of the BSC process. Also, 59 percent of civil servants agree that the BSC increased the efficiency of their directorate and 53 percent of civil servants to some extent agree that the BSC reform led to them being better trained. However, around 60 percent of civil servants agree to some extent that the BSC's subjective component is non-meritocratic and unfairly biased by personal preferences (Figure 3.5). This perception is particularly strong among staff in the revenue sector.

Figure 3.5: Staff perception of unfair bias inherent in the subjective component of the BSC



The proportion of all staff that responded Agree or Strongly Agree to the following:
The subjective component of the BSC is unfairly biased by the personal preferences of the supervisor.

116. Furthermore, while staff are being assessed and informed about their individual performance, there is little direct consequence to good or poor performance. Training (38 percent), followed by nothing (33 percent) are the most common responses to a very poor BSC score; while non-financial rewards (37 percent), followed by nothing (35 percent) are the most common responses to a very good BSC score. A majority of directors or heads surveyed pointed out that they do not have sufficiently clear guidance on how to reward staff based on BSC scores.

3.4.2 Perceptions of the Change Army

117. According to the ECSS, almost all organization heads consider the Change Army's State Wing to have improved peer-to-peer learning, workplace practices and efficiency, client interactions, service delivery, and the spread of best practices. The survey results also suggest that the State Wing has led to improvements in the flow of information within organizations, likely as the result of the increased number of meetings and peer-to-peer interactions. Although regional- and woreda-level organization heads report more frequent State Wing meetings, the impact of the Change Army on daily activities from the point of view of all civil servants is greater at the federal level.

118. Furthermore, 60 percent of organization heads considered the State Wing to be effective in discussing and identifying solutions to rent-seeking in the civil service. Across all civil servants, the majority selected the Change Army (specifically, the '1 to 5') as one of the most effective tools for limiting rent-seeking, suggesting the reform's perceived potential at dealing with this issue. The only organization in which this issue is raised in a very limited way is the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, implying that more work needs to be done in this tier-sector to strengthen the Change Army reform. The Public Wing is much less cited by the civil servants as a form of dealing with rent-seeking, although it does appear more important in the trade sector at the regional level.

119. In terms of the Public Wing, 87 percent of organization heads reported that the public wing members are involved in planning and evaluation processes. Heads are also positive about the implementation success of Public Wing reform: meeting minutes are recorded effectively, the reform is harmonized with other activities, and is associated with an improvement in workplace practices.

120. Yet, key informant interviews found that understanding of the Public Wing members is not complete, especially in the agriculture sector. Although the Public Wing has helped identify key constraints in the health, education, and revenue sectors, it operates in an ad-hoc manner.

3.4.3 Perception on the Citizens Charter

121. According to almost all organization heads, the Citizens Charter has improved information flows in the majority of cases, and clearly communicates service delivery standards. Almost all heads agree that a clear complaint handling system and sufficient accountability exists because of the Citizens Charter.

122. But the consolidated result for organization heads and civil servants draws a different picture.


The Citizens Charter is mentioned most when respondents are asked to identify especially unsuccessful reforms (33 percent nationally). This is highest at the regional level (42 percent), followed by the federal level (36 percent), and then the woreda level (34 percent). Among sectors, civil servants in agriculture and trade view the Citizens Charter most negatively, with 46 percent and 43 percent of respondents from each sector, respectively, suggesting it as an especially unsuccessful reform. Similarly, while around 60 percent of heads agree that the Citizens Charter has improved workplace practices, the response from the civil servants shows that the Citizens Charter has a limited influence on the daily activities of civil servants. This is true for all three tiers of government.

3.5 Regional comparison of government effectiveness

123. Overall, as indicated in Figure 3.7 below, Ethiopia, along with Rwanda, stand out as countries that have made greater progress on strengthening Government Effectiveness over the past two decades, reaching the average level of a lower middle income country. However, in recent years, Ethiopia’s average performance has stagnated


and even somewhat declined, in comparison to Rwanda, which has remained relatively steady. Rwanda has deployed a particularly strong focus on performance management (Versailles 2012), and stands out as a country that has made the greatest degree of progress in the region.

Figure 3.6: Government effectiveness by income blocks



Source Worldwide Governance Indicators 2016.

Figure 3.7: Changes in government effectiveness in selected African countries - 1998-2015



Source Worldwide Governance Indicators 2017.

124. While the World Governance Indicators (WGIs) are based on the aggregation of multiple indicators, most of which are perception based, the most recent trend gives an indication about the need for further reform efforts in Ethiopia. This view complements the perspective of the

Ethiopian government set out in this report’s introduction, that there is a need to reinvigorate reform efforts, so as to be able to meet rising expectations of citizens as well as manage and guide increasingly complex economic development efforts effectively.

3.6 Management practices within Ethiopia’s civil service

125. The reform tools discussed in the previous section aim to improve the performance of civil service organizations to achieve their objectives.

In order to have a better understanding of the current state of civil service organizations, the study implemented a standard management measurement tool—the World Management Survey—across all offices surveyed by the ECSS to assess the quality of their management practices. Key components of management practices to be discussed in this section include targeting (setting targets for units and individual staff), monitoring (based on targets set), roles (autonomy afforded to staff), flexibility (the ability to confront new demands and/or ways of working), incentives, staff contributions, and staffing. The quality of management practices is

measured on a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicates worst practice and 5 indicates best practice.

126. According to the ECSS, monitoring and targeting are the relatively stronger management aspects in Ethiopia, while flexibility, incentives, and staff involvement are the weakest. The best managed area at the national level is monitoring (with an average score of 3.48) and the least is staff involvement (score of 2.0). Federal organizations exhibit the highest management scores overall (average score 3.1), with education appearing as the best-managed sector (average score 2.9). Addis Ababa, Amhara, and Tigray are the regions with the best-managed organizations (average of score 3). Gambella shows the lowest scores across all dimensions, with an average score of 2.1.

Figure 3.8: Average management scores across management dimensions





Figure 3.9: Average quality of management (composite measure of all management dimensions)



127. With the strong emphasis on the BSC and Change Army, the performance of targeting and monitoring should be expected above a level of 3, i.e. above 'average', for a larger number of organizations. Similarly, the autonomy of roles and staffing might be expected to perform more strongly as the result of the BPR reform, as the BPR aimed to empower front line workers and deploy the right staff for the right jobs. It is relatively less surprising that flexibility, incentives, and staff involvement are weaker areas, as these have not been a focus of recent reforms and these areas might benefit from greater attention in the future.


3.6.1 Targeting

128. **Setting targets and breaking them down for units and individual staff members provides a**

sense of direction and purpose. Employees benefit from clearly understanding what is expected from them. The ECSS confirms that through the BSC, tasks tend to cascade from the organizational scorecard and evaluations are based on the BSC indicators. For more information, please refer to the section on perceptions of BSC in this chapter.

129. Figure 3.10 below demonstrates a positive correlation between those organizations that implemented the BSC reform with greater intensity (that a greater proportion of activities are stated to be influenced by the reform) and the increased use of performance targeting by the management. This figure provides suggestive evidence that the BSC reform is associated with a higher score in the World Management Survey targeting indicator.

Figure 3.10: Relationship between the intensity of BSC reform implementation and the use of performance targeting by management




R-squared=0.2328

130. Overall performance on targeting is 'middling' on average, with a score of 3. With the strong emphasis on BSC, one might have expected a performance on targeting above 'average', for a larger number of organizations. This score indicates that overall, organizations in the civil service assign targets to their directorates, which are then broken down to managerial and employee-level targets. These are generally well understood by mid-level staff, although they are not necessarily communicated in a clear and concise manner to lower-level staff, which suggests

it is not always clear how the targets contribute to their organization's goals. Importantly, the tasks assigned to staff on a day-to-day basis are not always related to those targets. Targeting is best managed at the federal-level (average score of 3.8) followed by the regional (3.1) and woreda (2.9) levels. The distribution of targeting quality across sectors shows Afar to be the worst-managed region in terms of targeting (average score of 2.3), and Addis Ababa as the best (3.8). The distribution is similar across sectors (ranging from an average score of 2.8-3.4).

Figure 3.11: Targeting




3.6.2 Monitoring

131. The main purpose of monitoring is to track implementation and outputs systematically to determine exactly when targets are on track and when changes may be needed. The BSC reform is positively associated with the use of performance monitoring, as shown in Figure 3.12

below. The BSC reform introduces targets, which feed into planning, but also function heavily as a monitoring and evaluation tool. This is suggested in the data, as organizations who applied the BSC with a greater intensity (that a greater proportion of activities are stated to be influenced by the reform) display greater scores in the monitoring indicator of the World Management Survey.

Figure 3.12: Relationship between the intensity of BSC reform implementation and the use of performance monitoring by management




R-squared=0.3199

132. The mean score for monitoring management is 3.5. This indicates that directorates generally track a limited number of performance indicators somewhat regularly, which are seen and reviewed by senior management only. Although some of this data

may be shared with relevant staff members, there is **limited communication about performance and how it is monitored and reviewed**. This suggests that although some monitoring is taking place at the directorate-level, it is done inconsistently.

Figure 3.13: Monitoring




133. Again, monitoring is best managed at the federal level, for which we find an average score of 3.7, followed by 3.5 at the woreda level and 3.4 at the regional level. The education sector appears to have higher quality monitoring, with an average score of 3.7. Addis Ababa and Tigray are the best managed regions in terms of monitoring (average score 4), followed closely by Amhara (3.9). Gambella lags behind with an average score of 2.6.

134. Performance monitoring and links to incentives. The Individual Performance Appraisal System was added to the BSC in 2012. Around 60 percent of civil servants agree to some extent that the behavioral component of the individual employee performance management and measurement is non-meritocratic and unfairly biased by personal preferences. Even so, when the BSC is used as an evaluation tool, the consequences of a very good or very poor

BSC report score are limited.

135. The mean score for performance monitoring and incentive system is 2.4. This indicates that performance is evaluated through a formal system and good performance could be rewarded (financially or non-financially), however there is no system or clear criteria for doing so. Similarly, poor performance is addressed inconsistently and on an ad-hoc basis. In such cases concrete action may be taken to rectify the problem, but it is not consistently followed-through. Again, lack of discipline or bad behavior by employees is similarly managed. According to the respondents, the most common response to a very poor BSC score by management is assigning training (38 percent) or doing nothing (33 percent). Similarly, the most common managerial response to a very good BSC score is granting non-financial rewards (37 percent) or doing nothing (35 percent).

Figure 3.14: Incentives



136. The federal level has the best employee performance management system, with a score of 2.7. Again, scores across sectors are consistent, but less so across regions, with Addis Ababa once again leading the ranking with an average score


of 3.2, followed by Tigray with a score 3, and Gambella scoring lowest, with 1.4. Thus, while the monitoring of targets is done fairly well, it does not yet translate into effective employee performance management.

3.6.3 Roles

137. The mean score for roles (measuring the level of autonomy staff are given in undertaking tasks) is 2.5. This indicates that very little discretion is afforded to officers to carry out their assignments on a day-to-day basis. Staff contributions towards decisions on how to carry out tasks, as well as in the implementation of policy is infrequent and done in an ad-hoc manner.

Decisions on staffing and task assignments are subject to managers' personal knowledge of staff's skills and competencies, rather than on accurate, up-to-date documentation on each staff member. This means that not all staff are engaged equally and that they may be assigned to tasks to which they are not suited. Some staff members or staff groups are more burdened than others depending on a) their relationship with the manager, and b) the type of work they are responsible for.

Figure 3.15: Roles management




138. The management of role autonomy is once again highest at the federal-level (average score 2.9). The distribution is very similar across sectors, but less so across regions, where there is almost a one-point difference between the best-managed region, Addis Ababa (score 3), and the worst, Afar, Gambella and SNNPR (score 2.1).

3.6.4 Flexibility

139. The mean score for flexibility (the ability to confront new demands and/or ways of

working) is 2.5. This indicates that when directorates are confronted by new demands or the specific requirements of communities, clients, or other stakeholders, efforts are occasionally made to tailor procedures to those specific needs, although this is not done frequently and can present significant difficulties when those needs or demands are complex. New ideas or practices are adopted, but in an informal and/or isolated manner. Generally, directorates are slow to integrate new practices into their operations.

Figure 3.16: Flexibility




140. The federal sector shows the highest Staffing score in flexibility, with an average of 3 (2.6 and 2.3 at the regional and woreda levels, respectively). Again, the distribution is very similar across sectors but much less across regions: Addis Ababa and Tigray are at the top with scores of 3 and 2.9 respectively, and Gambella (1.9) and SNNPR (2) are at the bottom of the ranking.

3.6.5 Staffing

141. The mean score for staffing is 2.7. This indicates that when it comes to talent in the organization, senior management believes that attracting and developing talent is important, but there is no clear system for identifying, attracting, or retaining such talent. The promotion is based on performance and tenure, although this is more heavily weighted towards performance. There are limited opportunities for promotion and very little room for growth.

Figure 3.17: Staffing



142. The federal level scores a 3.1, regional level 2.8, and woreda level 2.6. The education sector shows higher management practices than the other sectors. Addis Ababa, Tigray and Amhara score highest by a relatively large margin, and once again Afar and Gambella score lowest (almost one point below average).


3.6.6 Staff involvement

143. The mean score for staff involvement (the ability of staff to become involved in operations and contribute towards decisions) is 2, by far the lowest scoring management area. This indicates

that because there is no system for identifying and solving problems, staff are not involved in providing solutions and making decisions. Suggestions may be taken from staff, but these occur on a rare and ad-hoc basis. Similarly, non-managerial staff do not actively contribute in staff meetings and rarely provide any kind of feedback.

144. There is almost no variation in the quality of staff involvement management across tiers or sectors, and only slight variation across regions: once again Addis Ababa and Tigray are the highest scoring (with 2.5 and 2.4 respectively), and Gambella is the lowest, with a score of 1.7.

Figure 3.18: Staff involvement







4

The State of the Service Today





4.1 Recruitment and management of staff

145. The recruitment and management of staff is a critical aspect of a public sector. Merit-based recruitment (i.e., not based on personal relationships) has long been recognized as central to an effective government (Fukuyama 2011). In particular in low-income contexts, the availability of a potential pool of applicants with sufficient

educational qualifications can pose a challenge. Once staff have been brought into the public sector, merit-based treatment and promotions are important to set incentives for performance, as well as identify and promote capable and effective leaders.

4.1.1 Performance management practices in the civil service

146. Hiring and other staffing decisions are made by individual MABs, in line with procedures set out in the law, and as prescribed by the Ministry of Public Service, respectively the Bureaus of Public Service at sub-national levels. A merit-based selection is prescribed in principle, and available evidence suggests that patronage-based hiring is not as much a concern as in a number of other countries in the region. Rather, key problems with recruitment appear to be that on the one hand, MAB managers believe that they cannot consistently attract qualified applicants, and on the other hand, some anecdotal evidence suggests that some selections are not fully based on meritocratic criteria, but also on political considerations and other factors.

147. Educational opportunities have been greatly expanded over the past two decades, and most professional-level public servants have completed post-secondary training. Formal qualifications of civil service employees are adequate (diploma or first degree of tertiary education). In the survey targeting professional staff as well as heads of agencies, over 99 percent of respondents held a post-high-school qualification, and 82 percent had at least an undergraduate qualification. However, there are issues with the quality of training, as discussed further below.

148. Based on the survey, the main channels for becoming aware of a position are job boards (especially for regional and woreda levels), adverts in newspapers (federal level), followed by transfers and informal invites. Online advertisements so far play a very minor role. Formal selection processes are very common at the federal level, and less so at regional and woreda levels (28 percent responded that there was no formal process at the regional level, and around 21 percent for the woreda level). Formal recruitment processes are less frequently followed in emerging regions, in particular in Gambella, Harari, Somali, and Afar (45 to 55 percent of respondents saying that formal

recruitment processes had not been followed). Sector-by-sector, formal recruitment processes appear to be mostly followed in the education sector across levels of government, but somewhat less so in agriculture, health, and revenue sectors at the regional and woreda level, and for trade at the regional level.

149. Probation periods of six months are common. Seventy-eight percent of heads of agencies reported this length of probation periods, while only 2.3 percent reported no probation period.

4.1.2 Treatment of staff

150. Respondents were asked to rank the most important determinants of how staff are treated including who gets hired, receives the best rewards and training opportunities and so on, in the organization. Figure 4.1 below shows the most important perceived determinants of how staff are treated. Similar to responses for recruitment as such, merit and performance are the top factors by a large margin (59 percent nationally), followed by the quality of the relationship with supervisors or managers (11 percent), and political connections (6 percent).


151. Merit and performance is perceived to be equally important across all levels of government on average, but with variation across sectors, and especially regions. Sixty-five percent of revenue staff perceive merit and performance to be the key determinant of treatment, compared to 53 percent of health staff. The difference across regions is even more pronounced: While 91 percent of respondents in Tigray consider merit and performance the key factor determining treatment, only 23 percent of Gambella-based respondents do. Interestingly, Addis Ababa, which ranks top in most management metrics (see section 3.4), comes second to last in the importance of merit and performance as a determinant of treatment, with only 37 percent (it is still the most important criteria, but by a significantly smaller margin). The second most important determinant of staff treatment in Addis

Ababa is political connections (26 percent). The importance of political connections is significantly lower in all other regions, a distant second being Harari with 11 percent. Political connections are especially unimportant in Somali (1 percent) and Tigray (2 percent), and entirely insignificant in Dire Dawa.

152. The quality of the relationships with

managers is considered the primary determinant of treatment by some federal staff (14 percent), and regional staff (8 percent). Across sectors, this is perceived as most important by agriculture staff (13 percent) and least by revenue staff (9 percent). The region where this is mentioned most frequently is Afar, with 22 percent of respondents identifying it as the primary determinant. It is considered least important in Tigray, with 2 percent.

Figure 4.1: Top determinants of how staff are treated




4.1.3 Is staff promotion merit based?

153. Generally, there is some confidence that staff promotions are merit based, followed by considerations about the length of service both in the public service in general and in a specific organization. Those surveyed perceive the top five most important criteria for promotion to be merit/ performance, quality of relationship with manager, length of service (in the public sector and in the organization), and political connections.


154. There is some noticeable variation across regions and sectors. Regionally, merit is commonly among the top three most important criteria for promotion, except in Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, and Gambella (Figure 4.2). On average, merit appears to be a slightly less important criterion at the regional level (74 percent) than at federal (78 percent) and woreda (76 percent) levels. Across the five sectors, merit is seen as most important in the education sector (81 percent) and least in the health sector (69 percent). The lowest views about merit-based promotions are expressed by regional health sector staff.

Figure 4.2: Importance of merit as a criterion for promotion. By tier and sector. By region



Rank the 3 most important criteria for promotions in your organization.
(Indicator if chosen among top 3.)

Figure 4.3: Importance of merit as a criterion for promotion. By tier and sector




Rank the 3 most important criteria for promotions in your organization.
(Indicator if chosen among top 3.)

155. Relationship with supervisor. The importance of one's relationship with the supervisor is the second most important perceived criteria for promotion, and is most strongly felt at the federal level (13 percent). The importance of this relationship on promotion is more significantly cited among federal level trade staff and least among revenue staff at the regional level (2 percent). This criterion is by far most important in the Afar region, being cited by 26 percent of respondents, followed by Amhara (15 percent). It is not considered important in Gambella or Benishangul-Gumuz, where only 3 and 4 percent of respondents respectively cited it as a criterion for promotion.

156. Length of service in the public sector and in the organization. Length of service in the civil

service is considered a slightly more important criterion for promotion than length of service in the organization (8 percent and 7 percent respectively). Tenure in both the service and the organization is perceived as a more important factor at the federal level, followed closely by the woreda and regional levels. Length in the organization is more likely to be perceived as a key factor among revenue staff (11 percent). While length of service in the organization is relatively most frequently cited as important in Addis Ababa (21 percent) and length of service in the civil service in Benishangul-Gumuz (20 percent), neither is perceived as a criterion at all in Harari (not a single respondent identified this as criteria).

Figure 4.4: Importance of length of service in the civil service. By tier and sector



157. Political connections. Political connections are considered the fifth most important criteria for promotion. This is highest at the regional level (8 percent) and lowest at the federal level (5 percent). Agriculture and education staff cite such connections slightly more frequently (9 and 8 percent respectively). Political connections are not


considered at all important (with no respondents citing this as a criteria) in the health and trade sectors at federal level. Across sectors, political connections are of high importance in Addis Ababa, where such connections are perceived as the principal criteria for promotion according to 32 percent of respondents. Political connections

are significantly less important in all other regions, the next highest being Oromia with 12 percent. Political connections are least important in SNNPR (1 percent) and Tigray (2 percent).

158. While civil servants perceive that promotions are overall merit based, confidence in actually receiving a promotion is more limited and divided. Around 45 percent of civil servants are confident that they will get promoted if they perform well. The distributions are similar across

tiers. Civil servants in the Somali region are by far the most confident that if they perform well they will get promoted, with 82 percent, compared to 26 percent in Gambella. Trade staff are most confident (with 55 percent) and revenue staff least confident (with 40 percent). Moreover, what stands out is that a substantial share of staff (around 30 percent across levels) expresses the view that they are very unconfident about being promoted, even if performing well; with an additional 12-18 percent of staff being 'somewhat unconfident'.

Figure 4.5: How confident are you that you will get promoted if you perform well?



159. One aspect to keep in mind when considering promotion in Ethiopia is that the level at which political appointees start is lower than in most other countries. Political appointees start at the Director level, rather than being formally limited to the level of Minister and State Minister. This can pose some limits for professional but non-political staff in terms of promotion opportunities.

4.1.4 Merit-based advancement: a cross-country comparison

160. Table 4.1 summarizes officials' beliefs around whether advancement in the civil service is based on merit.⁴¹ Looking at promotion specifically, 50 percent of civil servants in Pakistan disagree with the statement that "Promotions/bonuses go

to those who work hard to achieve the goals of the FBR." Twenty-nine percent of officials in the Philippines stated that their department was one in which "Most promotions went to people who did not meet the formal qualifications for promotion," and 28 percent agreed that, "Promotions are mainly given to those that have friends and family at higher levels in your department." Where we find the least evidence for merit-based advancement, in Pakistan, officials state that 'managerial favoritism' is what is driving career paths. Even in the Philippines, over 50 percent of staff agree that, "Favoritism among managers and employees often makes it difficult for public officials to perform in their jobs." Overall, Ethiopia is in the middle among the various countries in terms of perceptions among civil servants that promotions are merit-based.

Table 4.1: Perceived criteria for advancement in the civil service across countries

	All	(1) Ethiopia	(2) Ghana	(3) Indonesia	(4) Pakistan	(5) Philippines
Promotions are based on merit [agree=1]	0.65	0.56	0.87	0.89	0.22	0.75
Other criteria for advancement						
<i>Merit</i>	0.71	0.56	0.75	0.9	0.61	0.76
<i>Tenure</i>	0.47	0.14	0.67	—	—	—
<i>Connections</i>	0.25	0.12	0.25	0.39	0.17	0.35
<i>Bribes</i>	0.02	0	0.12	0.1	0.01	0.02

⁴¹ Note that there is some variation in the question and answer choices among the surveys in different countries, so the results should be considered indicative. In Indonesia, Pakistan and the Philippines, the relevant question on promotion was "Rewards/Promotions go to those who work hard to further the goals of [the department/organization]". In Ghana, the relevant question was "In the past three years, have elected officials, their appointees, or political party officials tried to influenced any hiring decisions and or promotions in your organization?". The Ghanaian question was the best available, but includes hiring considerations. They are also phrased positively and negatively respectively, which may change the responses of officials. In Ethiopia, the relevant question on promotion was more direct: "Rank the three most important criteria for promotions in your organization".

161. Tenure and connections are the other two factors that are frequently selected across countries. Tenure is frequently highlighted as important in the civil service (it is high for Ghana, the only other country for which we have this data, with 0.67); and is comparatively much less important in Ethiopia (14 percent). Bribes play

an insignificant role in the countries we studied and is completely absent in Ethiopia, but direct questioning may not be the most appropriate way to get at this topic and advances in survey methodology may be required to gain more credible estimates of the effects of within-service bribery.

4.2 Drivers of staff turnover

162. There is a general concern about substantial staff turnover in Ethiopia, although actual turnover is relatively limited, with variation by sector and level of staff. As a previous survey and turn-over study from 2014 indicate, while overall voluntary turn-over is lower than perceived, it is concentrated in certain regions and sectors, notably Addis Ababa and Benishangul-Gumuz, and the revenue and justice sectors.⁴² Departing staff were mostly in the professional category, and it often took a long time to replace staff, contributing to high vacancy rates. The turnover survey also indicated a high prevalence of low motivation, an issue that is explored in greater detail in the 2016 ECSS.

163. The 2016 ECSS indicates that just under half of respondents are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied, and many intend to change jobs. Satisfaction is lowest at the federal level, followed by the woreda level, and is somewhat higher at regional levels. On the question of whether staff plan to stay or leave their current positions, over sixty percent of staff say that they intend to change their jobs within the next two years (71 percent at the federal level). While actual voluntary departures tend to be significantly lower than the intention to leave, such a high level of 'intentions to leave' poses risks, both in terms of actual turnover materializing, as well as demotivated staff remaining in post.

164. The survey also indicates that staff turnover is particularly acute at the federal level in the health and trade sectors. Respondents recall that six to seven staff left their respective directorates over the past 12 months. The type of staff who leave are perceived to be mostly professionals, a finding that is consistent with the 2014 study on turnover.

165. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 reflect the views of heads of organizations and staff, respectively, with regard to motivations for turnover, and both point to a lack of opportunities for promotion as the main reason. Directors cite the following reasons for why previous staff have departed: 1) lack of opportunities for promotion, 2) working climate, 3) poor pay and benefits, 4) workload, and 5) problems with one's manager. As is discussed further in Chapter 5, dissatisfaction with salaries and benefits appears to be the most important factor impacting motivation; while with regards to turnover, promotion opportunities play a significantly greater role. For staff considering to change jobs, the top five issues are 1) limited promotion opportunities, 2) conditions of service apart from wages, 3) poor training and development opportunities, 4) wages, and 5) limited opportunity to have an impact.

⁴² The study was undertaken in 2013-14 and based on two surveys of: i) 474 HR Officers responsible for 9 percent of the total civil servants across the three levels of government; and ii) 2,307 civil servants randomly selected from professional groups that leave organizations the most.

Figure 4.6: Top 5 drivers of turnover (directors/heads)⁴³





Figure 4.7: Reasons for wanting to change jobs (staff)⁴⁴



166. Lack of opportunities for promotion. Directors cited the lack of opportunities for promotion most frequently at the regional and woreda levels. Across sectors, while 50 percent of

federal-level agriculture staff perceive it to be the main driver, it is not an issue at all among federal-level trade staff (not a single respondent cited the lack of promotion opportunities as a driver). There

⁴³ This question was asked to Directors only: "What do you think are the greatest drivers of turnover? List all relevant responses."

⁴⁴ "Which of the following issues are reasons you want to change jobs? Is it because of the..." for those who answered yes to "In the next two years, would you want to change your job?" to employees only.

is significantly less variation at the woreda level. Dire Dawa stands out as the region where a lack of promotion opportunity is especially widely cited (57 percent), whereas it is not a significant issue in Tigray (8 percent).

167. Among staff, limited opportunities for promotion were especially pointed out by staff in the agriculture and health sectors across levels.

Career structure schemes, which allow predictable promotion upon satisfactory performance without requiring a vacancy, have been implemented in a few professional groups (teachers, health professionals, agriculture extension workers). Similar career structures are not in place for administrative staff working in the same ministries and offices, which could explain the particular dissatisfaction in these sectors. The government is now working to put in place an analytical point factors job evaluation scheme but until the law is amended accordingly, the Position Classification System remains the only legally binding method.

168. Poor pay and benefits is the third most important perceived driver of turnover by directors, while among staff, other conditions of service (such as holiday allowance or leave, health insurance provision, or transportation allowance) are cited more frequently than wages as such. Poor pay and benefits are cited most

frequently at the federal level with 28 percent of directors seeing it as the main driver, compared to only 11 percent at woreda level. At the federal level, revenue and trade directors perceive wage and non-wage benefits to be the primary driver of turnover (both of them with 42 percent). The sector-pattern holds at the woreda level (although much less significantly), but not at the regional level where limited wage and non-wage rewards are perceived as the main drivers of turnover especially in the education sector. Perceived poor pay and benefits were overwhelmingly the most cited reason for a decrease in motivation, as captured by the open-ended questions (see also section 5.1 below).

169. The issue of poor training and development was cited by staff as the third most important reason for considering job changes, and significantly more frequently at the regional level. As is discussed further in section 5.2 below, for about 30 percent of staff, opportunities for learning are an important point of attraction to the public sector. Thus, expanding such opportunities could be considered as one of the ways through which to strengthen continuous staff development and motivation.

170. A problematic relationship with a manager and too high a workload are the other two of the



Lack of opportunities for promotion is reported as one of the main reasons for wanting to change jobs.

top five drivers of turnover perceived by directors, but are rarely mentioned by staff. Problematic relationships appear less important at the regional level (7 percent) than at the federal and woreda levels (15 percent and 13 percent respectively). Across sectors, it is more likely to be perceived as a driver of turnover in the health (18 percent) and trade (17 percent) sectors. Too much work is a slightly greater issue at the federal level, with 25 percent than at the regional (17 percent) and woreda (20 percent) level. There is slightly more variation across sectors, with 32 percent of revenue staff perceiving this as a driver of turnover, compared to only 14 percent in trade.

171. At least a part of the observed turnover of staff is directly within the control of respective Ministries and Bureaus. The survey asked organization heads the extent to which they regularly moved one or more staff around in their organization. One out of three Federal Ministers stated that their organization employs a regular reallocation of one or more workers between directorates. At the regional level, 19 out of 37 (51 percent) bureau heads stated that their organization exercises a regular reallocation of one or more

workers between directorates. Moreover, 133 out of 312 woreda heads of organization (43 percent) exercise a regular reallocation of one or more employees between directorates. The distribution of responses across sectors shows that around half of organization heads in each sector state that they conduct a regular reallocation of one or more workers across directorates, except for revenue where this is much less common – only 22 percent of organization heads stated that they do. Rotations across sectors are much less common. Two out of three federal ministers stated that they do not do this; 31 out of 37 regional bureau heads; and 227 out of 312 woreda-level heads.

172. In terms of impact, turnover was mentioned as limiting the productivity of remaining staff especially for three federal-level sectors: trade, revenue, and health. For all other sectors and levels, other factors were selected more frequently in terms of negatively impacting productivity. These responses are somewhat consistent with the issues raised by members of Public Wings, which pointed out that there are technical gaps and capacity limits due to significant staff turnover in the Ministry of Health.⁴⁵

4.3 Staff capacities - diverging perceptions

173. A vital issue raised in key informant interviews is that as a consequence of the very rapid expansion in training and hiring staff into the public service, quality has declined. This concern is shared across different technical specialties, including education, health, and agricultural staff, as well as other professions. A significant share of staff whose qualifications have been tested in service through competency assessments have failed to exhibit sufficient basic knowledge.

174. Several reasons are seen as contributing to the concerns about quality. One is the fact that many tertiary institutions were recently established and have young and not sufficiently trained faculty.⁴⁶ Second, given the rapid expansion of students to be trained, funding as well as management attention at tertiary-level institutions has become absorbed by administrative issues, such as running dormitories and hiring additional teaching staff as opposed to focusing on strengthening

⁴⁵ While the Public Wing structure of the Ministry of Trade seems to be rather weak overall and did not address the issue.

⁴⁶ In recent years, 33 new Universities were created, and in addition, many colleges and other tertiary training institutions were established.

curricula and teaching methods. Third, there are insufficient funds to ensure that students receive practical training to complement the theoretical knowledge being acquired. This negatively affects the actual skills that those graduating and then being recruited into the public service can bring to their assignments – despite the fact that formal qualifications have improved as noted above.

175. A lack of technical knowledge among staff in federal-level ministries was also raised in several discussions with Public Wing members.

In particular, members of the health sector's Public Wing noted significant capacity gaps in the responsible ministry, which they see as being due to a lack of technical specialists as well as staff turnover. Members of the agriculture sector's Public Wing also pointed out that sector ministry staff often lack in-depth knowledge about the issues they work on.

176. In contrast to the concerns about quality and adequacy of skills expressed in interviews and focus group discussions, civil servants covered in the ECSS perceive themselves as having adequate skills for their jobs. Only 2.1 percent of staff cited their lack of the right skill set for their tasks as a key constraint to their effectiveness. Only 22 percent of staff were aware of competency tests for their area of work; while among those aware of such tests, most agreed that they evaluate appropriate skills for the job.

177. While technical skills and knowledge are a primary concern, there is also a specific issue with the ability to use the IT applications that are being rolled out. In 64 percent of the organizations surveyed, fewer than half of the staff in a given unit are able to create an Excel spreadsheet or a Power Point presentation, and in 40 percent of organizations, fewer than half of all staff are able to use a computer to write a memo. Still, 74 percent of all staff surveyed agreed that they have the necessary skills to make use of the technology that is available to them (while as noted below,

at woreda levels, only 3 percent of directors have full access to computers/IT systems).

178. There are several possible reasons for the discrepancy between widespread concerns about the lack of training and skills on the one hand, and staff self-perceptions on the other hand. One is that the 2016 survey targets staff in ministries, bureaus, and offices rather than actual front line service delivery staff such as teachers, nurses, or agricultural extension workers, and so practical experience is less critical. It may also be that bureau and ministry positions attract and recruit better trained staff. Another possibility is that staff overestimate their own skill levels. Including bureau-level staff in competency tests may be one way to assess whether the latter is a significant issue. ICT skills clearly are particularly relevant for bureau staff and should receive attention.

179. Plans are being made to make the testing of civil service staff more widespread, followed by mandatory additional or remedial training, e.g. during the summer. This process currently remains at the initial stages, and the potential costs of such efforts are substantial. Moreover, some effort would need to focus on strengthening tertiary training institutions in the first place so as to reduce the continuation of the problem of insufficient initial training.

180. For federal-level staff, it appears to be critical that staff are truly well prepared in the subject matter they are responsible for, and remain in their post long enough to acquire strong knowledge. Federal-level staff fulfill critical policy roles. In successful developmental states such as South Korea, there was a strong emphasis on having competent and well respected staff in place in key roles so as to ensure that effective guidance could be provided. Moving in this direction would also imply that rotations need to be appropriately staggered to avoid a loss of knowledge.

4.4 Use of databases and client feedback

4.4.1 Do staff make use of available databases?

181. Just over half of organizations surveyed (52 percent) have a functioning MIS in place: 80 percent

of organizations at the federal level, 70 percent at regional level and 40 percent at woreda-level. The health sector has the highest prevalence of MIS with 84 percent, significantly higher than the next highest sectors, trade (48 percent) and education (47 percent).


Figure 4.8: Do you have a Management Information System (MIS) programme in place and functioning?



182. However, even among organizations that officially have an MIS in place, accessing the data can be difficult. Two challenges to accessing that data stand out: network problems and the lack of usefulness of the data available. Network problems (39 percent) is the most cited challenge to accessing data, especially for regional bureaus

(51 percent), and most notably in the health sector (50 percent). The lack of usefulness of the data in the MIS is the second most cited challenge (23 percent). Agriculture and education sector staff are more likely to suggest that the MIS does not have any useful data, particularly at the federal and regional level (40 and 50 percent, respectively).

Figure 4.9: "What would be the main challenges to getting the data?"



183. Relative to other sources of information, MISs still rank relatively low. The three main sources of information used by staff to find out about the state of service delivery in their jurisdiction are formal field visits (22 percent), reports from the frontline

(18 percent), and informal interactions such as those with co-workers (16 percent). The MIS is only used as the primary source of information by 9 percent of civil servants nationally: 15 percent at the federal, 14 percent at the regional, and 6 percent at woreda

Only 9% of civil servants, nationally, use the MIS as the primary source of information

levels. Health sector staff reported using the MIS as a main source of data the most frequently (17 percent) compared to agriculture sector staff, who, at 5 percent, are the least frequent users.

184. In terms of impact, at the organization level, around 85 percent of directors agree to some extent that the introduction of an MIS increased the information employees of their organization had access to regarding the state of service delivery in the jurisdiction. There is a similar level of agreement at all tiers of government (84-86 percent). The health and revenue sectors shows a greater degree of agreement, with 94 percent and 87 percent agreement respectively. The agriculture sector shows a significantly lower degree of agreement, with 18 percent of directors


disagreeing strongly. Eighty percent of directors also agree that the MIS allowed them to learn new things about their jurisdiction, and that it feeds into the performance review (similar distributions).

185. However, directors do not believe that employees worked harder because they had more information on what works, with 64 percent of directors disagreeing to some extent (34 percent of them strongly). Disagreement is highest at the woreda level (66 percent) and lowest at the federal (46 percent). Of similar importance is the high degree of disagreement among directors as to whether employees worked harder because they were being monitored more (64 percent disagree). This is highest at the regional level (66 percent).

Figure 4.10: To what extent do you agree that the introduction of the MIS increased the information employees of their organization had access to regarding the state of service delivery in the jurisdiction?



Figure 4.11: To what extent do you agree that the introduction of the MIS has made individuals work harder because they had more information about what works?



4.4.2 Attention to clients' feedback and complaints

186. Respondents were asked how important they felt different types of feedback were in determining how well they were doing as a civil servant. The three most important types of feedback nationally are feedback from colleagues (97 percent), feedback from citizens/clients (94 percent), and feedback from supervisors (94 percent). Respondents were given the option to specify how important each type of feedback is ('very' or 'quite'), and the option 'very important' was higher for citizen feedback than it was for supervisor feedback.

187. Feedback from citizens is indicated as very important across all tiers. It is considered most important in the revenue sector (96 percent), and in the Dire Dawa, Harari and Somali regions, where all respondents consider citizen feedback either 'quite important' or 'very important'. Rates are slightly lower at the regional level (89 percent), but still high.

188. Further, 80 percent of respondents believe there is a clear and effective complaints management system in place, with 46 percent agreeing 'strongly' that this is the case. A high percentage of respondents (77 percent) also believe that there is sufficient accountability and a

clear course of action to be taken when complaints are received. As noted above, civil servants also consider citizen complaint mechanisms to be an important tool for addressing corruption.

189. Feedback from supervisors and managers is similarly important at all tiers of government and sectors. It is considered most important in the Harari and Dire Dawa regions, where all respondents identify it as the principal form of feedback, and least in Tigray, where 90 percent considered it so.

190. Generally, this suggests that the civil service reform efforts that were made over the past two decades have had a positive impact in terms of the attitudes of civil servants, albeit with

some caveats. The highly expressed importance accorded to citizen feedback is somewhat inconsistent with the fact that, as discussed in Chapter 3, Citizens Charters are seen as a relatively less successful reform, given that complaints would in part be based on the service terms outlined in such charters. An insufficient 'service attitude' was also repeatedly raised by the key informant interviews as one of the continuing obstacles to better service delivery.

191. Going forward, it would be highly desirable to survey service users as a way to identify whether citizens similarly feel that their feedback is sought and effectively taken into account, and to ensure that civil servants are aware of the results of such surveys.



5

Constraints to Public Service Delivery Identified by Civil Servants





192. Civil service reform tools, as discussed in previous chapters, can bolster government performance; however, a range of constraints not directly targeted by such reforms can ultimately hinder their effectiveness. The 2016 Ethiopia Civil Servants Survey (ECSS) generates a picture of such potential constraints as perceived by public servants. As in the previous chapters, the information derived from the survey is also triangulated with information and views that emerge from interviews

and other available sources.


193. The quality of the service delivered by any organization is highly dependent on the quality of its staff and their ability to fulfil their roles. Civil servants face a myriad of challenges in their work. Given their day-to-day experience, the views of staff on which challenges are most important can offer some idea and guidance on what may be important to address going forward.

5.1 Five highest ranked challenges

194. A key survey question that asked respondents to identify constraints was “What are the biggest challenges to you being able to complete your most important tasks effectively?” Figure 5.1 highlights the top five challenges identified by civil servants across the three tiers of government. These issues were emphasised throughout the surveys as key bottlenecks to officials effectively undertaking their daily tasks.⁴⁷

195. The five most frequently voiced constraints are: (i) inadequate resources (42 percent), (ii) lack of motivation (21 percent), (iii) inadequate leadership (16 percent), (iv) disruptions by ad hoc work requests (12 percent), and (v) delays getting inputs from others (8 percent). Each of these is discussed in turn below.

Figure 5.1: Top 5 most common challenges to completing tasks effectively



5.1.1 Inadequate resources

196. Inadequate resources, transportation, and IT present civil servants with a challenge at all levels, increasing in importance from federal (23 percent) to woreda level (48 percent), where it represents a significant challenge in all five sectors. Without sufficient resources to work with, civil

servants feel that they are challenged to complete tasks effectively.

197. Resources are generally less of a constraint at the federal level, except for the agricultural sector. This is somewhat surprising given the critical role that this sector plays for Ethiopia’s growth strategy. In contrast, health sector staff at

⁴⁷ Respondents were asked to rank their top three choices from a pre-determined list of options. For the purpose of this analysis the single key constraint chosen by each respondent was taken, as it felt this was the most interesting and potentially useful statistic. However, it should be noted that another way of interpreting this data would be to look at how many times the constraints listed featured in each respondent’s ‘top three’ challenges.

the federal level perceive a resource constraint much less frequently.⁴⁸ At the woreda level, concerns about resource constraints are very high across all five sectors.

198. The importance given to this issue by civil servants is consistent with some of the information from recent expenditure analyses, and from interviews. Due to the same constraints of a low revenue to GDP ratio, low per capita GDP, and an overriding commitment to dedicate scarce fiscal resources to capital expenditures,


operating resources have remained very small – 3 percent of GDP by 2011/12, and 3.8 percent by 2013/14 (most recent year available). A number of interlocutors emphasized in the qualitative interviews that operating and maintenance spending is very limited, and particularly so at sub-national levels.⁴⁹ This was particularly raised for the agricultural sector, in terms of their ability to reach farmers, which requires transport expenses and potentially per diems that, as discussed in Section 2.2, have also been inadequate for regular staff.

Particular challenges around IT use and networks

199. IT use is being promoted by many governments around the world in their public sectors. The aim is to (i) capture data for accountability as well as management purposes, (ii) make processes faster, more reliable, and trackable as files are migrated from manual to automatized processing, and (iii) potentially facilitate better access in a cost-effective way in remote areas (e.g. for licensing requests), (iv) to facilitate user feedback. After a period of catching up with the private sector, governments have become more intensive users of information technology than firms.

200. However, as the 2016 World Development Report (WDR) sets out, deploying IT systems effectively is not an easy task and many governments experience various types of difficulties. Many public sector digital technology projects fail, and even if e-government projects are successfully implemented, they may actually worsen outcomes as, without proper regulatory safeguards in place, automation makes it easier to perpetrate fraud and corrupt practices, erase records, or avoid capturing them altogether, thereby eroding transparency mechanisms.

Figure 5.2: Success rate of large ICT public sector projects



Source

WDR 2016 team, based on Standish Group 2014 and World Bank (2015a) Digital Governance Projects Database. Data at: http://bit.do/WDR2016-FigB3_5_L.

⁴⁸ As noted in section 1.2, 80 percent of public funding for the health sector is provided by development partners, which may entail ampler resources at the federal level for non-wage recurrent expenditures.

⁴⁹ Some sectors receive significant external support at sub-national levels for recurrent costs, notably through the PBS project (water, health, education, agriculture). However, with a total volume of 400-500USD for 6 years, the additional resources per year are still quite limited.

201. Ethiopia is in the process of pursuing greater IT use in its public sector. The GoE e-government strategy (2005-2015) has facilitated the adoption of mobile technologies and expansion of networks and local contents. A number of informational and transactional services were developed and became operational. The Ethiopian government envisions having a capacity of 103 million mobile phones in the country in the next five years. There are various potential opportunities and challenges that are emanating from the expansion of these technologies. The strategy has been revised.

202. As would be expected, in Ethiopia IT-use by public servants currently remains clearly stratified by level of government, and is very limited at the woreda level. While among federal level staff, 79 percent of respondents mention that all professional staff have access to computers. At the regional level this drops to 48 percent, and at the woreda level computers are available to all staff in only 3 percent of organizations. Woreda-level staff also have limited access to the internet: 57 percent of organizations have no access to the internet, and only 5 percent have regular access.

Figure 5.3: Out of every 10 experts, how many have access to a computer? By tier and sector






Figure 5.4: Out of every 10 experts, how many have access to a computer? By region⁵⁰



⁵⁰ As noted in section 1.1, no woreda level results are reported for Harari, Dire Dawa, and Addis Ababa.


Figure 5.5: Out of the five working days, how many days is the internet access good enough to check email?



203. Network interruptions pose a significant challenge across all levels of government. For 59 percent of federal respondents, all network interruptions are a challenge. This is similar at the regional level, and is even higher at the woreda level, at 65 percent. Network disruptions present a significant challenge in the health

sector, with 62 percent of respondents disagreeing that disruptions are not a challenge. Network disruptions are the principal impediment to acquiring data from the MIS. Again, this is an especially important issue in the health sector, at 51 percent, given that MIS is generally more widely used in this sector.

Figure 5.6: Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following: Network interruptions are not a challenge towards me being able to complete my tasks



204. Moreover, phones also do not work continuously.

When staff cannot use the internet, they rely on phone calls to exchange information. However, only 31.6 percent of organizations have a phone that works for at least 50 percent of calls, all five days of the week.

205. While the survey does not delve deeper into this issue, the concern about network disruptions at woreda levels imply that in principle, some processes and tasks require at least some computer and internet use, rather than being completely manual.

Considering the implications from this analysis, it would be useful to clarify further to what extent IT applications are expected to be used across the five sectors, and how effectively IT systems are de facto deployed at local levels in particular.

206. Software and IT management are important constraints. Without the right software packages,

the civil service cannot use IT effectively to better manage and track processes and provide services within the time limits foreseen. Software is a large constraint at the woreda level (54 percent disagreed that there was enough software to complete tasks), but much less so at the federal level (where 30 percent disagreed) and regional level (40 percent disagreed). Software constraints appear to be a significant problem in the agriculture sector, with 61 percent of respondents raising them as a challenge. Furthermore, maintenance, updating, and management of IT equipment was seen as a challenge by a substantial number of staff. Overall, 47 percent of respondents *disagree* that maintenance and management of IT equipment was sufficient. The level of disagreement is especially high at the woreda level, at 56 percent, but is consistent across sectors, with the exception of revenue, where disagreement is lower than in other sectors (35 percent).

Figure 5.7: Please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following: software and applications are not a challenge towards me being able to complete my tasks



207. WoredaNet. The ECSS shows that less than 40 percent of woredas have WoredaNet. In those woredas where there is access, on average staff used it on a weekly (35 percent of woredas), monthly (25 percent), and quarterly (10 percent) basis. WoredaNet is most used in the trade sector and least prevalent in the agriculture sector. Woredas in Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella have no access at all.

208. Access to electricity - another key input for a modern civil service to function - is relatively good, given Ethiopia's income level and still very limited power generation. In all, 78 percent

of organizations have power for at least four hours of every working day. That said, for two sectors (agriculture and revenue), continuous power seems - rather surprisingly - limited at the federal level. Given that staff at the federal level are meant to work with computers, uninterrupted power appears particularly important to ensure effective use of staff time. Regionally, Gambella and Afar are the two regions with relatively least full-time access to electricity. As the power supply is expected to improve further for many regions, access to electricity should be good enough so as not to stall the deployment and usage of improved IT systems.

Figure 5.8: During a typical working day, how many hours is there electricity? By tier and sector





Figure 5.9: During a typical working day, how many hours is there electricity? By region



5.1.2 Motivation

209. The high frequency with which low motivation is cited as a direct hindrance to working effectively is a significant concern.


A lack of motivation to undertake their job is the second biggest challenge according to civil servants at all three tiers and across all sectors, with the exception of federal staff in the health sector (for whom it is the joint sixth challenge). A lack of motivation was identified as the main challenge by 20 percent of federal staff, 14 percent of regional staff, and 18 percent of woreda staff. A lack of motivation is most keenly felt in the education sector (23 percent), and least in the health sector (13 percent). In terms of regions, low motivation is a greater challenge in the Harari (24 percent) and Benishangul-Gumuz

(22 percent) regions, and less so in Dire Dawa (9 percent) and Gambella (8 percent).

210. Changes in motivation largely decrease over time, while staying high for some.

One of the questions in the survey asks respondents to imagine that when they entered the service their motivation was 100, and to state what their motivation is now relative to the initial level. On average civil servants feel 18 percent less motivated now than they did when they first entered the service, 31 percent feel just as motivated, and 8 percent feel more motivated than when they entered the service. Woreda-level staff show the least change in motivation (13 percent) and federal staff the most (21 percent). Staff in the agriculture sector show the largest decrease in motivation (21 percent).

Figure 5.10: 'Imagine when you started your motivation was 100. What number would you say it is now relative to that?' By tier of government



211. Section 5.3 below explores a number of motivation issues further. The survey did not cover questions of how lack of motivation exactly affects what staff do – e.g. whether they slow their

pace of work, reduce the time spent at work, or are less friendly to customers – this may be something to explore in greater detail in repeat surveys that may be undertaken in future.

Motivation: a cross-country comparison

212. Many civil servant surveys ask questions related to the satisfaction of officials along multiple margins, typically their overall satisfaction with

their job, and their specific satisfaction with their wage and other benefits. Unfortunately, the precise wording of the questions varied across countries.⁵¹

Table 5.1: Level of satisfaction with job in the civil service: a cross-country comparison

	(1) All	(2) Ethiopia	(3) Ghana	(4) Indonesia	(5) Nigeria	(6) Pakistan
Satisfied with job [satisfied=1]	0.75	0.56	0.53	0.85	0.89	0.71

213. With overall job satisfaction, we can fairly straightforwardly compare amongst surveys in Ghana, Indonesia, and Pakistan, as these all ask about the experience of working in the public sector relative to the private sector.

Looking at the country averages in Table 5.1, we see relatively substantial differences, with 53 percent of Ghanaian civil servants being neutral or positively satisfied with their jobs relative to the private sector and 85 percent of Indonesian civil servants. The Nigeria survey, however, asks about their overall satisfaction with their job. Officials may feel that jobs in the private sector

are better than those in the public sector, but overall it is better to have a job than not at all. Such a story would be consistent with the fact that Nigeria has the highest overall level of satisfaction (with 89 percent of civil servants being neutral or positively satisfied with their job overall).

214. The question asked in the Nigerian survey is closely related to the question asked in the Ethiopian questionnaire (stated above). Fifty-six percent of the Ethiopian civil servants we surveyed stated that they were satisfied or very

⁵¹ In Ethiopia, officials were asked, "To what extent would you say you are satisfied with your experience of the civil service?" with options 'Very satisfied', 'Satisfied', 'Very dissatisfied' and 'Dissatisfied'. In Ghana, officials were asked to what extent they agreed with, "Working in the public sector is generally better than working in the private sector", "My salary is very satisfactory" and "My other benefits (pension, health, etc.) are very satisfactory". In Indonesia and Pakistan, they were asked, "How do you compare [your organization] as a place to work with private sector firms that are in a similar area as [your organization]?" and the extent to which they agreed that, "Your pay is fair compared to staff doing similar jobs in other [ministries]". In Nigeria, officials were asked directly whether they were satisfied with their current job, current income and working conditions. In the Philippines, the question was the extent to which they agreed that, "You are satisfied with the pay you receive for your work".


satisfied with their 'experience of the civil service'. This is substantially lower than the Nigeria average. We can make comparisons to the other countries, but as discussed in footnote 33, this is conditional on the comparability of the concepts assessed. Assuming they are comparable, Ethiopia's service has a similar average to Ghana, but lower than Indonesia or Pakistan.

215. We can also look at the distribution of satisfaction within and across government organizations. Figure 5.11 plots, for each organization in different samples of civil servants across these five countries, the proportion of civil servants in that organization that are neutral or positively satisfied with their job. These proportions are plotted against the percentile of average satisfaction at an organization within the country. Thus, Figure 5.11 shows us that officials

at the median organization in the Ghanaian data are roughly 40 percent less satisfied with their jobs than those in the Indonesian data. A similar claim could be made about the comparison between Ghana and Nigeria, but this would be conditional on the wording issues outlined above.

216. We see that the profile of Ethiopia is very similar to that of Ghana, with both being relative outliers in the extent of variation their organizations exhibit in average satisfaction. The other surveys fluctuate between 60 percent and 100 percent of staff satisfied with their jobs overall. However, Ethiopia has one of the highest proportions of organizations in which all staff are satisfied or very satisfied. A crude characterization is that Ethiopia has a relatively low level of motivation as well as a relatively high degree of inequality across organizations.

Figure 5.11: Proportion of civil servants in that organization that are neutral or positively satisfied with their job



5.1.3 Inadequate leadership

217. Third on the list of main challenges identified by civil servants is the absence of adequate leadership in the organization, with 15 percent of federal, 9 percent of regional and 19 percent of woreda level staff identifying this as the most important obstacle to completing tasks effectively. Inadequate leadership is particularly important in the health sector (24 percent), and within the health sector at the woreda level, but much less so for the federal or regional level. At the federal level, inadequate leadership was especially flagged in the trade and education sectors; and at the woreda level also for the revenue sector. It is rarely flagged among regional-level staff.

218. In the open-ended section of the survey, 5.6 percent of respondents raised poor leadership as a particular reason for demotivation.⁵² While this is far below the frequency of salaries and poor conditions of work, it is still something that the government should pay attention to, as it can weaken particular organizations and areas of the public sector.

219. The quality of leadership had emerged quite strongly in the qualitative discussions, with the main question raised about whether consistently good leaders are selected in the public sector. In Ethiopia, political appointments start relatively low in the hierarchy of the public administration. On the one hand, this is an honest approach: in many countries, permanent secretaries, undersecretaries, and director generals are classified as 'civil servants', but nonetheless de facto are political appointees. Formally designating them as political appointees acknowledges this more clearly. On the other hand, selecting good managers who have

a thorough understanding of the services that are to be delivered matters.

220. Political appointees may at times be selected on criteria such as regional or group balances, or political loyalty. These criteria may come at the cost of having relevant expertise, or having a track record as a good manager. Moreover, seeking a political career can distract attention away from the good management of a ministry or agency, which requires focusing on the good use of internal resources and maximizing service delivery performance.


221. One particular issue which emerges from the ECSS is that leaders within the public service do not use performance information consistently. Thus, 46 percent of heads of departments believe that bad performance is addressed inconsistently or not at all; and a full 63 percent believe that poor performers either stay in their positions or their performance may be addressed on an ad hoc basis only. Conversely, most heads of agencies believe that there are no clear systems or criteria for rewarding well performing staff.

5.1.4 Last minute/ad hoc work requests

222. Around 30 percent of civil servants' time is used for ad hoc tasks that are not part of their main job. This is similar across tiers and sectors, (highest in agriculture with 33 percent and lowest in trade with 27 percent). Again, there is significantly more variation across regions with civil servants in Afar spending 57 percent of their time on ad-hoc tasks, compared to only 19 percent of the civil servants' time in the Dire Dawa, Harari, and Somali regions.

⁵² Inappropriate management, leadership practices, abuse of power - raised by 3.5 percent, and lack of qualified and competent leadership - raised by 2.1 percent.

Figure 5.12: What percentage of your time is used on tasks which are not part of your main job?



5.1.5 Delays receiving inputs from others

223. Delays in receiving required inputs from others is another important challenge encountered prominently at the federal level (15 percent), but less so at the woreda level (5 percent). The distribution is similar across all sectors (8-9 percent). There is significantly more variation in the distribution across regions, presenting a significant problem in Addis Ababa, where 23 percent of respondents identify this

as the main constraint, compared to regions such as Gambella or Harari where this problem was not selected by respondents.

224. In principle, the BPR has addressed workflows, including a focus on reducing idle time due to waiting for inputs from others. For those offices where this is a greater concern, it might be relevant to revisit whether workflows are still sufficiently well organized.

Around 30% of civil servants' time is used for ad hoc tasks that are not part of their main job


5.2 Other constraints and challenges

5.2.1 Rent seeking and corruption

225. Rent seeking and corruption are concerns in Ethiopia even if they are perceived to be less prevalent than in other countries in the

region. Notably Rwanda appears to control corruption more effectively relative to Ethiopia (see Graph 6.1). On the positive side, control of corruption is seen as continuing to improve in recent years.

Figure 5.13: Comparative progress in control of corruption, Ethiopia and Rwanda



Source Worldwide Governance Indicators 2017.

226. The areas that the government itself, as well as other sources, has identified as most prone to corruption include land management, revenue authorities, commercial licensing, procurement, and construction/public infrastructure. In these areas, civil servants on comparatively low salaries are interacting with significant economic interests, such as contracts worth the equivalent of millions of US-Dollars, or tax obligations worth thousands of US-Dollars. Corruption in service delivery sectors such as health and education seems to remain relatively uncommon.

227. Rent seeking was raised as one of the major challenges in the key informant interviews. According to several interlocutors, there is a widespread sense that requests for bribes are becoming more common. The areas that the government itself, as well as other sources, has identified as most prone to corruption include land management, revenue authorities, commercial licensing, procurement, and construction/public infrastructure. The Change Army reform and the Public Wing are considered as tools to limit rent seeking, which was explored in the survey and discussed below.

228. The revenue and trade sectors, in particular, raised rent seeking as constraints. For the Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority, reducing corruption is a major challenge. Taxpayers have a significant incentive to offer bribes to tax officials so as to reduce assessed tax obligations. Depending on the size of the taxpayer, the bribes being offered can be substantial. A Good Governance Plan has been produced annually since 2013. For the Ministry of Trade (MoT), corruption is seen as a significant challenge, as the MoT and Trade Office have a controlling function, and this creates incentives to offer bribes to evade controls. Areas considered as particularly prone to bribery include the speeding up licensing processes, and seeking approval for the import of goods – for example, when traders try to import goods that do not meet the technical specifications and standards set by trade institutions. Certificate of Competency (CoC) is another type of license that is seen to be prone to corruption. At the same time, non-government stakeholders interviewed for this argued that licensing requirements can be overly narrow and re-licensing requirements (overly) frequent.


229. The survey sheds some further light on this issue, mainly with regards to mechanisms for containing or combating corruption. Corruption was only named by 2.7 percent of civil servants as hindering work effectiveness. It was mentioned somewhat more frequently at the woreda level and in the agriculture, health, and education sectors. Corruption also appears to present a greater challenge in Oromia, but was not mentioned by respondents in Harari, Dire Dawa, or Addis Ababa. Generally, due to a limited number of targeted questions, the survey does not shed much light on how widespread civil servants believe corruption and rent seeking is.

230. The views regarding the effectiveness of different anti-corruption tools show a different distribution than might be expected. As tools to limit rent-seeking, civil servants saw the following as most effective: (i) the Change Army/'1 to 5' groups (26.6 percent⁵³), and (ii) complaints from users (23.8 percent) as the two by far most effective mechanisms. These are followed by: monitoring by managers (14.43 percent), internal audits (6.53 percent), monitoring by peers

(6.43 percent), ethics training (5.97 percent), eliminating red tape (4.92 percent), transparency of service requirements (4.60 percent), and Public Wings (3.45 percent). Only 1.3 percent thought that investigations by the Federal and Regional Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commissions were effective to limit rent seeking.

231. The Change Army is considered as effective in identifying solutions to rent seeking in the civil service by 65 percent of organization heads (Figure 5.15). Across all civil servants, the majority select the Change Army (specifically the '1 to 5') as one of the most effective tools at limiting rent seeking, suggesting the reforms perceived potential at dealing with this issue in the civil service (Figure 5.15). The organization in which this is raised in a very limited way is the Federal Ministry of Agriculture, implying that more work needs to be done in this tier and sector to strengthen the Change Army reform. The Public Wing is much less cited by the civil servants as a form of dealing with rent seeking, though it does appear to be more important in the trade sector at the regional level.

Figure 5.14: How does the Change Army deal with rent seeking? Heads of organization only.




How does the daily change army meeting deal with rent-seeking?

Source Graphs by Tier of government

⁵³ Percentages are for those referencing a particular tool as the most important. Frequencies are higher if including all those mentioning a tool/mechanism as among the top three.

Figure 5.15: Which of these tools do you think are most effective at limiting rent seeking?



Which of these tools do you think are most effective at limiting rent-seeking?
Indicator if selected

Which of these tools do you think are most effective at limiting rent-seeking?
Indicator if selected

232. Concerning the (limited) role of Public Wings in addressing rent seeking and corruption, perceptions of civil servants broadly match those of the Public Wing members interviewed. Most Public Wing members feel that corruption and rent-seeking problems are sensitive and are not discussed much at Public Wing meetings. For the health sector, Public Wing members mentioned that they had offered to contribute to a better monitoring of corruption in the sector, as they are able to see and hear many things. However, according to Public Wing members' accounts, this offer was not very welcome. Thus, if anything, the Public Wings' roles are even more limited in this

regard than civil servants may perceive.

233. In addition to the limited role of Public Wings, civil servants also expressed some concerns about how other employees and leaders in the organization would react if they sought to address rent seeking. Answers to the open-ended question "What is stopping you from further reducing rent-seeking in your organization or directorate?" are shown in 5.2. This suggests that organizational leadership needs to signal and demonstrate more clearly that it is committed to following up on rent-seeking allegations when they are raised by internal whistleblowers.

The Public Wings' roles are even more limited than civil servants may perceive

Table 5.2: Factors that stop civil servants to fight rent seeking. All civil servants.

No.	Response	Frequency	%
1.	Nothing	476	16.02
2.	Fear of retaliation from higher bodies/those involved in rent seeking	297	9.99
3.	Lack of commitment/negligence/reluctance among employees	203	6.83
4.	Strong network among rent seekers and higher government bodies	179	6.02
5.	Lack of awareness about rent seeking and its consequences	156	5.25
6.	Lack of transparency and accountability	134	4.51
7.	Lack of evidence/secret nature of rent seeking	125	4.21
8.	Leadership is not committed/leniency in leadership about rent seeking	121	4.07
9.	Wrong attitude towards rent seeking	117	3.94
10.	Rent seekers are not accountable for their deeds/no legal action taken against them/no real consequence	99	3.33
11.	Lack of strong check and balance system to fight rent seeking	87	2.93
12.	I don't know	55	1.85
13.	Favoritism/nepotism	53	1.78
14.	The legal system is weak on rent seeking/no rule of law	48	1.62
15.	The involvement of political leaders/higher officials in rent seeking/corruption	47	1.58
16.	Lack of commitment by officials to take serious measures on rent seeking/reluctance to catch the big fish	47	1.58
17.	Pressure/interference by political leaders	42	1.41
18.	Lack of readiness to take corrective action	41	1.38
19.	Lack of conducive environment to fight rent seeking	38	1.28
20.	Ethnic affiliation	38	1.28

5.2.2 Effective use of staff time

234. Hours Worked: According to the Civil Service Proclamation, the regular working hours of a civil servant should be determined based on the condition of the work, and should not exceed

39 hours a week. When asked about the *actual* number of hours they work a week, only 8 percent of staff worked the standard 39 hours: 33 percent of staff work less than the 39 hours and 58 percent work more. The majority of staff (41 percent) work 40 hours a week during a typical workweek.

235. Staff work an average of 39.5 hours at the federal level, 40 at the regional-level, and 40.5, at the woreda level; this is higher for managers, who on average work 46.6, 45 and 46 hours at the federal, regional, and woreda levels respectively. Civil servants employed in the trade sector work on average the least number of hours per week (39.5


hours), whereas those employed in agriculture work the most (43 hours). Where we find the most variation in the number of hours worked is across regions. Civil servants in Gambella work an average of 32 hours a week, compared to 49 and 50 hours among civil servants in Amhara and Tigray respectively.

Managers' use of employee time

236. Time use and coordination on tasks assigned: Civil servants in Ethiopia have an average of two superiors who assign them tasks regularly, and spend, on average, 57 percent of their time on tasks given to them by their direct superiors. This does not differ significantly across tiers, sectors, or regions. The majority of tasks in the civil service are assigned to staff by either director (47 percent) or team leaders (40 percent) from within the organization (see Figure 5.17). This is similar across tiers and sectors, with the exception of health and trade where deputy heads of the organization assign tasks in 8 percent and 9 percent of cases. Addis Ababa is where there is most variation in who allocates tasks to staff, with directors and team leaders from outside the organization accounting for 11 percent of task allocations.

237. A majority of respondents across all tiers believe their managers do not actively compete for their time and do not coordinate, leading staff to be overworked and overburdened. This perception of a lack of coordination that leads managers to assign an excessive workload is highest at the woreda level (61 percent), followed by the regional (58 percent) and federal (53 percent) levels. The level of coordination is similarly low across sectors, the trade sector showing the highest level of coordination, with 44 percent of respondents saying their managers coordinate, and ensure their time is used effectively and reasonably. The lack of coordination is especially important in Dire Dawa where 84 percent of respondents say there is a

Figure 5.16: Hours worked by civil servants per week (staff and directors only)



lack of coordination in the allocation of tasks and use of time, leading them to be overworked. Staff in the Somali region indicate the highest level of coordination, with 47 percent.



Figure 5.17: "Which of these groups regularly give you tasks as part of your formal work duties?"




Meetings

238. To measure the perception on the effectiveness of meetings, respondents were asked about the proportion of meetings that i) stick to a fixed agenda, ii) achieve meeting goals in the minimum amount of time, and iii) are of substantive use to daily tasks.

239. Pre-determined agendas. Federal staff seem significantly more positive about the effectiveness of meetings than staff at the regional and woreda-

levels. Pre-determined agendas appear to be more commonly used at the federal levels with 51 percent of staff believing that meetings stick to a fixed agenda more than 75 percent of the time. This is significantly higher than at woreda-level, where only 30 percent of meetings are perceived to stick to an agenda more than 75 percent of the time (Figure 5.18). The distribution is similar across sectors, with 30-38 percent of respondents believing meetings stick to an agenda in more than 75 percent of cases.

Figure 5.18: Perception of proportion of meetings that stick to a fixed agenda




Source Graphs by Tier of government

240. Goals of meeting are achieved in a minimum amount of time. Perceptions on the proportion of meetings which achieve their goals in a minimum amount of time are overall lower across the tiers, but especially so at the woreda level where 52 percent of respondents think meetings achieve this less than 25 percent of the time (Figure 5.19). The education sector appears to struggle with this most, with only

12 percent of respondents believing meetings achieve their goals in a minimum amount of time more than 75 percent of the time, and 53 percent believing this happens less than 25 percent of the time. Conversely, the agriculture sector does best, with 25 percent believing goals are achieved in a timely manner in 25 percent of cases, and 44 percent believing it happens in less than 25 percent.


Figure 5.19: Perception of proportion of meetings that achieve their goals in minimum time



241. Usefulness of meetings. When it comes to the usefulness of meetings towards the daily tasks of respondents, federal staff are more positive than regional and woreda-level staff. While 37 percent of federal respondents believe meetings are useful in more than 75 percent of cases, 45 percent of woreda staff believe meetings are useful in less than 25 percent

of cases (Figure 5.20). Meetings appear less useful in Gambella, where only 4 percent of respondents think meetings are useful more than 75 percent of the time, and where 57 percent think they are useful less than 25 percent of the time. This contrasts with the Tigray region, where 42 percent think meetings are useful in more than 75 percent of cases.

Figure 5.20: Perception of proportion of meetings that are of substantive use to daily tasks




242. The survey thus suggests some areas of improvement with regards to time use. Overall, working hours appear to be broadly reasonable, but the balance across regions may need some attention, to avoid both excessive working hours and overly short hours. There appears to be some scope to further improve management practices with regards to time use of staff, coordination when assigning tasks, and ensuring an effective use of meetings, in particular at regional and woreda levels.

5.2.3 Satisfaction and perceived advantages and disadvantages/satisfaction/experience

243. As noted earlier in this report, staff satisfaction in Ethiopia is quite low, but it is also quite dispersed across organizations. In the survey

“To what extent would you say you are satisfied with your experience of the civil service?” The data shows that around half of civil servants are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied at all tiers, but are particularly so at the federal and woreda level and less so at the regional level (see Figure 5.21). Agriculture staff are the least satisfied, with a 49 percent satisfaction rate, followed by health staff with 56 percent. Female staff appear to be more satisfied with their experience with the service, with 67 percent satisfaction compared to 52 percent among men. The youngest staff (25 and under) in the service are more satisfied than any other age groups (60 percent); another group with high satisfaction rates are those who have been in the service between 30 and 35 years (74 percent satisfaction). The following sub-sections further explore specific aspects of satisfaction.

Figure 5.21: “To what extent would you say you are satisfied with your experience of the civil service?”




Advantages of working in the civil service

244. Job security. Job security is the principal attraction to the civil service, particularly at the regional and woreda levels (42 percent and 41 percent respectively). This is the main attraction for trade staff in particular (46 percent), and for staff in the Somali (70 percent) and Gambella (64

percent) regions, less so for staff in Amhara and SNNPR (both 33 percent). As noted above, this suggests that civil service positions are particularly attractive in regions with limited private sector formal employment opportunities.

Figure 5.22: What would you say are the advantages of working in the civil service relative to the private sector? Job security. By tier and sector



245. Opportunities for learning. The attraction offered by opportunities for learning is considered the main attraction of the civil service by federal staff with 30 percent, compared to 27 percent at the regional and 28 percent at the woreda-level. The distribution is similar across sectors and most regions, with the exception of Tigray, Somali, and Dire Dawa, where staff give higher importance to the learning opportunities offered by the civil service (52 percent, 37 percent, and 35 percent respectively). This is not considered as important a factor by both the eldest civil servants (between 50 and 60 years) and those that have been in the civil service for more than 30 years.

246. Career Opportunities. Career opportunities

are the main attraction for 22 percent of federal employees, 15 percent regional employees, and 21 percent woreda employees. Revenue staff are the least likely to have been attracted into the civil service by career opportunities with 16 percent, and health staff the most, with 23 percent. Career opportunities are a main attraction in the Somali region (25 percent) and least in Harari (10 percent). Similarly, career opportunities as an attraction to join the service are less important the older the respondent is (ranging from 25 percent to 10 percent). It is also less of an attraction for those respondents who have been in the civil service longest. The attraction of career opportunities is more important for those respondents who are confident they will be promoted if they perform well.

Figure 5.23: What would you say are the advantages of working in the civil service relative to the private sector? Opportunities for learning. By tier and sector






Figure 5.24: What would you say are the advantages of working in the civil service relative to the private sector? Career opportunities. By tier and sector



247. Prestige. Prestige is particularly low at the federal level (8 percent), and increases somewhat at sub-national levels, to 11 percent at the regional and 14 percent at the woreda levels. Prestige is most important as an attraction in the health sector with 14 percent. Somali is the region in

which prestige represents a main attraction (31 percent), compared to the lower-ranking regions of Amhara and Benishangul-Gumuz, both with 6 percent. Typically, the importance given to prestige as an attraction to the civil service decreases with the number of years served in the civil service.

Figure 5.25: What would you say are the advantages of working in the civil service relative to the private sector? Prestige/ social status. By tier and sector



248. Overall, these preferences as expressed by civil servants suggest more of a 'security' and less of a growth mind-set. This is reflected in the relatively lower values attached to opportunities for learning and expected career development.

As noted above, the very low prestige that civil servants perceive particularly at the federal level is a cause of concern in terms of having a high caliber, effective civil service that can play a critical role in social and economic transformation.


Most favored and painful aspects of the civil service

249. In addition to the closed questions concerning working in the civil service, respondents were asked, "what is the best thing about working in the civil service?" and "what pains you most about working in the civil service?" as open-ended questions without providing pre-determined options.

250. The responses can be categorized into broad themes, under which certain patterns of preference

are discernible. There are three main perceived benefits to working in the Ethiopian civil service: (i) the opportunity to serve the public and/or Ethiopia (38 percent), (ii) the job security and pension (26 percent), and (iii) the opportunity for learning and career development (13 percent). This indicates a significant public service orientation and patriotism as a motivation.

Figure 5.26: Favored aspects of working in the civil service





251. In terms of greatest pain, the most frequent responses referred to low salaries, with 41 percent of respondents indicating this as the most painful aspect. It is followed by a lack of training and learning opportunities (8 percent), and the lack of benefits (7

percent). The observation that a share of civil servants find training opportunities to be lacking, indicates that there is an unfulfilled potential, i.e. at least some civil servants see more learning opportunities as even more critical than improving salaries.

6

Options for the Way Forward





252. Based on the discussion in the preceding chapters, this section outlines what might be done going forward. The suggestions made are mindful of resource constraints and seek to minimize suggestions that would have a substantial fiscal cost. In moving forward, the Government of Ethiopia, and the Ministry of Public Service specifically and in collaboration with other ministries, can build on the substantial reform efforts and progress that have already been made, and which indicate that Ethiopia has a good capacity to pursue reforms once the direction of these has been agreed upon and decided.

253. The proposed implications draw on the survey as well as on the qualitative analysis undertaken. As described in Section 1.2, the survey covers staff working in ministries, bureaus, and offices down to the woreda level, but for the agriculture, education, and health sectors, it does not include front-line service delivery staff such as extension workers, teachers, or doctors and nurses. The qualitative analysis has included discussions on front-line service delivery issues, such as training needs, needs for additional resources, and others. The team has also reviewed existing key information on specific service delivery challenges in the five sectors (see Annex 1).

254. The Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development, jointly with the sector ministries and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Cooperation, can play a critical role in deciding and supporting the implementation of further public sector reforms, with the Reform Directorates of sector ministries being a key interface. Most of the recommendations provided below could first be piloted, e.g. for a set of organizations such as the regional bureaus of a particular sector, if that is an approach the government would like to take. The Ministry of Public Service would also have a critical role to play with regards to monitoring 'what works' and what improvements are being achieved,

and sharing such lessons with other parts of the government.

255. An overall insight, setting this analysis in the context of Ethiopia's overall development, is that it has been possible to achieve progress, and to have a relatively close alignment of policies and actions (i.e. a relatively low implementation gap), despite a relatively high level of dissatisfaction among civil servants. However, civil service improvements are a continuous challenge as the country develops, and as the complexity of development tasks grows; the suggestions made here are intended to provide a set of options for the way forward.

6.1 Recognize strengths and preserve what works

256. Ethiopia's public sector stands out for two main strengths: (i) a lot has been achieved with very limited resources and (ii) there is a relatively good alignment between taking decisions and actual implementation, so that practices such as targeting and monitoring are deployed relatively effectively. These two aspects

are very important strengths, and many other low income countries have struggled with these aspects. Thus, in seeking to address challenges such as staff motivation and reducing delivery bottlenecks, attention should also be given to maintaining and further developing these strengths.

6.2 Options for addressing the challenge of low motivation and low prestige of the civil service

257. Low motivation and low prestige appear as important aspects of the findings presented across several chapters of this report. Pursuing a 'developmental state' model, such low motivation

is particularly risky, since the state is meant to play an important role in the economy and in society. The following are potential options for seeking to improve motivation:

i Establishing a system based on competitive entry exams. Such processes have been used in Asian developmental states, as well as in parts of continental Europe. They create a greater sense that only the best and the brightest can join key positions in the civil service, and hence contribute to greater prestige. Specialized competitive exams can be used for recruitment into sectors. Selecting the best and the brightest is particularly critical for key economic policy functions, again in line

with the experience of previous developmental states such as South Korea or Japan.

ii Allocating greater funds for key operational tasks and systems. The findings presented in Chapter 5 indicate that having sufficient funds and systems (such as functioning IT systems) are the most important constraint to performance and to effectively delivering public services, and are the top level constraint mentioned by staff from all

five sectors. International research on the importance of this (e.g. relative to public sector pay and non-wage incentives) is limited; however, the specific constellation in Ethiopia suggests O&M as a key area with the greatest potential initial pay-off in terms of allocating additional resources.

iii Leadership selection and leadership training focused on motivating staff. The importance of good leadership for motivating performance is well recognized. Inadequate

leadership appears as an important constraint especially in the health and revenue sectors where concerns about leadership are voiced more frequently.

iv Seeking to understand further why motivation varies so greatly between organizations within Ethiopia. As addressed in Chapter 5.1, the dispersion of motivation among staff in different organizational units is very noticeable. This merits further exploration.

6.3 Options for further improving management practices

258. Over the past 10 to 15 years, the reforms pursued have been relatively standardized, and rolled out across all sectors (e.g. BPR, BSC, Change Army). In terms of current management practices, surveyed civil servants rate target setting and monitoring appear higher, and flexibility and staff involvement lower. Going forward, a more specific approach that addresses particular constraints

in sectors and organizational units would appear as useful, and contribute towards empowering/motivating staff – without losing the benefits of target setting and monitoring. The Change Army appears as a particularly well-regarded reform approach, and it is at least in part a more flexible and adaptive reform tool.

i Moving from general reform models to identifying and enabling sector and task specific improvements: As is described further in Annex 1, the specific challenges faced and the role and functions of staff differ across sectors. Making public service reform efforts more specific can entail at least two avenues: (a) The Ministry of Public Service may want to develop its further reform efforts in close collaboration with specific sector ministries, or clusters of ministries such as health and education, or trade and revenue; while at the same time keeping an eye on overall coherence, e.g. in terms of staff grading, pay scales, and recruitment standards; (b) within individual sectors, eliciting ideas from staff of potential organizational improvements (within their units and with regards to the sectors managed) could make valuable

contributions to improved service delivery. In addition, this may also contribute to an increased perception of staff involvement in terms of good management practices (see also Box 6.1 on problem-driven approaches to reforms). Within sector ministries, Reform Directorates can play a critical role in shaping public sector changes that support wider sector reform efforts and coordinating these with the Ministry of Public Service.

ii Consider rebranding the Change Army as Quality Circles: The case team workers seem comparable to “quality circles” in that they are a formal, institutionalized mechanism for participatory problem solving, peer to peer learning and continuous improvement of performance. However, the qualitative interviews and dissemination discussions indicate that

the Change Army system is perceived to be politicized and there is too much emphasis on attitudes and not enough on knowledge and constructive problem solving. Rebranding the Change Army will encourage team members to cooperate with one another to focus on finding solutions for improving service delivery and to steer away from fault finding.

iii Facilitating learning across organizational units in the same sector/level of government:

The Change Army addresses peer learning within organizational units. However, given that there are significant differences between units within the same sector in terms of motivation and management scores, it would seem useful to facilitate learning across such units.

iv Consider enhanced staff involvement in policy formulation and monitoring functions. Greater autonomy and flexibility,

as well as greater involvement in policy and monitoring functions is expected to contribute to staff satisfaction, and to facilitate attracting, retaining, and motivating well-performing staff. The latter aspect is particularly critical, as low motivation has been identified as a central driver that limits performance.

v Better use of staff time should receive attention to improve overall public sector efficiency.

The wage bill essentially pays for a set of staff time, skills, and efforts. As the survey indicates, ad hoc tasks, and meetings that are not sufficiently pertinent and which are not efficient, in particular at woreda levels, reduce public sector efficiency. Investments in leadership training can include greater guidance on how to use time and how to conduct meetings efficiently and in a way that supports organizational performance.

Box 6.1: Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA)
as a way to generate specific reform options

The Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation approach suggests that problems provide common windows through which agents can examine their contexts, identify necessary changes, and explore alternatives to find appropriate solutions. It argues that problems can be used to drive processes of state capability building in practice; given the need to construct problems, deconstruct problems, and then promote problem-driven sequencing.

The first step in doing PDIA is **constructing problems** out of conditions, drawing attention to the need for change and bringing such change onto the social,

political, and administrative agenda. In order to achieve these impacts, the focal problem needs to reflect on a performance deficiency that cannot be denied or ignored and that matters to key change agents. The construction process involves gathering key change agents to answer four questions: "What is the problem?" "Why does it matter?" "To whom does it matter?" "Who needs to care more?" and "How do we get them to give it more attention?" It is important—in principle and practice—to think about who answers these questions (and frames the problem). It provokes reflection, mobilizes attention, and promotes targeted and context-sensitive engagement.

The second step is **deconstructing problems** into manageable problems. The problems identified in the first step are usually difficult to answer because the problems are complex and the “right” solutions are hard to identify. Therefore, one needs break the problems down into smaller components that are more open to localized solution building. This involves deconstructing the problem to reveal its causes (where one can ask what is going wrong and why), and look for workable solutions to these problems. Deconstructing problems in this manner also helps one identify multiple points at which to pursue short- and medium-term successes (or quick wins), which are vital when dealing with a big problem that will likely only be solved in the long run (and which is therefore not likely to attract the needed short- and medium-term political support).

Deconstruction provides the basis for the last step, which is **problem-driven sequencing** in the change process, where sequencing refers to the timing and staging of interventions and engagement. It begins with recognizing that most deconstructed problems take the form of meta-problems (with many dimensions and indeed many problems making up the larger problem). Solving these problems requires multiple interventions, which allows multiple entry points for change. Each cause and sub-cause is essentially a separate—albeit connected—point of engagement, and each causal dimension offers different

space for change or readiness. The change space is contingent on contextual factors commonly found to influence policy and reform success, shaping what and how much one can do in any policy or reform initiative at any time. Authority, Acceptance, Ability are found to be critical in influencing space for change /readiness.

- “Authority” refers to the support needed to effect reform or policy change or build state capability (political, legal, organizational, and personal). Some change needs more authority than other change, and it is always important to assess the extent of authority one already has—and the authority gaps that need to be closed.
- “Acceptance” relates to the extent to which those who will be affected by reform or policy change accept the need for change and the implications of change. Different types of change require different levels of acceptance (from narrow or broad groups and at different depths) and the key is to recognize what acceptance exists and what gaps need to be closed to foster change.
- “Ability” focuses on the practical side of reform or policy change, and the need for time, money, skills and the like to even start any kind of intervention. It is important to ask what abilities exist and what gaps need to be closed.

Source | Andrews, Pritchett, and Woolcock (2017).

6.4 Options for incentivizing performance and professional growth

259. Findings discussed in section 5.1 and 5.2 (perceived advantages/disadvantages of the public sector), and section 4.1 on the treatment of staff suggest that there is a perception of limited opportunities for growth. Staff believe that opportunities for promotions are slim, and

- i **A first consideration should be to create more training and learning opportunities for staff.** Staff should be more widely encouraged to scale up their skills, knowledge, and competencies. This can take various forms, e.g. class-room based learning, but also temporary assignments to different tasks, as well as on the job mentoring. As the report has noted, staff seem to be reluctant to admit to skills gaps, despite these being widely noted by key informants, as well as by Public Wing representatives. An approach that combines stronger assessments of actual skills, competitive entry, and greater opportunities for learning can contribute to an upgrading of competencies of staff, as well as contributing to job satisfaction and motivation.
- ii **It is important that staff action is taken with regards to staff who are identified as poor performers, and to provide recognition to**

even opportunities for training and learning are limited. Also, while a performance system is in place, it does not offer much in terms of rewards for good performance, and poor performance is not dealt with systematically.

- good performers.** While regular performance assessments have been put in place through the BSC reforms, survey responses suggest that the follow-up on assessments remains limited (see section 5.1.3). A lack of follow up may make staff reluctant to make strong investments in better performance.
- iii **Consider to somewhat expand promotion opportunities.** As reflected in Chapter 4 of this report, while staff believe that promotions are largely merit-based, there is also a perception that promotion opportunities are limited. A lack of promotion opportunities is also cited as the most important reason for turnover. While we have to be careful to make causal assumptions, it seems that limited opportunities for promotion also contribute to declining motivation among staff. Some broadening of promotion opportunities should be considered in pay and grading exercises.

6.5 Ensuring that tools and systems work as intended

- i **Pay attention to deployment and usability of ICT systems.** Staff clearly struggle with systems being available and useable; and the latter includes the ability to reliably make phone calls. Investing in functioning ICT systems may have the greatest pay-off for revenue collection, followed by agriculture as a key productive sector. The required investments are not just in hardware and software, but also in the availability of requisite staff to provide trouble-shooting, software updates,

and so on, to ensure continuous usability.

- ii **Simplify reform tools.** Interventions that are simple are more likely to be implemented sustainably. The BSC is a good tool in principle, but remains difficult to use effectively, and in practice, the process of target setting, monitoring and performance assessments remain challenging. There appears to be some scope for simplification on the one hand, and for automatization on the other.

6.6 Demand-side accountability for reforms and further service delivery improvements

260. Citizens' feedback mechanisms that work are important for strengthening the service delivery orientation of the public sector. As has been discussed in Chapter 3 of this report, the Citizens Charters, the tool that was expected to provide citizens' power to know and ask their rights is considered to be a relatively unimportant and less successful reform tool by implementers. Similarly, the key informant interviews suggest that the level of activity, seriousness of the engagement, and usefulness of Public Wings

vary. The understanding of the role of Public Wings is not complete and the Public Wings are not consistently well organized for an effective discussion within each sector. At the same time, civil servants themselves perceive that they are paying substantial attention to feedback from citizens and clients.

231. The following avenues could be pursued to further strengthen accountability and effective feedback mechanisms:

- i Surveys of civil servants such as those carried out for this report should be complemented by surveys of service users.** This would be extremely valuable for understanding whether there are matches or mismatches in perceptions. Findings could then be fed back to public sector managers to take action and monitor future improvements. Such surveys could also serve as an incentive for identifying and rewarding particularly well performing teams. Such efforts could initially be piloted in selected urban areas to limit costs.
- ii Continuing efforts should be made to develop Citizens Charters and effective complaints mechanisms.** Citizens Charters appear to be less effective than desirable, while some progress appears to have been achieved already on which further efforts can build. Charters should be clear and realistic, e.g. in terms of processing times. The government can also consider making Citizens Charters legally binding, as has been done in India through the adoption of a 'Rights to Public Services Act'.⁵⁴ It also appears as important

to monitor patterns of complaints and how complaints are addressed.

- iii Opportunities for more effective public-private partnerships for effective service delivery.** There is a need for increased formalization of the Public Wing consultation mechanisms, also in terms of agreed actions and follow up on such actions. It may be relevant to consider arrangements that enable more issue specific discussions, either through the formation of sub-committees (e.g. on cancer care in the health sector), or through the advance announcement of meeting agendas for Public Wing meetings. Moreover, there are areas in which the government can consider to 'do less' or crowd in private sector contributions more, e.g. through involving the private sector in the continuing training of specialists.
- iv Improved communication:** The government may consider to communicate more explicitly and widely about what public sector reforms are being pursued, why, how, and with what expected results. This will

⁵⁴ This would require ensuring that resources are available to service delivery units to stay reliably within targets set in Citizens Charters, or else such an approach could trigger substantial litigation.

help stakeholders to be then attentive to what is actually being done and to provide feedback and proposals accordingly.

- v **Broaden opportunities for feedback:** The main feedback channel from citizens/service users to specific organizational units currently are complaints mechanisms, e.g. in the form of boxes to collect complaints,

and then follow up by staff and managers as appropriate, as well as Public Wing meetings. It may be helpful to broaden the feedback being solicited from 'complaints' to 'suggestions, ideas, and complaints'. This way, service users would feel encouraged to also contribute ideas of what could be done better, and to provide additional channels for 'bottom-up' communication.





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Annex 1

Specific Issues in Focus Sectors

1. This section reviews the particular challenges in the way that civil service reforms have taken place in the five sectors selected as a focus for this analysis. The selected sectors are agriculture,

education, health, revenue administration, and trade. This section briefly highlights the particular issues that were raised by representatives from the five sectors.


A1.1 Agriculture

Key sector dynamics

2. Agriculture is one of the critical economic sectors for Ethiopia, and the government has made significant efforts at supporting increases

in agricultural productivity (Figure A1.1). Available data suggests that taken together, important increases in productivity have been achieved, while further progress remains highly important for food security as well as to enable further growth in per capita incomes, especially in rural areas.⁵⁵

Figure A.1.1: Increase in cereal yields, Ethiopia compared to East Africa, 1992-2014



Source: FAO statistics (2016).

⁵⁵ This will also require a further shift in the allocation of labor from agriculture to industry and services as highlighted by the recent SCD. These issues are not explored further here.

3. Two key challenges for effective government action on agriculture have been how to ensure strong competency both at the Ministry of Agriculture and in its outreach, via agricultural extension services. With regards to the former, the Ministry of Agriculture was one of the first federal ministries that underwent restructuring as part of the BPR reform process in 2006-2008. As part of this reform process, the number of staff in the ministry was reduced from about 270 to around 70. This very significant cut in staff numbers was associated with a loss of capacity, as well as the creation of some wider resentment and concern about civil service reforms, and the BPR in particular.

4. In order to regain some of the capacity that was lost as part of the reform process, the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) was established in late 2010.⁵⁶ As an agency headed by a CEO, the ATA is an institution sitting 'outside' the regular public service structure, similar to a number of other agencies that have been established in recent years.

5. The main current reform efforts in the agricultural sector include a focus on the Change Army, as well as the application of the Balanced Scorecard (BSC) for setting targets and assessing performance. At the grassroots level, the Change Army effort that has been initiated in recent years is centered on 'model farmers' that are identified for using good practices. It is also applied to upstream levels of government agencies involved in the sector, up to the level

of the Federal Minister and State Minister. As for other sectors, the idea is to form '1 to 5' clusters of 'change teams'. In principle, model farmers should have greater credibility than development agents, given that they are selected based on their greater productivity and successful use of inputs.

6. Within the Federal Ministry, 'Change Army' efforts are cascaded from the level of the Minister, through the mid-level management, to specific teams. At each of these levels, weekly or bi-weekly meetings are held to discuss potential best practices and improvements. Consistent with the emphasis on 'internal' as well as the 'Public Wing', issues that are discussed concern both internal processes as well as consultations with external stakeholders. The latter also includes a review of complaints received. 'Good governance' issues are a cross-cutting concern of these discussions; for example, to ensure that scarce resources such as per diems are appropriately allocated, or that discussions on procurement processes take place. Land issues are also a major concern, and a frequent point of discussion with external stakeholders.

7. Staff reviews based on the BSC are held twice a year. In principle, efforts are being made to identify good performers, and provide at least some rewards for such performance (e.g. monetary rewards, opportunities for further study). As in other ministries, performance is assessed in terms of achievement of results (60 percent) as well as behavior (40 percent).

Discussions with public wing representatives at the federal level

8. Representatives of organizations that have been asked to join Public Wing meetings for the agricultural sector have mixed views: on the one

hand, a number of representatives stressed that their specific interactions with specific directorates, agencies, and institutes under the Ministry are

⁵⁶ See also: <http://www.ata.gov.et/about-ata/origin-history-2/>.

very useful and productive; on the other hand, the general public wing discussions as such are seen as useful, but also rather broad, as well as ad hoc in terms of the issues being discussed.

9. Public wing representatives find that professional staff in the Ministry of Agriculture and other related agencies are not consistently and sufficiently knowledgeable, and that this

limits their overall effectiveness in policy development and support to the sector. Public Wing meetings as such remain ad hoc – the idea to create a permanent secretariat was discussed, but has not been pursued further. Public Wing members are asked to provide evaluation feedback on the directorates of the ministry; but this is not seen as very deep or effective, since representatives cannot fully assess the performance of many directorates.

Staff survey results for agriculture

10. On average, management scores across the five categories set out in section 3.6 of this report are similar to those of all sectors; however, the spread among different organizational units in the agricultural sector is wide, and many units are below the mid-point. Nearly 60 percent of all organizational units are rated below the mid-point. The wide spread of perceived management practices may need further attention, in particular to understand further where and why low scored units are seen negatively by staff, and whether this matches with service delivery performance.

11. Staff in the agricultural sector particularly rarely cite learning or professional development as an advantage of working in the public compared to the private sector. Inadequate resources are most commonly cited as a constraint by agriculture staff compared to the other sectors (by 46 percent), while other factors are relatively much less important (lack of motivation and inadequate leadership are mentioned by 12 and 13 percent of staff). The higher share of citing resources as a key constraint is especially driven by federal level staff expressing such a view far more frequently than in other sectors.

Information available on front-line staff delivery challenges from other sources

12. With regards to front-line service delivery, the number of agricultural 'Development Agents' was rapidly expanded, but with many quality and associated effectiveness challenges. Most development agents recruited into the public service have received two years of training at Agricultural Technical and Vocational Training (ATVET) colleges. Similar to tertiary training institutes for other professions, the number of such colleges was rapidly expanded over the past two decades, from an initial nucleus of a few established Colleges of Agriculture. This led to a deterioration of the training content. Moreover, practical training for prospective

development agents is very limited. This reduces their credibility vis-à-vis farmers, and their ability to provide advice and assistance that is effective in increasing productivity (e.g. practical knowledge about the use of improved seeds, application of pesticides and fertilizers, etc.).

13. Development agents themselves have a more positive perception of their knowledge and the quality of training they've received. According to the 2016 Development Agent Tracking Survey, development agents assess their own knowledge as sufficient, but raise the issue of insufficient in-service training and lack of opportunities for

further training.⁵⁷ A relatively low share (21 percent) agreed that they had methodological knowledge and skills gaps, and only 3.6 percent assessed that they had gaps in technical knowledge. Over 90 percent of surveyed development agents thought that the theoretical and practical training at ATVETs was adequate.

14. The same Tracking Survey shows that households have some satisfaction with the services provided by development agents, in particular with regards to advice and services related to crop farming and natural resource

management. There is less satisfaction with regards to animal husbandry, and information provision regarding markets and water (see Table A1.1). Thus, development agents are seen as helpful in some areas, but less so in others. The survey also suggests that the level of general effort by development agents is substantial, with many visiting assigned households/farmers at least once a month, for a typical assignment under 600 households, despite most development agents not having access to motorized transport.⁵⁸ The Tracking Survey does not report in detail the number of households assigned to each DA.

Table A1.1: Percentage of farmers' qualitative rating on the extent of DA-FES helping farmers to address technical problems

S. N	Package	Success/result (%)		
		Adequate to very adequate	Average	Below average
1	Crop farming	48.3	29.0	22.7
2	Animal husbandry	32.4	29.9	37.7
3	Natural resources management	49.2	23.3	27.5
4	Land tenure security and certificate provision	44.2	14.9	40.9
5	Market and water information provision	23.5	21.1	55.4
6	Establishment and strengthening of self-help group and cooperatives	37.4	26.7	35.9
7	Others(WASH) related advice, good governance and other community interests	47.3	23.0	29.7

Source DA Performance Tracking Study, January 2015, MoA.

⁵⁷ A 'Tracking Survey' of Development Agent Services was prepared on behalf of the Ministry of Agriculture in 2015 (published in 2016). It covers six regions: Tigray, Gambella and Afar, Amhara, Oromia, and SNNP.

⁵⁸ Over 67% of the interviewed farmers reported 1-4 meetings a month. The outreach figures seem to be on the high side, as for an assigned number of 500, a development agent would need to visit 25 households per day on every working day. Development agents do complain that they are not regularly receiving free weekends or leave.

15. In addition to very significant limits in the quality of training, concerns have been voiced that development agents typically have very limited funding for operating costs (see also Negera 2014; Gebru 2012). One crucial limitation that this creates is that development agents can rarely travel to visit farmers further away from kebele centers. In surveys undertaken for groups of development agents in specific regions, motivation is seen as quite low and turnover as substantial.

16. Turnover among development agents in the six regions covered by the Tracking Survey is quite high at 38 percent, and thus notably higher than for the civil service on average (10 percent). Based on the survey, development agents voice a number of key concerns: (i) heavy workload with limited resources; (ii) insufficient pay and benefits relative to health extension workers and teachers; (iii) few opportunities for further education and career progression; (iv) being burdened by additional responsibilities that are not part of the core job description.

17. The additional responsibilities given to development agents include 'facilitating tax collection', organizing and mobilizing farmers for communal development activities, and organizing and mobilizing farmers for administrative and political purposes and activities. Sixty percent of surveyed development agents reported that these 'auxiliary' activities take up a substantial share of their working time (up to 50 percent); and a

Civil service issues and reforms in the sector

19. Regional and woreda education bureaus recruit teachers. Most teachers are trained at one

majority of development agents would prefer not to be involved in such activities.

A1.2 Education sector

Key sector dynamics

18. For the education sector, the sheer scale of the recent rapid expansion of service delivery poses major challenges. As in other low-income countries, the Ethiopian education sector is grappling with the challenges of providing universal free access to primary and secondary education, while at the same time ensuring at least a basic quality. The numbers of schools and enrollment levels have rapidly increased over the past two decades;⁵⁹ however, quality issues have been noted with regard to infrastructure, as well as curricula and the capabilities of teachers, and ultimately learning outcomes. Recent ambitions to universally have three languages of instruction – the local language, English, and Amharic – further increase the challenges. Learning assessments that have been carried out since 2000 for grade 4 show a slight worsening in terms of performance over time.⁶⁰ Apart from increasing to a level of 100 percent enrollment at the primary level, key government goals for the sector under GTP II include having a primary school within a 2.5 kilometer radius, and a secondary school within a 10 kilometer radius. Furthermore, the provision of free school meals is intended to be expanded as a way to improve retention rates.

of the current 36 Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs). While teachers' basic knowledge is generally seen

⁵⁹ Net Enrollment Ratio (NER) for primary education (grades 1-8) expanded from 24.9 percent in 1996/97 to 87.9 percent in 2009/10. The government aims at a NER of 100%. The student-teacher ratio is still very high; a Service Delivery Indicator survey carried out in 2014 measured an average ratio of 54.5, with a higher ratio (69:1) in urban compared to rural areas (46:1). http://www.majersite.org/issue16/16_3.pdf/

⁶⁰ See PAD 2013.

as sufficient, with some gaps related to English, pedagogical skills are very limited. More broadly, teaching is not seen as an aspirational career choice, and consequently, TTCs have been unable to enforce a strong enough selection of candidates to be trained.

20. The Federal Ministry of Education has sought to utilize civil service reform tools as well as other means to improve performance in the sector. The main reform tools that are currently being applied are the BSC and the 'Change Army'. In addition, the education sector has invested in establishing an Education Management Information System (EMIS) that captures service delivery data and is intended to make it easier for the staff in education bureaus to assess progress with regards to delivering education services. However, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this report, education sector staff, especially at regional and federal levels, widely criticize that the system does not contain sufficiently useful data (about 31.7 percent at the regional and 55.6 percent at the federal level).

21. BPR-focused reforms were implemented in the sector in the 2000s, from the federal level to the level of district education offices. Overall, BPR reforms are currently seen as not having been a 'good fit' for the sector, and having resulted in some capacity losses that had to be subsequently recouped. The emphasis on streamlining processes in general has greater relevance for institutions that are involved in particular approvals, such as issuing licenses, than for MDAs involved in service provision. One of the departments that was eliminated as part of the BPR effort was that for teachers' licensing and re-licensing. This has been re-created more recently, given that ensuring good enough quality of teachers poses a key challenge in the sector.

22. In contrast, the implementation of the BSC approach is seen as suitable for the sector and as contributing to the pursuit of better results.

Targets are being set for the three state ministers responsible for different parts of the education sector, and are then further broken down for particular directors and teams. The education sector has been the first sector to automate its BSC processes. Targets and the measurement of results achieved are based on the data collected in the EMIS, and also include information on required resources.⁶¹ Individual assessments are carried out (with a 60/40 weighting for the achievement of results and behavior/attitudes), using the automated system. The average rating is 88 percent, seen as a 'B' rating ('A' ratings are 94 percent and above). Out of over 500 staff in the Federal Ministry of Education, 24 employees were identified as high performers last year. The ministry seeks to provide some performance incentives to such staff, including paid vacations and visits abroad.

23. A 'Change Army' approach has been used in the education sector since 2011-12. The tool is highly valued by the leadership of the ministry, with the Minister calling it 'the best reform tool' given its more problem-solving approach. At the same time, acceptance of this approach in different parts of the sector has been mixed, with strong uptake in some parts and resistance in others. For example, '1 to 5' teams are being used by teachers to help improve teaching methods, and have been proposed for students. There has been some resistance, e.g. some potential 'model students' have complained that they need to spend time completing their own assignments rather than dedicating most of their study time to helping others; and similar concerns have been raised by

⁶¹ BSC related performance targets and assessments are only done for policy and administrative staff, not for front-line staff, i.e. teachers.

some faculty staff at tertiary level institutions. Considerations are under way to re-brand the approach as 'cooperative learning' to move away from the military campaign connotations associated with an 'army'.

24. In parallel, the Education Sector Management Information System (EMIS) was introduced at the woreda level from 2009-2010 onwards.

Prior to the introduction of this system, it was difficult to generate aggregate data on education sector trends in a given woreda from various manually maintained files. Some recent research suggests that the EMIS program led to significant improvements in education service delivery through increased information availability for decision makers. However, as discussed above, a substantial share of survey respondents were still quite skeptical about the quality of data contained in the EMIS, indicating that such a reform is a continuing effort.

25. As other spending ministries, the Federal Ministry of Education is keen to dedicate additional resources so as to be able to improve service delivery.

Specific changes that are currently being sought include an increase in the starting salary of teachers, and introducing housing options and transport packages for teachers. For students, the intention is to introduce free school meals to increase retention rates. This fiscal year, school meals have already been introduced for children in drought-affected areas, with a significant effect on dropout rates in those areas.

26. In parallel, the Ministry of Education is seeking to tackle quality constraints the rolling

out of in-service testing, licensing, and re-licensing.

As a start, 20,000 teachers have taken tests on a voluntary basis. The intention for GTP II is to rollout testing to all 500k + public sector teaching staff, and to devise an approach that not only involves paper-based tests but also includes observation of teachers' performances in the classroom. Failure to pass these tests is expected to result in mandatory additional training. This would initially be offered free of charge by the government through summer training programs, but might subsequently also require teachers to pay.

27. On the positive side, while management scores are above those of other sectors, motivation is frequently cited as a challenge.

Management scores in the sector are somewhat above those for all sectors on average, while the ordering of best to less well performing aspects is the same. Low motivation appears to be a significant issue in the sector among the types of staff surveyed. A high share of respondents see promotions and treatment as merit based.

28. Overall, the education sector reflects the dynamism, ambition, and challenges affecting the civil service in Ethiopia -

the latter including the significant needs for additional resources. Given the scale and the planned further expansion of the education sector, investing in higher salaries and working conditions for teachers and rolling out a stronger supervision system will involve significant costs. As a basic service, the government has been able to access grants or concessional financing to some extent for the sector.

The EMIS program has lead to significant improvements in education service delivery

A1.3 Health sector

Key sector dynamics

29. Similar to the education sector, the health sector has seen a rapid expansion in recent years,⁶² but quality continues to pose major challenges. Thus, Ethiopia made good progress towards the MDG targets of reducing the mortality of infants and of children under 5 years of age. However, the MDG on reducing maternal mortality was not met, even though an initial significant reduction was achieved – from 1,400 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 420 deaths per 100,000 births by 2013. For all health indicators, there are still significant differences between more and less developed regions of Ethiopia (Ethiopia MDG report 2015).

30. As for other fields, the training that medical students receive tends to be focused on theoretical learning, and does not involve sufficient practical training. The number of

tertiary institutions providing training for health care workers has rapidly expanded, as has the number of students graduating annually; but as for the other sectors, this fast expansion has been associated with a dilution in quality.⁶³ As the Health Sector Transformation Strategy notes: “There are concerns about validity and consistent implementation of certificate of competence assessment for low and mid-level healthcare providers. There is a need to put structures and processes in place to review ethics and competence of health workers at facility, district, and regional levels.” (MOH 2015: 47).

31. Assessments of clinical knowledge conducted in recent years show a mixed picture: 71 percent of all health care providers were able to correctly diagnose key medical conditions such as malaria, TBC, and post-partum hemorrhage (SPA 2014: 242). Adherence to medical guidelines for managing the conditions was lower, ranging from around 30 to 50 percent for different diseases and aspects of guidelines (EPHI et al. 2014).

Civil service issues and reforms in the sector

32. BPR reforms were seen as a more problematic reform. The application of BPR in the sector mainly focused on analyzing institutional structures and human resources in health. Survey results indicate that compared to other sectors, the view that BPR reforms achieved its objective of reduced processing times is less common in the health sector.

33. The introduction of the BSC reform evolved over almost a decade. BSC as a management tool was introduced into the sector starting in 2006, with considerable interest from the Federal Ministry (BSCI 2013). However, interest flagged somewhat after a change in leadership at the Federal Ministry of Health. One challenge was an initially very high number of strategic

⁶² Between 2005 and 2013, the number of small health posts or clinics nearly quadrupled from 4,211 to 14,416, the number of health centers increased from 519 to 3,245, and the number of public hospitals grew from 79 to 127. According to Ministry of Health data, primary health service coverage reached 93.4 % of the population in 2012/13 and 94.0 % in 2013/14.

⁶³ The number of public higher educational institutions have increased from eight to 57. Of these, 34 are universities and hospital-based colleges offering degree programs while 23 are regional health science colleges offering technical and vocational qualifications (level 1 to 5). Private health science colleges have also flourished, with 24 institutions offering accredited programs as of 2012/2013. [...] Graduation output from higher educational institutions has increased close to 16-fold from 1,041 in 1999/2000 to 16,017 by 2012/2013. (MOE, 2014; MoH 2013; Jhpiego, 2014). <http://www.moh.gov.et/documents/26765/0/Health+Sector+Transformation+Plan/5542a23a-9bc7-46a2-8c1f-8b32c2603208?version=1.0>.

objectives (over 80). A simplified approach was developed in 2009/2010, with support from the Balanced Scorecard Institute, a US-based management consultancy. This was followed in 2011-13 by a process of 'cascading' the overall goals, derived from the MDGs to specific targets for health teams. However, challenges remain with actually monitoring progress, as well as with providing incentives for delivering good or improving performance.

34. Views on the BSC are somewhat mixed, while they are more positive on the Change Army.

For the BSC, a substantial share of respondents (over 50 percent) see it as having been drawn

out, and training and awareness as having been insufficient. While BSC reporting and use of BSC targets appears now fairly well established especially at federal and regional levels, the use for rewarding good performance or taking action on poor performance is still limited in this as in other sectors. The Change Army reform is assessed positively by a majority of respondents, in terms of improved workplace attitudes, spread of best practices, and improved efficiency and service delivery; views on a number of these dimensions are more strongly positive among regional than among woreda level health sector staff (in particular with regards to workplace attitudes and improved efficiency).

Information available on front-line staff delivery challenges from existing sources

35. Absenteeism appears to present a significant problem, in part associated with incentives to practice privately on the side.

Given the balance of opportunities, medical professionals either leave the civil service or start taking up private practice on the side. According to a facility survey, the average absenteeism rate from a facility is 33 percent (see also Lewis 2006).⁶⁴ The 2014 SPA+ found a similar absenteeism rate of 33 percent, of which facility management did not authorize 9 percent (EPHI et al. 2014).⁶⁵ Absenteeism rates were highest in health posts and for health extension workers (40 percent), for whom 17 percent of absences were unapproved. As the Health Sector Transformation Plan (2015) notes, there is an urgent need to generally improve Human Resource Management practices in the sector (MOH 2015: 47).

36. Recent information does not indicate a high level of dissatisfaction with health care services, and suggests some possible improvements over time, but available information remains limited.

Interviews were conducted with those using health care services for the SPA (a sample of 1,908 individual health care users countrywide). As a countrywide average, 10 percent of caretakers of children complained about long waiting times to see a provider (with a range of 2 to 24 percent across regions). On average, 9 percent complained about the absence of medicines at a facility (ranging from 3 to 19 percent), and 8 percent about insufficient explanations about the illness, ranging from 1 to 25 percent. Given that health care services are still very basic, the level of complaints seems limited, with the caveat that the sample size is rather small (EPHI 2014).

⁶⁴ Focus groups in Ethiopia among health workers revealed common understaffing due to late arrivals, long breaks and a general disregard for the necessity of staffing clinics. Absences are frequently motivated by responsibilities at second jobs. Lack of management and manager's reluctance to confront physicians inspires lower level workers to behave accordingly, leading to high absenteeism and low productivity at all levels. (Lindelov, Serneels and Lemma, 2003). <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.542.2159&rep=rep1&type=pdf>

⁶⁵ Based on a sample of 3,383 individual health service staff.

37. Earlier research based on focus group discussions undertaken in 2003 reflected a greater level of dissatisfaction. “Both health workers and users provide a sobering account that indicates a high level of distrust and frustration with the public health system” (Lindelov and Serneels 2006: 2228). Complaints included slow service and long waiting times, no service orientation among providers, poor diagnostic knowledge, as well as growing corruption due to increased opportunities to ‘leak’ medicines and medical supplies as well as staff time to private practice. The difference in results between 2003 and 2014 suggests a ‘direction of travel’ towards improvements; however, the research designs are very different and both have significant limitations.

38. Complaints mechanisms at the facility level appear to be still very scarce. Among health facilities other than health posts, only 19 percent had a feedback mechanism for clients, and among health posts, the level was even lower, at only 6 percent (among the 802 facilities surveyed). The ratio is significantly higher for referral and primary hospitals (59 and 52 percent respectively) (EPHI et al. 2014: 35).⁶⁵

39. An important initiative in the sector is the Health Development Army, which, similar to the other sectors discussed here, has been established as a way of social mobilization and the spreading of good practices. Under the related ‘Health Extension Program; the government has invested in rapidly training thousands of health extension workers, doubling their numbers to 38,000 from 2011-2014.⁶⁶

40. As in the education sector, reports on the health sector highlight the need for substantial additional resources in order to facilitate further progress in expanding and improving service delivery. This includes a need to further scale up staffing (see Health Sector Transformation Plan 2015),⁶⁷ as well as further investments in the quality of initial training, certification, and continuous learning. According to the 2014 SPA+, only 50 percent of most types of health facilities have the level of staff that is defined as the norm for this facility (EPHI et al. 2014: 37).

A1.4 Revenue sector

Key sector dynamics

41. The current Ethiopian Revenue and Customs Authority (ERCA) is a relatively recently created agency. It was established in mid-2008, when the Ministry of Revenue, the Ethiopian Customs Authority, and the Federal Inland Revenue Authority were merged. The agency is currently headed by a Director General and five Deputy Directors General, and has 34 offices across Ethiopia, as well as external posts in the port of Djibouti and in Burbera, Somalia.

42. An important challenge is that revenue collection relative to GDP remains limited, albeit gradually increasing. For FY15/16, tax revenue reached 13.5 percent, up from 11.7 percent five years earlier. Identified causes include a mix of policy (tax exemptions) as well as administrative issues.

⁶⁶ Ethiopia’s Fifth National Health Accounts, 2010/2011 (2014). Government of Ethiopia: Addis Ababa. <https://www.hfgproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Ethiopia-Main-NHA-Report.pdf>.

⁶⁷ “The doctor, health officer, nurse and midwife to population ratio is 0.7 per 1000 population, far behind the minimum threshold of 2.3 doctor, nurse and midwife to 1000 population ratio required to ensure high coverage with essential health interventions (revised HRH strategy-MoH, 2014)”.

See:<http://www.moh.gov.et/documents/26765/0/Health+Sector+Transformation+Plan/5542a23a-9bc7-46a2-8c1f-8b32c2603208?version=1.0>

Civil service issues and reforms in the sector

43. ERCA exemplifies the challenges related to staffing and recruitment: staffing has been significantly scaled up in recent years - from 6,095 in 2011 to 11,500 in 2015. In addition to the expansion in staff numbers, turnover is particularly high for the agency. As a consequence, hiring has been in the order of 2,000-3,000 staff per year. The agency has established a relatively intensive 3-month long induction training for new recruits.

44. The creation of ERCA was in part linked to the BPR reform process. The BPR review of the previously existing MDAs responsible for revenue collection was started in late 2007, and concluded that a merger would help to reap efficiencies and to streamline processes, including with regards to trade facilitation, i.e. making the settling of customs and tax obligations and refunds easier. In the view of ERCA's current leadership, while the BPR reforms are outdated, there is a continuing need for ongoing Business Process improvements.

45. In principle, business process efficiency and reliability are crucial aspects for a revenue agency, given that it has a large number of clients who must be served, while at the same time, it must be credible that compliance will be enforced if necessary. Moreover, how the revenue agency functions has a direct bearing on the state's ability to raise revenue, taxpayer compliance, as well as on the business sector - which is in turn critical to promoting growth and to job-creation.

Consequently, continuous monitoring and improving of business processes has significant relevance for an institution such as ERCA.

46. As an agency with a mandate that is critical for the government, and in line with practices in several other countries for revenue agencies, ERCA has been allowed to offer higher salary levels than those used in other MDAs. ERCA's salaries range from 4,000 Birr at the lowest to 14,000 Birr at the highest level. While this was significantly higher than salaries offered by other agencies at the time of the agency's establishment, there is now a sense that pay levels for civil servants in other areas is 'catching up', and that ERCA's salaries are therefore no longer as attractive. As for other sectors for which interviews were conducted, ERCA's management is also seeking permission to further increase remuneration levels.

47. Despite offering higher salary levels, turnover has been extremely high - reaching levels of up to 50 percent of staff - and is one of the crucial concerns of ERCA's management. Several reasons are seen as important: the challenges of being a tax auditor, remote postings for some of the customs staff in particular, as well as the fact that businesses like to hire staff that have been trained by ERCA so as to assist with their tax compliance. Also, most staff are hired to ERCA directly after completing their BA or higher-level degrees at universities and colleges, and such young employees tend to be more mobile.

Businesses like to hire staff that have been trained by ERCA so as to assist with their tax compliance.

48. ERCA management is seeking to address high turn-over, and as part of this is paying particular attention to the hiring and promotion of female staff – who have been identified as less likely to leave the agency, and who are also seen as more resistant to corruption. Because of this strategy, currently 51 percent of ERCA's staff is female (compared to 34 percent for the civil service overall), and in 'decision-making' roles (team leader and above), female staff account for 30 percent. Among staff dismissed for corruption in recent years, 91 percent have been male, and 9 percent have been female.

49. Reducing corruption is a major challenge for ERCA. Taxpayers have a significant incentive to offer bribe payments to tax officials so as to reduce assessed tax obligations. Depending on the size of the taxpayer, the bribes being offered can be substantial. In 2013, the then head of ERCA and a deputy director general were arrested on corruption charges. A Good Governance Plan has been produced annually since 2013.

50. The range of current reform tools is also being pursued in ERCA. The BSC is being implemented since the start of GTP I; divided into six strategic areas and three plans (operational plan, revenue collection plan, and good governance plan). Thus far, the system is not automated and the manual compilation for thousands of employees is seen as burdensome, while the implementation of an automated system is being pursued jointly with the Ministry of Public Service. Furthermore, there are challenges with regards to ensuring that the performance assessments help to assess strengths and weaknesses. According to the survey, while

the BSC system is used for target setting and monitoring, staff see very little translation of individual BSC results into rewards or actions taken in the case of poor performance.

51. The Change Army system is being deployed across three levels: (i) employees, (ii) management, and (iii) taxpayers. Among employees, '1 to 5' meetings are held daily for 20-30 minutes, while other larger meetings are organized weekly at the division level, bi-weekly at the management level, and monthly at a larger scale.

52. The Change Army reform is seen positively also among revenue staff, albeit slightly less so than among other sectors. In particular, peer-to-peer learning is seen as a benefit, and efficiency and service delivery are considered to have improved. The spread of best practices is less frequently cited as a positive effect than among staff from other sectors. One reason for this could be that staff turnover holds back the establishment of good practices.

53. Citizens Charter efforts were introduced only in early 2016, and are still in the process of being rolled out. The aim is to clearly publicize the rights and obligations of taxpayers; and this has been rolled out to all 34 offices of the agency. ERCA has also formed of a partnership with private sector associations to jointly supervise tax and customs branch offices, aiming to identify issues and options for improvement.

54. A set of complaints mechanisms are in place. This includes a telephone hotline (which also receives anonymous complaints), an internal ethics

Taxpayers have a significant incentive to offer bribe payments to tax officials

office, and a tax appeals system for taxpayers. The number of customer service complaints has been increasing over time – which ERCA’s management sees as related to having become more pro-active in terms of publicizing taxpayers’ rights.

55. Discussions of ERCA management with public wing representatives were started in 2015, while the level of activity and the impact is seen as constrained thus far.

In the focus group discussion, held in late 2016, the following issues were raised: while a policy exists on Citizens’ Charters, these are not consistently available/ displayed at regional and woreda levels. There is also a concern that tax and customs officers are not consistently knowledgeable, and as a consequence rules are applied unevenly, and it can be difficult for entrepreneurs or traders to receive correct information on payments due. The interaction through the Public Wing helps to spread knowledge among the business community about existing tax and customs rules. Public Wing discussions have also raised the need for some legal amendments or clarifications. After an initial effort of carrying out assessments of key issues for improvements was completed, follow-up action was limited, and there is a perception that the Public Wing meetings are a formality. One area for which follow-up was observed were initial improvements in working environments and some improvements of customs services.

56. Given high staff turnover in recent years, there has been a constant need to induct new staff in the various performance and good governance tools being used in the agency.

The agency is seeking to ensure that new management staff in particular receives training on the BSC. Weak skills with regards to change management, motivating staff, and agency leadership towards realizing improvements are seen as ongoing challenges. Very high turnover inevitably increases a risk

that reform initiatives and particular efforts to implement them, e.g. within a given directorate, are not followed through. The wider initiative to reduce turnover to more moderate levels has therefore direct implications also for ERCA’s ability to make good use of the current set of civil service reform tools.

57. Apart from concerns about being able to pay wages that are sufficiently attractive, there are also other important resource constraints.

One important constraint is space: both to accommodate the growing number of staff, and to ensure that offices serving taxpayers are well organized, and function smoothly even during ‘peak periods’ such as the end of the month or the quarter. IT functionality is another important resource constraint. Both the current IT systems for customs (Automated System for Customs Data, ASYCUDA) and tax (Standard Integrated Government Tax Administration System, SIGITAS) that ERCA operates are considered to be in need of updating. Network interruptions render it difficult to use systems continuously. This is also confirmed by survey results. These indicate a very low availability of computers especially at woreda levels, and the fact that network access remains difficult – according to the survey, internet access is ‘good enough’ on 1 out of 5 days for revenue sector staff at woreda levels.

58. Certain functionalities, such as e-filing, do not really function reliably. The agency currently employs 70 IT specialists who support the running of systems throughout the country; however, there is also a constant need to ensure that this team has up to date skills and can assist all offices in a timely way. Furthermore, as ERCA officials point out, due to resource constraints, it is often necessary to make trade-offs between investing in facilitating voluntary tax compliance and investing in effective controls.

Available information on the impact of reform efforts

59. Revenue collection trends and limited existing research suggests that at least some improvements have been achieved in recent years. Revenue collection has increased since the establishment of ERCA, significantly in absolute terms, and gradually in terms of the ratio of revenue to GDP. In absolute terms, tax revenue (including customs duties) increased from 23.8bn Birr in 2007/08, the year prior to ERCA's establishment, to 196.2bn Birr in 2015/16, i.e. almost 8.5 times.⁶⁸ In relative terms, tax revenue (including customs duties) increased from 9.7 percent to 13.5 percent of GDP over the same period. At the same time, Debela and Hagos (2011) report for a small sample of tax offices and a customs office that a majority of taxpayers believe that there have been improvements in terms of waiting times at the tax administration (as of mid-2010).

A1.5 Trade sector

Key sector characteristics and trends

60. The institutional structures responsible for trade play an important role with regards to Ethiopia's economic development. The institutional structure consists of the Federal Ministry of Trade (MoT) and regional Offices of Trade and Industry. The Federal MoT also oversees the Ethiopian Commodities Exchange, the Consumer Protection Agency, and the Grain Trade Enterprise. The ministry and offices play an important role with regards to business licensing and regulation as well as with regards to trade facilitation. Business licensing is a decentralized function, while overall regulation is a federal prerogative. The Federal Ministry has 13 branch offices, primarily related to import and

export coordination. Thus far, export promotion has focused on agricultural commodities, while there is an intention to also strengthen the export promotion of industrial production – resource constraints permitting. In terms of staff numbers, the Federal MoT has 966 approved positions, out of which 491 positions were filled as of March 2016.

61. One fundamental challenge that the sector faces is its capacity to implement and, as needed, reform the existing set of rules and regulations. There are some inconsistencies among existing rules and regulations that have been identified, but still need to be addressed. Given staff constraints, it has been challenging to make progress on this agenda. Some observers also point out that it would be useful to consider whether there are sensible opportunities for reducing the regulatory burden. Any regulation that exists requires staff time and other costs associated with enforcement, while at the same time also typically increasing the cost of doing business. While many regulations serve important purposes – such as protecting consumers or ensuring that pollution is being minimized – some regulations can be duplicative, unnecessary, or not designed in ways that minimize the burden of compliance.

62. Corruption is seen as a significant challenge. The MoT and Trade Office have a controlling function, and this creates incentives to offer bribes for evading controls. Areas that are seen as particularly prone to bribery is to speed up licensing processes and seeking approval for the import of goods – for example, when traders are trying to import something that does not meet the technical specifications

⁶⁸ Source: IMF, all data for 'General Government'.

and inspection set by the trade institutions. Certificates of competency (CoC) are another type of licenses that are seen as prone to corruption. At the same time, non-government stakeholders interviewed for this report argued that licensing requirements in this regard can be overly narrow, and re-licensing requirements are frequent.

Civil service issues and reforms

64. The Federal MoT is engaged on the current civil service reform tools, while still seeking to define how best to use them. Similar to other federal ministries, the Federal MoT has a *Directorate of System Improvement and Human Resource Management*, which is meant to lead the implementation of civil service reform efforts for the ministry, in collaboration with the Planning and Information Management Directorate.

65. Survey results indicate that BPR reforms had a significant impact for the trade sector, which is consistent with its particular role. Especially federal and regional level staff agree that processes were dissolved or changed, and that processing times were reduced.

66. With regards to the BSC, this is seen as a good idea in principle, but posing challenges in terms of actual implementation. One key challenge is the availability of staff capable of formulating strategic plans, setting out a monitoring framework, and then actually monitoring implementation and the achievement of targets. For the assessments of individual staff, the lack of automation poses a problem. Staff assessments have been carried out for 2014 and 2015. The Ministry of trade is engaging in discussions with the Ministry of Public Service of how best to develop BSC plans and documents, as well as on the automatization of evaluations for individual staff. According to survey results, at the federal level, actions taken in response to poor performance are training or

63. A success that has been achieved in recent years is the integration of trade administration with customs for clearing imports and exports.

An on-line system has been established for this. A key purpose is to be able to certify the standards of imports and exports, and to make sure that trade license requirements are checked when clearing customs.

reallocations; while nothing is done in response to good performance.

67. While key informants from federal sector management had some reservations about the relevance of the 'Change Army' for the sector, survey results suggest positive perceptions. The spread of best practices, as well as overall sector efficiency and performance is seen as having improved by trade sector staff across all levels of government.

68. A revised Citizens Charter is being prepared but was not yet published by March 2016. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Trade sees itself engaging more frequently with representatives of the private sector. Meetings with the Chamber of Commerce and with sectoral associations are being held regularly at quarterly intervals, or more frequently when needed. As part of those consultations, draft legislation is also being shared with stakeholders. Currently, the MoT and trade offices do not yet operate hotlines to receive complaints; but plans exist to establish such a mechanism.

69. The Public Wing representatives for the trade sector are mainly chambers of commerce as well as some other associations. Chambers of commerce exist at the federal and regional levels, as well as in over 500 cities. For over a decade, there have been various efforts at developing public-private dialogue, with support from various development partners, and an MoU was signed

between the federal Chamber of Commerce and the Ministry of Trade. There is some concern about maintaining a sufficiently active dialogue, as well as about the follow up to suggestions raised.

70. Overall, the range of civil service reform tools – BSC, Change Army, Citizens Charter, good governance plans, and Public Wing engagements – is not seen as an excessive burden; however, there are multiple reporting requirements and requests for these plans and strategies that are seen as burdensome as well as repetitive. Also, given the institutional mandates, it is not always easy to set clear and quantifiable targets against which performance can be measured. This concern

is very much consistent with findings from other countries regarding performance management, as reflected in the literature on civil service reforms (Hood 2006; Pollitt; etc.).

71. As for the other sectors considered for this report, the federal Ministry of Trade faces significant resource constraints. As a regular ministry, Ministry of Trade offers standard salaries starting at 2,800 Birr/month and up to 5,700 Birr/month at the director level (~130-263 USD). Consequently, positions often cannot be filled with qualified staff. In addition, the office space of the ministry is particularly constrained and old.

Annex 2

Methodology Notes for the Civil Service Survey

72. This chapter covers the methodology of the questionnaire development; followed by details of the translation, the interview format, enumerator training, team assignment and quality assurance; and how the sample was selected.

73. The aim of the Ethiopia Civil Servant Survey is to gather micro-level data on the perceptions and experiences of civil servants, and on the key restraints to civil servants performing their duties to the best of their abilities, and to the provision of public goods. This civil servant survey aims to contribute to the development of diagnostic

tools which will allow us to better understand the incentive environments which lead to different types of behavior and the determinants of service delivery in the civil service. What distinguishes civil servant surveys from other types of surveys is not only their scale and scope, but the clear shift from form to function. Much of the previous work in civil service reform defaulted to optimal 'forms' for the civil service motivated by theory. Through the creation of improved survey modules, the survey builds a foundation for the systematic collection of data directly from individuals with first-hand experience.

Building on existing civil servant surveys

74. The Ethiopia Civil Servant Survey is part of the 'Strengthening Research on the Civil Service' (SRCS) initiative, which aims to develop the evidence base for public sector reform by understanding the characteristics of public officials and the systems and organizations in which they work. The SRCS aims to develop improved methods of data collection and analysis on the civil service, based on a complementary set of quantitative and qualitative approaches.

75. By experimenting with survey design, the project aims to create a new flagship survey on civil service staff and organizations around the world. The project has developed several civil servant surveys across sub-Saharan Africa to assist governments in diagnosing key reform issues. To inform these efforts, existing surveys of public officials are continually reviewed to assist in the development of a database of questions and methodologies. The Ethiopia Civil Servant Survey questionnaire draws extensively from this database, but expands upon it by including a set of modules aimed at addressing country-specific

issues. The survey follows and expands upon similar work in Nigeria (Rasul and Rogger 2010) and Ghana (Rasul, Rogger, and Williams 2015).

76. Survey of Civil Servants: Nigeria. In 2010 a research team, in partnership with the Nigerian government, visited institutions across the country to interview civil servants to answer some of the key questions arising from the public administration literature and the debate on why bureaucracies in the developing world often fail to fulfil their duty of providing critical services that support the capabilities of its people. To answer these questions -Why do civil services fail to deliver public goods so much of the time? What are the key bottlenecks to effective service delivery? What is the experience of a civil servant working in a developing country bureaucracy? - 4148 civil servants from 63 organizations across Nigeria at all three tiers of government were interviewed. The survey was split into a quantitative questionnaire and a qualitative discussion process. This first questionnaire forms the basis of the Ethiopian civil servant survey.

Questionnaire structure

77. To obtain reliable information on public-sector organizations, it was important to recognize that protocol and language-use in civil services are country-specific. The questionnaire was therefore created in consultation with members of the Ministry of Public Service and Human Resource Development (MPSHRD), a World Bank qualitative mission from 7th to 17th March 2016, and a number of pilot interviews conducted to ensure question viability, as well as to ensure question wording and phrasing remained relevant and suitable to the Ethiopian context.

78. The questionnaire aims to gather information on the experience of civil servants in the service. It

aims to understand the challenges faced by public officers in their daily duties. It includes questions on the demographics and work history of officers, how officers entered the service and their current relationship to it. It asks about their job - how satisfied they are, what they expect their career trajectory to be in the next few years. It asks about their local environment, and the engagements they face daily.

79. In order to ensure questions remained relevant to each broad level of staff within the Ethiopian civil service, the questionnaire was split into three tracks: an employee-level track, a director-level track and a head-of-organization (political



appointee)-level track. While some modules were covered in all three tracks, some modules were designed specifically to be administered to specific tracks only, and not to all sampled individuals.

80. Below is a brief outline of all the sections covered by all three tracks and the purposes behind them:

- **Demographics and Work History:** The purpose of this section is to obtain basic characteristics of the official. This allows us to separate the experience of the service by different groups. It also investigates the career trajectory of the individual civil servant, and thus what the context of their experience of the service has been to date.
- **Time Use and Bottlenecks:** This section explores how the official uses their time during a typical work day or week, and what the obstacles they face at work are. This module incorporates experimental methods for the measurement of time use in order to help build the knowledge base of how best to measure this aspect of civil servant life.
- **Stakeholder Engagement:** This section explores who the official interacts with in their day-to-day. It aims to understand their current relationships in the service, and how this determines their experience.
- **Reforms:** This section aims to give us a sense of how individual officials feel about

government reforms, and how these have impacted operations on the ground in each of the organizations.

- **Information:** This section aims to explicitly assess the level of information that officials (directors and employees only) have about the demographic conditions of their jurisdiction and the state of services in their respective sectors.
- **Information technology:** The purpose of this section is to investigate information systems in the organization, the type of information available and how accessible it is.
- **Public service motivation and locus of control:** This section uses the Perry (1996) Public Service Motivation Scale and Levenson's IPC scale (1981) to measure motivation and behavioural characteristics of civil servants.

81. Below is a brief outline of the sections covered by the **employee-level track** only:

- **Recruitment and Selection:** The aim of this section is to identify the criteria on which recruitment into the service is based.
- **Attitude:** This section explores officers' attitude to their job and their organization; their feedback sources; how satisfied they are; what they believe drives promotion in the organization; their position relative to career

goals, and how much they identify with the mission and objectives of their directorate, their organization and the service as a whole. The purpose of this section is to get a sense of officers' motivation and the sources from which they derive it.

82. Below is a brief outline of the sections covered by the **director-level track** only:

- **Turnover:** This section investigates the structure and nature of turnover in the organization from a management perspective.

- **Management practices:** This section determines the nature of core management practices from the frequency of monitoring, through what is done with that data, to procedures to implement targets.

83. Below is a brief outline of the only section of the survey administered to political appointees only through the **head of organization-level track**:

- **Benchmarking:** A short section to assess the extent to which woreda operations benchmark against indicators measuring institutional quality.

Questionnaire design by module

Demographic and work history

84. Objective: Collect data on basic characteristics of the individuals that make up the civil service.

85. Rationale: Designing effective policy and implementing it efficiently and fairly requires bureaucrats and the organizations they work in to have the requisite capacity, incentives and motivation. The question "what makes a good civil servant?" is thus an important one. Despite their importance, existing data on the basic characteristics of civil servants and their trajectory

through, and experience in, the civil service is extremely limited. The aim of this module is to collect basic statistics on the individuals that make up the civil service. This will not only provide a snapshot of the composition of the civil service, but it will allow for the investigation of if and how individual characteristics and experiences of the civil service affect perceptions, motivation, and performance.

86. Methodology: Basic questions on age, role, tenure and educational background.

Management practices

87. Objective: Adapt the existing World Management Survey (WMS) instrument to the public sector (civil service) to measure the quality of management practices within and across civil service organizations.

88. Rationale: To measure the quality, and degree of adoption, of 18 management practices in the civil service sector to shed light on how the correlation between bureaucratic output/

productivity and management practices vary with bureaucrat characteristics (measured using additional questions on their tenure, employment history, intrinsic motivation, and perceptions of organizational corruption).

89. Methodology: 1) Review the public administration literature on management (e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1986, Wilson 1989), as well as the WMS methodology (Bloom and Van Reenen,

1997) to determine how to approach the creation of an adapted instrument for the civil service setting. 2) Create a new instrument measuring 18 key management practices relevant to the civil service context, measurable on a scale of 1-5, and covering questions on operations, performance tracking, target setting and people management.

90. The management section (director track only) was based on an adapted survey methodology described in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and previously employed in the manufacturing, retail, education and healthcare sectors. These dimensions are investigated through open ended questions measuring the adoption of 18 basic management practices, where the degree of adoption is evaluated on a scale of 1 to 5, where a higher score indicates a higher level of adoption.

91. The management section was first adapted to the civil sector setting in Nigeria in 2010, and then applied to the Ghanaian civil service in 2015, taking account of insights from the public administration literature. Adapting the WMS instrument to the civil service setting (first in Nigeria, then in Ghana, and most recently in Ethiopia) required extensive consultation with members of the relevant collaborating

organizations in undertaking the questionnaire development process. At its inception, a number of pilots using semi-structured interviews like those used by Bloom and Van Reenen were held to outline key similarities and deviations from the original WMS methodology (Rasul and Rogger 2016). Adapting the Nigerian/ Ghanaian-setting instruments to the Ethiopian context required only minimal changes in terminology (e.g. changing the term 'unit' to the more service-relevant 'directorate').

92. For each organization the focus was on the two dimensions of management practice most focused in earlier academic work: (i) the autonomy provided to bureaucrats; (ii) the provision of incentives and monitoring of bureaucrats. The autonomy index captures the extent to which: (i) bureaucrats input into policy formulation and implementation processes; (ii) the flexibility with which bureaucrats can be reorganized to respond to best practice and project peculiarities. The incentives/monitoring-based management index captures the extent to which an organization collects indicators of project performance, how these indicators are reviewed, and whether bureaucrats are rewarded for achievements reflected in these indicators.

Turnover (Public Sector Staff Turnover Study 2014)

93. Objective: Recapture the state of turnover in the civil service.

94. Rationale: To add weight to the findings of the Public Sector Staff Turnover Study (2014) and to provide additional instruments for validation checks.

95. Methodology: The items of this module were directly transported from the Public Sector Staff Turnover Study (2014), which itself was designed to measure actual turnover and intentions to quit. The Ethiopian civil servants survey uses only the items measuring actual turnovers and the drivers in order to allow validation checks.

Recruitment and selection

96. Objective: Investigate individuals' perception on the recruitment and selection strategies used by their organizations.

97. Rationale: Recruitment and selection has an important role to play in ensuring employee performance and can play a pivotally important role in shaping an organization's effectiveness and performance. The purpose of this section is to investigate individuals' perceptions on how they believe selection and reward decisions are made in their organization. By providing data on

individual's perceptions on the fairness of the system and what attracted those individuals to the job in the first place, these questions can tell us something about individuals' motivation to join, and stay, in their organization.

98. Methodology: Questions on how individuals learned about open positions and were selected into those positions; and the factors that influence how staff are treated. Questions were formulated in such a way as to elicit what practices are in place without biasing the respondent.

Attitude

99. Objective: Collect data on individuals' attitude towards different aspects of their job in the civil service, and how this affects their satisfaction and motivation levels. The questions go beyond traditional issues of job satisfaction and focus on individuals' feelings and beliefs regarding satisfaction, value, mission and trust within the organization.

100. Rationale: Attitude is of great interest to the government as a method to improve public service delivery. Two of the recent major reforms, the BSC and the Change Army, have focused on employee attitude. The extent to which attitude could be a significant driver of service delivery needs to be addressed in order to say anything about these initiatives and similar future initiatives. Apart from important questions about job satisfaction, this module aims to investigate deeper issues related to individuals' attitude and intrinsic motivation, their sources of feedback, and how they perceive their career, the public service, and their value to and fit within their organization.

101. Methodology: Attitude and motivation is measured in relative terms: feedback sources,

career goals and relative performance, value of the public sector relative to the private sector, satisfaction of financial and non-financial rewards, mission alignment and trust levels. This section emphasizes process-focused motivation which produces judgments, experiences, and behaviors congruent with an emphasis on process (feedback, mission alignment, value) rather than outcome (salary, promotions). Only one question directly asks respondents to rate their motivation, all other questions in this module present respondents with preference/ choice questions to prevent answers from being biased by social desirability concerns. While most questions provide choice options for the respondent, a number of open ended questions have been included to ensure the module captured the strength of motivation, as well as the direction of motivation.

102. We supplement these questions on attitude through the investigation of BSC scores, which allows us to measure motivation in terms of level of performance at a goal-related task. The purpose of this is to determine the extent to which attitude scores on the BSC and positively associated with performance scores on the BSC.

103. This section is also supplemented with the use of the Perry (1996) Public Service Motivation scale and the Locus of Control scale, to determine the link

between stated motivation and intrinsic motivation and perceptions of control as measured by these standardized scales, see 12 for further details.



Time use and bottlenecks

104. Objective: 1) Methodological experiment: to investigate the strengths of 5 different time use data collection methods to measure how civil servants use their time during working hours. 2) To understand some of the key bottlenecks civil servants encounter in their day-to-day which prevent them from carrying out their tasks effectively.

105. Rationale: During the qualitative phase of the project, the inefficient use of time and the ineffectiveness of meetings were raised as concerns by the MPSRHD and key stakeholders.

106. Methodology: 1) Time use: Review of existing time use research methodologies to identify feasible methods to collect civil servant time use data. 5 different time use data collection

methods were identified: (i) direct questioning (1 week, short version); (ii) direct questioning (1 week, short version); (iii) direct questioning (1 month, short version); (iv) graphical method; (v) time use diary. For all employee-level civil servants outside of Addis Ababa one randomly chosen time use method was administered and all data was collected during the interview. Addis-based respondents were provided with a template time use diary, to be filled in daily for the duration of one week and collected by the enumerator at the end of the week. 2) Bottlenecks: Time use modules were supplemented with questions on the effectiveness of meetings and perceived bottlenecks to explore what some of the obstacles civil servants face at work on a day-to-day basis are.

Information

107. Objective: Investigate the degree to which information flows within and across civil service organization by assessing civil servant awareness and knowledge of conditions in their jurisdiction - demographic conditions and sector-specific conditions.

108. Rationale: Information has been cited as a severe constraint by civil service organizations in Ethiopia. Addressing this concern can only be done by understanding: the stock and distribution of information among and between different types

of civil servants, how information is disseminated, how it is used as a strategic tool, and what the barriers against effective information flows are.

109. Methodology: 1) Information booklet: an information booklet, containing information on the demographic and service indicators measured in the survey, was sent to randomly selected organizations to observe if and how far the information was disseminated throughout each organization. Furthermore, the comparison of responses to the information questions between those organizations that received the booklet and those that did not will provide a measure of the extent to which information flows to and through organizations. Correlating randomly induced changes to the stock of information to changes in productivity or changes in service delivery will also provide insight into the extent to which improved information can indeed lead to improvements in service delivery 2) Questions on uniform, verifiable items of information, constant across all civil servants: the Civil Service Proclamation was chosen to determine

the extent to which civil servants have knowledge of basic information they are assumed/ expected by the service to be familiar with. Basic questions on the tenets of the proclamation were asked. This provides a benchmark measure of information with which to compare jurisdiction-specific items of information. 3) Questions on demographic, jurisdiction-specific, verifiable items of information: these items measure the official's knowledge of the population, unemployment rate, and percentage of rural inhabitants of the jurisdiction. The responses can be measured against the official census data. The understanding of such characteristics could be key in the formulation of appropriate policies and determine the quality of service delivery. 4) Questions on sector-specific, jurisdiction-specific, verifiable items of information: these items measure the official's knowledge of sector-specific indicators in the jurisdiction, which can be measured relative to official administrative data. Understanding the existing state of service delivery could be vital in directing policies towards the right areas, and affect the overall levels of service provision.

Information technology

110. Objective: Understand the state of information technology and information management systems, the frequency of use, barriers to access and use, possible effects, and integration into the BSC.

111. Rationale: Information is considered a key constraint to service delivery in Ethiopia. In addition to understanding the level of information within organizations, understanding the information management systems and how they

are integrated into processes, and the barriers to full integration, will provide insight into the extent to which the functioning of systems facilitates effective information and service delivery.

112. Methodology: Respondents are asked directly about the existence and frequency of use of information systems, their perceptions of the major challenges towards integrating these systems into processes, and their possible effects.

Stakeholder engagement

113. Objective: To investigate the extent to which civil servants interact with individuals or entities outside their own organization.

114. Rationale: It is increasingly expected that to implement policy and deliver public goods effectively all those stakeholders concerned

should be engaged during the policy-making, design and implementation process to maximize the quality of information disseminated and received and its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the types of engagement are important and an imbalance of the relative influence of different stakeholders can negatively impact the design of

policy and the provision of public goods.

Reforms

116. Objective: To investigate general attitudes towards recent government reform efforts: whether reform has been helpful in improving service delivery and how; which aspects of reform to date have been lacking, in terms of awareness and implementation; and whether civil servants view the prospect of further reform favorably.

117. Rationale: Before embarking upon further reform, the government of Ethiopia has called for a study on the status of civil service reforms: how past reform has been received by civil servants; the elements of reform design and implementation that have limited acceptance and effectiveness. The aim of the module is thus not only to know if civil servants thought a reform was positive or negative, but *why* it was positive or negative.

118. Methodology: Addressing the broader question of whether reform in general has helped solve the problem of service delivery requires an understanding of the general feeling among civil servants toward reform and whether there is an appetite for reform moving forward. It was considered that evaluating the true impact of specific reforms would be more complicated among employees for the following reasons: (i) sample censoring (the large increase in the number of civil servants in the years since reforms were implemented resulted in a smaller sample of civil servants who can comment on the impact of such reforms); (ii) among those civil servants who were in

115. Methodology: Respondents are asked to consider key projects or tasks they worked on in the last year, and questions are asked on the type and degree of engagement with different stakeholders, public, private and community.

place when reforms were implemented there may exist a problem of recall; (iii) asking individuals about counterfactuals would not provide reliable information that is representative of civil servants' attitude towards reform; (iv) asking questions about the BSC (civil servants often receive a high BSC score and as such are likely to view it favorably) or the BPR (which resulted in the large-scale removal of employees and as such is likely to be viewed unfavorably, regardless of other aspects of the reform) could give us skewed results, (v) conversely, if civil servants are not directly affected by reforms in their day-to-day, they are less likely to have a strong opinion on that reform resulting in an 'average' opinion which has less clear implications for reform. In order to address these concerns the reform module was split into two tracks: (i) the employee- and director-level tracks covered reform in general terms (e.g. "What percentage of your activities in the civil service has been substantially affected by the following reforms?"); (ii) the head of organization (assumed to have a better understanding of past reform by nature of their position) track covered five key reforms in detail: Business Process Reengineering (BPR), Balance Scorecards (BSC), Change Army, Public Wing, and Citizens' Charter. In particular, regarding the BPR and the issue of distant recall, heads of organization were explicitly asked where they were working at the time of implementation, in order to identify the possibility of differential responses based on direct experience.

Woreda and city benchmarking

119. Objective: Incorporate existing measures of institutional characteristics at the woreda level to provide up-to-date information on woreda-level operations, to provide a source of validation checks, and to assess changes in institutional characteristics over time.

120. Rationale: The Woreda and City Benchmarking Survey (WCBS) has been ongoing in Ethiopia since 2005, covering 5 rounds of survey until 2012/13. This module of the survey incorporated items from the WCBS directly in order to observe the changes in institutional features at the woreda level over time, independent of the phrasing of questions. Furthermore, using existing and available data sources to validate the survey

data and understand why certain trends or changes have been experienced ensure a greater understanding of the quality of the data and/or the trends in woreda-level operations.

121. Methodology: 11 core items were identified from the latest questionnaire of the WCBS (round 5) to be directly relevant to woreda-level operations in terms of financial processes and audits; human resource management; participatory planning; community consultations and committees. The WCBS items themselves have been developed over previous rounds of surveying, leading to round 3 (2009/10) and round 5 (2012/13) forming a panel dataset in terms of variables.

Public service motivation and locus of control

Public service motivation (PSM)

122. Objective: Apply Perry's Public Service Motivation (PSM) scale (1996) to Ethiopian civil servants at all three tiers of government.

123. Rationale: To measure the degree of PSM among Ethiopian civil servants and investigate the interplay between intrinsic motivation (measured through the PSM scale) and extrinsic motivation (measured using questions on incentives, tenure and perceptions of organizational corruption).

124. Methodology: An unaltered version of Perry's original scale is used. The PSM construct is associated conceptually with six dimensions: attraction to public policy making, commitment to the public interest, civic duty, social justice, self-sacrifice, and compassion. The scale uses Likert-type items for each dimension. Self-administered questionnaire.

Locus of control (LOC)

125. Objective: Create a locus of control measurement scale for civil servants.

126. Rationale: To measure the locus of control of civil servants to better understand their beliefs about what determines the events that affect their professional lives. Understanding the locus of control of civil servants will give us an insight into how civil servants perceive control systems in their organizations and how this affects their motivation and performance levels.

127. Methodology: 1) Review of locus of control literature and existing measurement scale to determine how to approach the creation of an adapted scale for the civil service setting. 2) Create a new scale by combining an adapted version of an existing scale and a new sub-scale inspired

by the I-E scale. Levenson's IPC scale (1981) was identified as the most appropriate scale on which to build a bureaucracy-specific scale of locus of control. Self-administered questionnaire.

128. In order to adapt the IPC Scale to a civil service setting, each item in the scale was assessed in terms of how it could be applied to the professional life of a civil servant. In those instances where items were applicable to this setting, no changes were made. In those instances where items did not apply to the professional setting of a civil servant the wording was adapted, but without changing the underlying objective of those items. Some items required only a small change, such as replacing the word 'friends' with 'colleagues', whereas other items required a more substantial change. In order to ensure adapted items continued to capture the basic original ideas, careful consideration was given to the original rationale behind each item. Using this as a baseline, items were adapted to reflect the specific context of the bureaucracy without changing the

original rationale. The scale was also adapted in such a way that it would be relevant to all civil servants equally across hierarchies and sectors.

129. Based on our knowledge of the literature on public service, it was determined that there was one key aspect of a civil servant's life that would not be captured by the IPC scale: institutional or system constraints. Civil servants typically operate in environments regulated by strict rules and rigid structures which significantly impacts an individual's ability to use their discretion in how they act and behave in the workplace. In order to capture systemic control over civil servants' locus of control, a fourth sub-scale was added: Power of the System. To ensure consistency, it was determined that this fourth scale should complement the other three scales and should be inspired by Rotter's scale. Eight new items were included in this scale, each of which corresponds to one of the pre-existing three-item sets in the IPC scale, preserving the parallelism across the full adapted scale (becoming four-item sets).

Translation

130. Once developed in English, the questionnaire was translated into Amharic by a translator with experience in the civil service, in order to align the vocabulary of the document with that frequently used in the civil service, particularly those around the processes and reforms. The questionnaire needed to be in Amharic to generate greater understanding, familiarity, and comfortability of the respondents, particularly

those in more remote or developing areas. The translation went through a series of iterations, including consultations with the MPSHRD, the enumerators, and the Task Team Leader. The translated version of the document was used in a number of the practice interviews and was used in the pilot interviews, to verify the validity of the translation and to provide an opportunity for further feedback from actual respondents.

Method of interview

131. Face-to-face interviews were considered the best enumeration methodology, using SurveyCTO software through Android tablets, for this type of survey for various reasons:

- **Length of the survey:** civil servant surveys tend to be quite long, so it is important to ensure the respondent remains comfortable, engaged and focused throughout the entire

duration, which is more easily achieved in person than over the phone.

- **Complexity of the modules:** civil servant surveys include innovative and potentially complex modules which require the enumerator to gauge the level of understanding of the respondent, which is also more easily achieved in person.
- **Confidentiality and respondent ease:** it is significantly easier to achieve a rapport between the respondent and the enumerator in person, and this is of particular importance in relation to concerns about confidentiality.
- **Commitment:** respondents are more likely to commit to starting and completing the interview if they know someone has travelled to interview them (and it is also a

lot more difficult for them to pretend they are not there!).

132. In addition, due to their specific nature of questioning and aiming to minimize the duration of the survey, paper forms were used for: the Graphical Time Use option (measuring how civil servants use their time with a pie chart); the Time Use Diary (for civil servants based near Addis Ababa for logistical reasons, measuring their time use during an actual week with the use of an hourly diary); the Perry Public Service Motivation scale and the Locus of Control scale.

133. The questionnaire was timed to take approximately 1.5 hours for all sections, including the self-administered forms. The respondents were first presented with an introduction into the purpose of the survey and the confidentiality agreement, and were able to opt out of the survey if they did not feel comfortable.

Enumerator training

134. Enumerators underwent comprehensive training by the field coordinators from Monday 6th June to Saturday 11th June 2016, during which pilot surveys were also conducted at federal institutions. The training consisted of:

- **Project overview:** providing an overview of the background, objectives and importance / relevance of the project, in order to generate and maintain interest, professionalism, and a sense of being involved in something bigger.
- **Core modules:** specific training on items of the survey, with a particular focus on: attitude, the World Management Survey, and the time-use experiments. This section is to ensure a standardized understanding of the survey items across all enumerators, for the purpose of data quality.
- **Interviewing techniques:** ensuring no prior conceptions are taken to the interview, that the interview is conducted professionally, without bias, and to assert that the civil servants' responses are confidential and the purpose of the interview is to purely capture their thoughts, opinions and beliefs, rather than what the official documents / guidelines state. Another major part of the technique is to effectively manage the duration of the interview.
- **Tablet use:** enumerators were provided with specific training on how to use the tablets and the SurveyCTO software. Practice sessions were designed in order to ensure comfortability with the tablets and software.



- Research standards and confidentiality:** generating a commitment to the scientific method and the understanding of the need for standardized, true measures of the situation of the civil service was a major part of the training. The major parts of this training were to: highlight the need for the survey to be introduced and administered in the same way across respondents and organizations; garner understanding of the requirement to make respondents feel equally comfortable with the survey and the confidentiality of the responses; provide each respondent with roughly the same amount of time to fill in the questionnaire. This element of the training is vital to allow comparability of responses across organizations.
- Practice interviews and pilots:** in order to put the training into practice and to observe the understanding of the enumerators, a series of practice interviews were conducted during the training week and guidance given by the coordinators on what could be improved. Furthermore, interviews with actual civil servants in the field were organized for the enumerators, observed by the coordinators, to apply their training in the actual context. The practice interviews were important to highlight areas that needed further training and to also highlight any areas where the questionnaire could be improved.

Team makeup

135. Enumerators were assigned to teams of 4 during the training week, based on their performance and team fit. An organizational supervisor was assigned within each team, with the responsibility for: organizing the daily activities; informing the organizations of the timing and logistical requirements; provide enumerators with the correct respondent codes and ensure that they have all of the correct materials for the day. A survey supervisor was assigned to sit with the enumerators at the end of the day / during travel days to discuss the questionnaire, in particular the management scores, and general challenges; to ensure that all paper forms were

correctly labelled and all parts of the survey were filled in; and to oversee the uploading of completed surveys to the SurveyCTO server. Each team was assigned a list of jurisdictions, designed to maximize logistical efficiency. During the first week of out-of-Addis-Ababa enumeration, each team was assigned an external coordinator to ensure that the necessary checks, discussions, and general approaches as discussed during the training phase became systematized. Furthermore, the enumerators had a direct line and continuous communication with the TTL in Addis Ababa, able to reach enumerators in cases where extra support was required.

Project and data quality assurance

136. Throughout the enumeration period, the data, through the online server, was followed by the field coordination team to ensure that the project was going as planned and that the data looked reasonable. After all interviews were conducted, a debriefing session was held between the enumerators and the field coordinator to identify any possible issues with the data that may not be visible in just the data itself and to understand general challenges. During the data-cleaning stage, much quality assurance and back-and-forth was conducted between the analysis team and the field team in order to reconcile

any irregularities in the data (primarily slight identification-number errors). The paper forms were entered by a data-entry team and a team of analysts were hired to double check the data entry. The data-entry passed a further stage of cleaning during the analysis and merging phase and more than 95% of forms have been perfectly matched to the survey data. Data checks show that the location and data identifiers correspond to the agreed itineraries and that the team identifiers do not show any specific explanatory variation, suggesting that the data is unlikely to be biased by team-specific effects.

Sample selection

137. To provide a large sample for statistical analysis, while remaining within budget, the Ethiopian civil servants survey focused on the three major policymaking tiers of government: Federal; Regional; and Woreda. The Ministry of Public Sector and Human Resource Development identified the 5 core sectors that the survey should include: agriculture, education, health, revenue, and trade. The government of Ethiopia also requested that all 9 regional governments and 2 city administrations be included in the survey (11 'region-level' governments). The decision was made then to plan to interview a sufficient number of individuals from each of those tiers and allocate the remaining funds to woreda-level interviews. With this methodology, with the funds available, 70 woredas were included in the target sample at the planning stage. At the Federal level 330 individuals were planned to be interviewed; 550 at the Region level; and 1615 at the Woreda level. Within each region 50 individuals were targeted to be interviewed, except in Addis Ababa, where the target was 40 due to not having an agriculture bureau, and except in Oromiya, where, due to additional funds becoming available, the target became 60. Within each woreda, 25 individuals were planned to be sampled. The details

below outline exactly how these individuals were distributed at the sampling stage.

138. Federal offices – 66 individuals per ministry – 8 directorates – Finance, Planning, Resource Mobilization, 5 Randomly-Selected Service Delivery Directorates:

- The Head of Organization (or Deputy Head)
- The director of the Finance office
- The director of the Planning office
- The director of the Resource Mobilization office
- The director of Service Delivery Directorate 1
- The director of Service Delivery Directorate 2
- The director of Service Delivery Directorate 3
- The director of Service Delivery Directorate 4
- The director of Service Delivery Directorate 5
- 57 randomly selected employees from the above directorates

139. Note, in some cases, where we do not know the directorates of the individuals, we ensure that there is at least one individual from each directorate (randomly selected), and then simply randomly select among all professional staff in the Ministry.

140. Regional offices - 10 individuals per bureau - 3 directorates - Finance, Planning, Randomly-Selected Service Delivery

- The Head of Organization (or Deputy Head)
- The director of the Finance office
- The director of the Planning office
- The director of one randomly selected Service Delivery directorate
- 6 randomly selected employees from the above directorates

141. In cases where we do not know the directorates, we will ensure that one randomly selected individual is sampled from each of the above directorates and then 3 randomly selected individuals from the entire Bureau (that are professional staff).

142. For Oromiya regional bureau, due to additional funds made available, 12 individuals from each bureau were targeted for sampling

143. Woreda offices - 5 individuals per office

- The Head of Organization (or Deputy Head)
- One randomly selected director (many woredas have only one director)
- 3 randomly sampled individuals

144. Stratified randomization was conducted to select 70 woredas from the 9 regional states in a way that is proportional to the size of the region (in terms of number of woredas as per the 2007 census). The table below outlines exactly how this was done.

Table A.2.1: Total number of woredas per region and number of woredas sampled

	Total number of woredas (2007 Census)	Sample weights	Target sample	Sample
Tigray	47	6%	70	5
Afar	30	4%		3
Amhara	139	19%		13
Oromia	277	38%		26
Somali	53	7%		5
Benishangul Gumuz	20	3%		2
SNNPR	145	20%		14
Gambela	13	2%		2
Harar	1	0%		0
Addis Ababa	10	1%		0
Dire Dawa	1	0%		0
Special EA	4			70
	740			
	736 excluding Special EAs			

Source ethphcensusatlas_data.xls, sheet 'Spatial Units'.

145. The following woredas, however, were removed from the sample due to security or logistic infeasibility and replaced with the woredas noted “included instead”. The “included instead” woredas were simply next on the list of the randomly selected woreda list per region. For Addis Ababa City Administration, the city administration alone

will be surveyed and not woredas, due to the relevance to policy and the recent large number of changes in woreda structure in Addis Ababa.

146. Pre-survey exclusions: the following list of woredas were identified as security risks or logistically infeasible *prior* to the survey.

Table A.2.2: Pre-survey changes to woredas based on identified security risks or infeasible logistics

Region	Wereda	Note
Benishangul Gumuz	KURMUK WEREDA	Security
Benishangul Gumuz	YASO WEREDA	Included instead
Gambela	WANTAWO WEREDA	Security
Gambela	JOR WEREDA	Security
Gambela	GAMBELLA ZURIYA WEREDA	Included instead
Gambela	ABOBO WEREDA	Included instead
Oromia	WOLMERA WEREDA	Not on map
Oromia	MOYALE WEREDA	Logistically infeasible
Oromia	MANA WEREDA	Not on map
Oromia	ARERO WEREDA	Logistically infeasible (Excluded as a replacement for the above)
Oromia	HITOSA WEREDA	Included instead
Oromia	YEMALOGI WELEL WEREDA	Security (Excluded as a replacement for the above)
Oromia	GIDA KIREMU WEREDA	Included instead
Oromia	MESELA WEREDA	Included instead
SNNPR	KOCHIRE WEREDA	Unable to locate
SNNPR	BASKETO WEREDA	Included instead
Somali	MULO WEREDA	Security
Somali	HARSHIN-WEREDA	Included instead

147. **During-survey exclusions:** the following list of woredas were identified as security risks or logistically infeasible *during* to the survey.

Table A.2.3: Woredas dropped during the survey period due to security challenges

Region	Wereda	Note
Amhara	GONDAR ZURIYA WEREDA	Conflict broke out during the enumeration period
Oromia	ARSI NEGELE WEREDA	Conflict broke out during the enumeration period
Oromia	BEDENO WEREDA	Conflict broke out during the enumeration period
Somali	AFDEM WEREDA	Adversely affected by flooding. Replaced with AWUBERE WEREDA (the only remaining woreda which the regional bureau staff were willing to travel with the enumerators)

Table A.2.4: Final sample list of woredas and original itineraries

Region	Wereda
Afar	TELALAK WEREDA
Afar	AWASH FENTALE WEREDA
Afar	TERU WEREDA
Amhara	AWABEL WEREDA
Amhara	DAWA CHEFA WEREDA
Amhara	DEBRESINA WEREDA
Amhara	ENARJ ENAWGA WEREDA
Amhara	TACH ARMACHOHO WEREDA
Amhara	BASONA WERANA WEREDA
Amhara	JABI TEHNAN WEREDA
Amhara	KUTABER WEREDA
Amhara	JILE TIMUGA WEREDA
Amhara	GIDAN WEREDA
Amhara	DEJEN WEREDA

Region	Wereda
Amhara	SIMADA WEREDA
Benishangul Gumuz	DIBATE WEREDA
Benishangul Gumuz	YASO WEREDA
Gambela	GAMBELLA ZURIYA WEREDA
Gambella	ABOBO WOREDA
Oromia	SERU WEREDA
Oromia	DIGLUNA TIJO WEREDA
Oromia	JARDEGA JARTE WEREDA
Oromia	JELDU WEREDA
Oromia	BEGI WEREDA
Oromia	NONO WEREDA
Oromia	SIRARO WEREDA
Oromia	TOLE WEREDA
Oromia	DEDESA WEREDA
Oromia	GORO GUTU WEREDA
Oromia	KOFELE WEREDA
Oromia	BABILE WEREDA
Oromia	ALE WEREDA
Oromia	WERE JARSO WEREDA
Oromia	GUDURU WEREDA
Oromia	BAKO TIBE WEREDA
Oromia	MIDGA TOLA WEREDA
Oromia	AMIGNA WEREDA
Oromia	HARO MAYA WEREDA
Oromia	WADERA WEREDA
Oromia	TIKUR ENCHINI WEREDA
Oromia	HITOSA WEREDA
Oromia	GIDA KIREMU WEREDA
Oromia	MESELA WEREDA
SNNPR	BONA ZURIYA WEREDA
SNNPR	DECHA WEREDA
SNNPR	DOYO GENA WEREDA

Region	Wereda
SNNPR	WENAGO WEREDA
SNNPR	SHEBEDINO WEREDA
SNNPR	HWASSA ZURIYA WEREDA
SNNPR	GOMIBORA WEREDA
SNNPR	AMARO WEREDA
SNNPR	BENA TSEMAY WEREDA
SNNPR	ANALIMO WEREDA
SNNPR	KUCHA WEREDA
SNNPR	DALE WEREDA
SNNPR	CHERE WEREDA
SNNPR	BASKETO WEREDA
Somali	KEBRI BEYAH WEREDA
Somali	ERER WEREDA
Somali	JIJIGA WEREDA
Somali	AWUBERE WEREDA
Tigray	TAHTAY KORARO WEREDA
Tigray	GULO MEHEDA WEREDA
Tigray	HINTALO WAJIRAT WEREDA
Tigray	WERE LEHE WEREDA
Tigray	EROB WEREDA

Table A.2.5: Original team itineraries

Itinerary plan of Group 1 (39 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
Oromia	Sunday, 19, June, 2016	Travel from AA to Filiklik town of Were Jarso Woreda (Oromia RS_North Shewa Zone)	
Oromia	Monday, 20, June, 2016	Data gathering in Were Jarso woreda offices	1
Amhara	Tuesday, 21, June, 2016	Travel to Dejen Woreda (Amhara RS_East Gojam Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	2

Itinerary plan of Group 1 (39 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
Amhara	Wednesday, 22, June, 2016	Travel to Lumame town of Awabel Woreda (Amahara RS_East Gojam Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	
Amhara	Thursday, 23, June, 2016	Data gathering in Awabel woreda offices	3
Amhara	Friday, 24, June, 2016	Travel to Debrework town of Enarj Enawga Woreda (Amhara RS_East Gojam Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	4
Amhara	Saturday, 25, June, 2016	Travel to Jabi Tehnan Woreda	
Amhara	Monday, 27, June, 2016	Data gathering in Jabi Tehnan woreda offices	5
Benishangul Gumuz	Tuesday, 28, June, 2016	Travel to Dibate Woreda (BGRS_Metekel Zone)	
Benishangul Gumuz	Wednesday, 29, June, 2016	Data gathering in Dibate woreda offices	6
Amhara	Thursday, 30, June, 2016	Travel to Bahir Dar city (Amahara RS) and begin data collection at Regional offices	
Amhara	Friday, 01, July, 2016	Data gathering in Regional bureaus	
Amhara	Saturday, 02, July, 2016	Travel to Gonder Zuria Woreda	
Amhara	Monday, 04, July, 2016	Data gathering in Gonder Zuria woreda offices	7
Amhara	Tuesday, 05, July, 2016	Travel to Tach Armachiho Woreda	
Amhara	Wednesday, 06, July, 2016	Data gathering in Tach Armachiho woreda offices	8
Tigray	Thursday, 07, July, 2016	Travel to Tahtay Koraro Woreda (Tigray RS_North Western Tigray Zone)	
Tigray	Friday, 08, July, 2016	Data gathering in Tahtay koraro woreda offices	9
Tigray	Saturday, 09, July, 2016	Travel to May Kinetal town of Were Lehe Woreda (Tigray RS)	
Tigray	Monday, 11, July, 2016	Data gathering in Were Lehe woreda offices	10
Tigray	Tuesday, 12, July, 2016	Travel to Zala Anbessa town of Gulo Meheda Woreda (Tigray RS)	
Tigray	Wednesday, 13, July, 2016	Data gathering in Gulo Meheda woreda offices	11
Tigray	Thursday, 14, July, 2016	Travel to Alitena town of Erob Woreda (Tigray RS) and start data gathering	
Tigray	Friday, 15, July, 2016	Finalise data gathering in Erob woreda offices	12
Tigray	Saturday, 16, July, 2016	Travel to Makalle City (Tigray RS)	

Itinerary plan of Group 1 (39 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
Tigray	Monday, 18, July, 2016	Data gathering inTigray Regional State bureaus	
Tigray	Tuesday, 19, July, 2016	Data gathering inTigray Regional State bureaus	
Tigray	Wednesday, 20, July, 2016	Travel to Adigudom town of Hintalo Wajirat Woreda (Tigry RS) and data gathering in the woreda offices	13
Amhara	Thursday, 21, July, 2016	Travel to Gidan Woreda (Amahara RS)	
Amhara	Friday, 22, July, 2016	Data gathering in Gidan woreda offices	14
Amhara	Saturday, 23, July, 2016	Travel to Simada Woreda (Amahara RS_ South Gonder Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	
Amhara	Monday, 25, July, 2016	Data gathering in Simada woreda offices	15
Afar	Tuesday, 26, July, 2016	Travel to Teru Woreda (Afar RS)	
Afar	Wednesday, 27, July, 2016	Data gathering in Teru woreda offices	16
Addis Ababa	Thursday, 28, July, 2016	Back to Addis	

Itinerary plan of Group 2 (39 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
Amhara	Sunday, 19, June, 2016	Travel to Kutaber Woreda (Amahara RS_ South Wollo Zone)	
Amhara	Monday, 20, June, 2016	Data gathering in Kutaber woreda offices	1
Amhara	Tuesday, 21, June, 2016	Travel to Chefa Gula Woreda (Amahara RS_ oromo Zone)	
Amhara	Wednesday, 22, June, 2016	Data gathering in Chefa Gula woreda offices	2
Amhara	Thursday, 23, June, 2016	Travel to Jile Timuga Woreda (Amahara RS_oromo Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	3
Amhara	Friday, 24, June, 2016	Travel to Debresina Woreda (Amahara RS_South wollo Zone)	
Amhara	Monday, 27, June, 2016	Data gathering in Debresina woreda offices	4

Itinerary plan of Group 2 (39 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
Amhara	Tuesday, 28, June, 2016	Travel to Gudo Beret of Basona Werana Woreda (Amahara RS_North Shewa Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	5
Addis Ababa	Wednesday, 29, June, 2016	Back to Addis	
Afar	Thursday, 30, June, 2016	Travel to Awash Fentale Woreda (Afar RS)	
Afar	Friday, 01, July, 2016	Data gathering in Awash Fentale woreda offices	6
Afar	Saturday, 02, July, 2016	Travel to Telalak Woreda (Afar RS)	
Afar	Monday, 04, July, 2016	Data gathering in Telalak woreda offices	7
Afar	Tuesday, 05, July, 2016	Travel to Semera town (Afar RS) and begin data collection in Afar Regional Offices	
Afar	Wednesday, 06, July, 2016	Finalise Data gathering in Afar regional Bureaus	
Oromia	Thursday, 07, July, 2016	Travel to Mesela woreda (Oromia RS_west Hararghe Zone)	
Oromia	Friday, 08, July, 2016	Data gathering in Mesela woreda offices	8
Oromia	Saturday, 09, July, 2016	Travel to Karamile town of Goro Gutu Woreda (oromia RS_ East Hararghe zone)	
Oromia	Monday, 11, July, 2016	Data gathering in Goro Gutu woreda offices	9
Dire Dawa	Tuesday, 12, July, 2016	Travel to Dire Dawa city and begin data collection at Regional Offices	
Dire Dawa	Wednesday, 13, July, 2016	Data gathering in the regional bureaus	
Somali	Thursday, 14, July, 2016	Travel to Erer woreda (Somali RS) and data gatering in the woreda offices	10
Somali	Friday, 15, July, 2016	Travel to Afdem Woreda and data gathering in the woreda offices	11
Oromia	Saturday, 16, July, 2016	Travel to Bedeno Woreda	
Oromia	Monday, 18, July, 2016	Data gathering in the offices of Bedeno woreda offices	12
Oromia	Tuesday, 19, July, 2016	Travel to Haromaya Woreda and data gathering in the woreda offices	13
Harar	Wednesday, 20, July, 2016	Travel to Harar city and data gathering in the regional offices	14

Itinerary plan of Group 2 (39 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
Oromia	Thursday, 21, July, 2016	Travel to Midega Tola Woreda and data gathering in the woreda offices	
Oromia	Friday, 22, July, 2016	Travel to Babile Woreda and data gathering in the woreda offices	15
Somali	Saturday, 23, July, 2016	Travel to Jijiga	
Somali	Monday, 25, July, 2016	Data gathering in Somali Regional Offices	
Somali	Tuesday, 26, July, 2016	Finalise data collection in Regional Offices	
Somali	Wednesday, 27, July, 2016	Data gathering in Jijiga zuria woreda offices	16
Somali	Thursday, 28, July, 2016	Travel to Kebri beyah Woreda and data gathering in the woreda offices	17
Somali	Friday, 29, July, 2016	Travel to Harshin Woreda and data gathering in the woreda offices	18
Addis Ababa	Saturday, 30, July, 2016	Back to Addis	

Itinerary plan of Group 3 (41 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
SNNPR	Sunday, 19, June, 2016	Travel from AA to Gembora Woreda (SNNPRS_Hadiya Zone)	
SNNPR	Monday, 20, June, 2016	Data gathering in the sampled 5 offices of Gembora woreda	1
SNNPR	Tuesday, 21, June, 2016	Travel to Foniko town of Analimo Woreda (SNNPRS_Hadiya Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	2
SNNPR	Wednesday, 22, June, 2016	Travel to Doyo Gena Woreda (SNNPRS_Kembata Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	3
SNNPR	Thursday, 23, June, 2016	Travel to Selam ber town of kucha Woreda (SNNPRS_Gamo Gofa Zone)	
SNNPR	Friday, 24, June, 2016	Data gathering in Kucha woreda offices	4

Itinerary plan of Group 3 (41 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
SNNPR	Saturday, 25, June, 2016	Travel to Laska town of Basketo special Woreda (SNNPRS)	
SNNPR	Monday, 27, June, 2016	Data gathering in Basketo S. woreda offices	5
SNNPR	Tuesday, 28, June, 2016	Travel from Basketo to Key Afer town of Bena tsemay Woreda (SNNPRS_South omo Zone)	
SNNPR	Wednesday, 29, June, 2016	Data gathering in bena tsemay woreda offices	6
SNNPR	Thursday, 30, June, 2016	Travel from Bena tsemay to Hawassa city (SNNPRS) and begin Regional office data collection	
SNNPR	Friday, 01, July, 2016	Finalise data gathering in Regional Bureaus	
SNNPR	Monday, 04, July, 2016	Data gathering in Hawassa zuria woreda offices	7
SNNPR	Tuesday, 05, July, 2016	Travel to Leku town of Shebedino Woreda (SNNPRS_Sidama Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	8
SNNPR	Wednesday, 06, July, 2016	Travel to Yirgalem town of Dale Woreda (SNNPRS_Sidama Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	9
SNNPR	Thursday, 07, July, 2016	Travel to Wenago Woreda (SNNPRS_Gedeo Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	10
SNNPR	Friday, 08, July, 2016	Finalise data gathering in wenago woreda offices	
SNNPR	Saturday, 09, July, 2016	Travel to Kele town of Amaro Special Woreda (SNNPRS)	
SNNPR	Monday, 11, July, 2016	Data gathering in Amaro S. woreda offices	11
SNNPR	Tuesday, 12, July, 2016	Travel to Bona town of Bona zuria Woreda (SNNPRS)	
SNNPR	Wednesday, 13, July, 2016	Data gathering in bona zuria woreda offices	12
SNNPR	Thursday, 14, July, 2016	Travel to Kele Chere Woreda (SNNPRS) and start data gathering	
SNNPR	Friday, 15, July, 2016	Finalise data gathering in Kele Chere Woreda offices	13
SNNPR	Saturday, 16, July, 2016	Travel to Wadera Woreda (Oromia RS_Guji zone)	
SNNPR	Monday, 18, July, 2016	Data gathering in Wadera woreda offices	14

Itinerary plan of Group 3 (41 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
SNNPR	Tuesday, 19, July, 2016	Travel to Arsi Negelle Woreda (Oromia RS_West Arsi zone)	
Oromia	Wednesday, 20, July, 2016	Data gathering in Arsi Negelle woreda offices	15
Oromia	Thursday, 21, July, 2016	Travel to Rope town of Siraro Woreda (Oromia RS_West Arsi Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	16
Oromia	Friday, 22, July, 2016	Travel to Kofele Woreda (Oromia RS_West Arsi Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	17
Oromia	Saturday, 23, July, 2016	Travel from kofele to Tijo town of Digluna Tijo Woreda (Oromia RS_ Arsi Zone)	
Oromia	Monday, 25, July, 2016	Data gathering in Digluna Tijo woreda offices	18
Oromia	Tuesday, 26, July, 2016	Travel to Eteya town of Hitosa Woreda (Oromia RS_Arsi Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	19
Oromia	Wednesday, 27, July, 2016	Travel to Adele town of Amigna Woreda (Oromia RS_ Arsi Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	20
Oromia	Thursday, 28, July, 2016	Travel to Seru Woreda (Oromia RS_ Arsi Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	
Oromia	Friday, 29, July, 2016	Data gathering in Seru woreda offices	21
Addis Ababa	Saturday, 30, July, 2016	Back to Addis	

Itinerary plan of Group 4 (40 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
Oromia	Sunday, 19, June, 2016	Travel to Jeldu Woreda (Oromia RS_West Shewa zone)	
Oromia	Monday, 20, June, 2016	Data gathering in Jeldu woreda offices	1
Oromia	Tuesday, 21, June, 2016	Travel to Enchini town of Tikur Enchini Woreda (Oromia RS_West Shewa Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	2

Itinerary plan of Group 4 (40 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
Oromia	Wednesday, 22, June, 2016	Travel to Bako town of Bako Tibe Woreda (Oromia RS_West Shewa Zone) and data gathering in the woreda offices	3
Oromia	Thursday, 23, June, 2016	Travel to Kombolcha town of Guduru Woreda (Oromia RS_Horo Guduru zone)	
Oromia	Friday, 24, June, 2016	Data gathering in Guduru woreda offices	4
Oromia	Saturday, 25, June, 2016	Travel to Alibo town of Jerdga Jerte Woreda (Oromia RS_Horo Guduru zone)	
Oromia	Monday, 27, June, 2016	Data gathering in Jerdga Jerte woreda offices	5
Oromia	Tuesday, 28, June, 2016	Travel to Kiremu town of Gida kiremu Woreda (Oromia RS_East Wellega zone)	
Oromia	Wednesday, 29, June, 2016	Data gathering in Gida Kiremu woreda offices	6
Oromia	Thursday, 30, June, 2016	Travel to Begi Woreda (Oromia RS_ West Wellega zone)	
Oromia	Friday, 01, July, 2016	Data gathering in Begi woreda offices	7
Benishangul Gumuz	Saturday, 02, July, 2016	Travel to Assosa city (Benshangul Gumuz RS)	
Benishangul Gumuz	Monday, 04, July, 2016	Data gathering in the regional bureaus	
Benishangul Gumuz	Tuesday, 05, July, 2016	Finalise data gathering in the regional bureaus	
Benishangul Gumuz	Wednesday, 06, July, 2016	Travel to Yaso Woreda (BGRS_ Kamashi zone)	
Benishangul Gumuz	Thursday, 07, July, 2016	Data gathering in Yaso woreda offices	8
Gambella	Friday, 08, July, 2016	Travel to Gambella city (Gambella RS) and begin Data Collection in Regional Offices	
Gambella	Monday, 11, July, 2016	Data gathering in the regional bureaus	
Gambella	Tuesday, 12, July, 2016	Data gathering in Gambella zuria woreda offices	9
Gambella	Wednesday, 13, July, 2016	Travel to Abobo Woreda and data gathering in the woreda offices	10
Oromia	Thursday, 14, July, 2016	Travel to Gore town of Ale Woreda and start data gathering in the woreda offices	
Oromia	Friday, 15, July, 2016	Finalise data gathering of Ale Woreda and travel to Denbi town of Dedesa Woreda (Oromia RS_Illu Ababora Zone)	11

Itinerary plan of Group 4 (40 Days)

Region	Date	Activity	Woreda Numbers
Oromia	Monday, 18, July, 2016	Data gathering in the offices of Dedesa woreda	12
SNNPR	Tuesday, 19, July, 2016	Travel to Chiri town of Decha Woreda (SNNPRS_ Kaffa Zone)	
SNNPR	Wednesday, 20, July, 2016	Data gathering in the offices of Decha woreda	13
Oromia	Thursday, 21, July, 2016	Travel to Silk amba town of Nono Woreda (Oromia RS_ West Shewa zone)	
Oromia	Friday, 22, July, 2016	Data gathering in Nono woreda offices	14
Oromia	Saturday, 23, July, 2016	Travel to Bantu town of Tole Woreda (Oromia RS_ South West Shewa zone)	
Oromia	Monday, 25, July, 2016	Data gathering in Tole woreda offices	15
Addis Ababa	Tuesday, 26, July, 2016	Back to Addis	
Oromia	Wednesday, 27, July, 2016	Data gathering in Oromia Regional Offices, based in Addis Ababa	
Oromia	Thursday, 28, July, 2016	Data gathering in Oromia Regional Offices, based in Addis Ababa	
Addis Ababa	Friday, 29, July, 2016	Data gathering in AA city administration Bureaus	

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Annex 3

Methodology for Graphs and the Management Practice Indices

This annex provides further detail on the methodology behind the figures in the report and how they can be interpreted. The first part of the annex explains the methodology and interpretation of each type of figure used in the report; the second part of the annex details the creation of the management practice indices, based on the World Management Survey methodology.

A.3.1 Methodological notes on individual graphs

Figure 2.1

Methodology

This graph uses historical data from the civil service statistical abstract and the World Development Indicators to plot the total number of civil servants against the total population.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The left-hand axis refers to the total population and corresponds to the red line. The right-hand axis refers to the total number of civil servants and corresponds to the blue line. The x-axis refers to the years in the Gregorian calendar.

Figure 2.2

Methodology

This graph uses historical fiscal data from the Government of Ethiopia to plot the spending on salary to the public sector as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).

How to interpret the output of this graph

The blue line refers to the left-hand axis, which represents the percentage of GDP that is spent on public-sector wages. The x-axis refers to the years in the Gregorian calendar.

Figure 2.3

Methodology

This graph combines historical data on the wage bill, GDP, total government revenue, and total government expenditure for groups of countries to show the wage bill to the public sector as a percentage of GDP and government expenditure and revenue.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The bars refer to the bottom axis of percentages: the grey bar represents the wage bill as a percentage of GDP; the orange bar represents the wage bill as a percentage of government revenue; the blue bar represents the wage bill as a percentage of government expenditure.

Figure 2.4

Methodology

This graph uses historical data from the civil service statistical abstracts to plot the number of additional civil servants per year from 1992/93 to 2013/14.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the years in the Gregorian calendar. The y-axis refers to the number of civil servants added in the respective year. The bars show the growth, in terms of the number of civil servants, in the civil service each year.

Figure 2.5

Methodology

This graph uses 2014 data from the World Bank Urban Labor Market study to show the distribution of the education level of staff within the public sector and the private sector.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The y-axis represents the percentage of staff. The yellow segment within each bar represents the percentage of staff that have a post-secondary qualification; the grey segment represents the percentage of staff that have a secondary education qualification; the orange segment, the percentage of staff that have a primary education qualification; and the blue segment, the percentage of staff with no formal recorded education. The first bar refers to the private sector; the second bar to the public sector.

Figure 3.1

Methodology

This graph uses official documents to produce a timeline of key reforms and changes within the civil service.

How to interpret the output of this graph

Each box represents the key reform or programme, and the x-axis refers to the year in which the reform was initiated (Gregorian calendar).

Figures 3.3; 3.4

Methodology

These figures use data from the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey (ECSS) 2016. The figures calculate the percentage of respondents by tier (sector) by counting the number of civil servants that selected the respective reform as most successful and dividing this by the total number of civil servants in that tier (sector).

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the percentage of respondents selecting the respective reform as especially successful. The y-axis represents the tier of government (federal, regional, or woreda-level) for Figure 3.3; and the sector (agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade) for Figure 3.4. The blue segment of the bar refers to the proportion of civil servants that selected the BSC as especially successful; the orange bar, the percentage that selected the Change Army; the grey bar, the percentage that selected the Citizens Charter; the yellow bar, the percentage that selected 'Other'.

Figures 3.5

Methodology

This figure uses data from the Ethiopian Civil Servants Survey (ECSS) 2016. The figure calculates the percentage of respondents by sector by counting the number of civil servants that selected 'Agree' or 'Strongly Agree' to the stated question and dividing this by the total number of civil servants in that sector.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the proportion⁶⁹ of civil servants that agreed or strongly agreed to the statement. The y-axis refers to the sector in which the civil servant currently works (agriculture, education, health, revenue, or trade).

Figures 3.6 and 3.7

Methodology

These figures use data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2016. The graphs show the government effectiveness by income blocks (3.6) and by country (3.7).

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the country or group. The y-axis refers to the government effectiveness index, on a range from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating greater effectiveness. Each bar within the country or group referred to in the x-axis represents a different year of data (1998, 2004, 2009, 2014). Further information on how the index is generated can be found under <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/>.

Figures 3.8

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016 based on the World Management Survey, see section A.3.2 below for further details. This figure represents the raw management scores (and not the Z-Scores) for each aggregate component of the management practices index. The aggregation is done as per the table below, the averaging across each of the raw scores within the component.

⁶⁹ This can be interpreted as a percentage if it is multiplied by 100. For example, a proportion of 0.2 means that 20% of civil servants within the respective sector agreed or strongly agreed to the respective statement.

How to interpret the output of this graph

Each bar in the graph refers to each aggregate component of the management practices index (monitoring, staffing, roles, staff involvement, targeting, flexibility, and incentives; see table below). Each individual item (question) within the management practices index is scored from 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the highest). Therefore, a higher score represents a higher average score across all of the items within the aggregate component. See the section below for details of the individual items that make up each aggregate component and examples of what constitutes a low score and a high score.

 **Figures 3.9, 3.11, 3.13, 3.14, 3.15, 3.16, 3.17, 3.18**

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016 based on the methodology used for the World Management Survey, see section below for further details. This figure represents the raw management scores (and not the Z-Scores) for the respective aggregate component of the management practices index (monitoring, staffing, roles, staff involvement, targeting, flexibility, and incentives). The aggregation is done as per the table below, the averaging across each of the raw scores within the component.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the score from 1 to 5 in the management component. The y-axis refers to the percentage of directors. The blue bar is a histogram which plots the exact percentage of respondents per score; the green line is a smooth version of the histogram, to show what the distribution of scores would look like if the scores on the x-axis were broken up into smaller and smaller partitions.

 **Figures 3.10, 3.12**

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016, using the management practices module asked to directors (based on the World Management Survey), and a measure of the intensity with which the BSC reforms were introduced within the organization. The intensity of the BSC reform is based on the organization-level average response to the following question, asked to all civil servants: "What percentage of your activities in the civil service has been substantially affected, both positively and negatively, by the following reforms - BSC?".

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the organization-level average response to the percentage of activities affected by the BSC. The y-axis refers to the organization-level average management Z-Score (see the next section) for the respective aggregate component of management practices (performance targeting,

monitoring, performance incentives, roles, flexibility, staff involvement, and staffing – see section A.3.2 below for further details). The Z-Score in the y-axis can be interpreted as a 'one-standard-deviation' change – that is a Z-Score of -1 in the performance targeting component means that the organization is one standard-deviation lower than the average score across all organizations. A standard deviation is the average deviation from the mean within the distribution (i.e. a standard deviation of 2 means that the scores are on average 2 units above or below the mean). The R-Squared represents the proportion of the variation in the management practice component that is explained by the variation in the BSC reform intensity (an R-Squared of 0.3199 means that 32% of the variation in the monitoring score across organizations is explained by the percentage of activities in the organization that have been affected by the BSC).

Figures 4.1, 5.1

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. This makes use of only the top-ranked responses. This takes the number of times the category is selected as the most important determinant of promotion and divides this number by the number of times *any category is selected as the most important determinant*. I.e. this is the number of 'Rank 1' responses for that category divided by the total number of 'Rank 1' responses over all categories. Figure 4.1 refers to employees only. Figure 5.1 refers to employees and directors.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the percentage of 'Rank 1' responses that select the respective category. The y-axis is a list of the options. Therefore, a figure of 57% for Merit/performance in Figure 4.1 means that, of all of the 'Rank 1' responses, 57% are within Merit/performance.

Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. This makes use of any time the category is selected within the top-3 most important determinants. This graph shows the proportion of times that the respective category is within the top-3 most important determinants out of all responses. I.e. this is the total number of times the category is ranked 1-3, divided by the total number of civil servants that responded to this question. All figures refer to questions asked to employees only.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis and bars refer to the grouping of responses (by tier or sector). The y-axis refers to the proportion of civil servants that selected the respective criterion (the y-axis label) in one of the top-3

most important determinants. Therefore, a value of 0.7 for Merit/performance in Figure 4.2 for Amhara among the region-level civil servants means that 70% of civil servants in the Amhara regional bureaus selected Merit/performance within the top-3 determinants of promotion. By the same reasoning, just over 60% of woreda-level civil servants in Afar selected 'Merit/performance' within the top-3 determinants of promotion.

 **Figures 4.5, 4.8, 4.10, 4.11, 5.6, 5.7, 5.14, 5.21**

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. This is the percentage of respondents that select the respective response for that specific question, grouped by tier of government. All histograms in the report are of the same nature. Figure 4.8 was asked to employees and directors. All other figures refer to questions asked to employees only.

How to interpret the output of this graph

Each sub-plot refers to the tier of government of the respondents. The y-axis refers to the percentage of respondents within that tier of government. Each bar reflects the percentage of civil servants within that tier of government that selected that option (Agree / Strongly Agree etc) for the respective question.

 **Figures 4.6, 4.7**

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. This is the number of selections for the respective category divided by the total number of selections (directors could select multiple options, with no ordering / ranking), converted into a percentage. Figure 4.6 refers to a survey question asked to directors only. Figure 4.7 to employees only.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The y-axis refers to each category or driver. The x-axis is the percentage of selections attributed to the respective category.


Figures 4.9, 5.15, 5.22, 5.23, 5.24, 5.25

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. This is the proportion of respondents that select the respective response for that specific question, grouped by sector of government (x-axis) and tier of government (different bars). Each respondent can select multiple options, so this figure is measuring the proportion of times that the respective criterion is chosen. Figure 4.9 was asked to employees only.

How to interpret the output of this graph

Each sub-plot refers to different criteria ('MIS Directorate does not have any useful data'; and 'Network problems'). The x-axis refers to the sector in which the civil servants work. The y-axis refers to the proportion of respondents within that sector of government that selected this option. Each bar reflects the percentage of civil servants within that tier of government that selected that option for the respective question.


Figure 5.2

Methodology

This figure uses data from the Standish Group 2014 and World Bank (2015a) Digital Governance Database and categorizes large public-sector ICT projects as failed, partially failed, or succeeded.

How to interpret the output of this graph

Each segment represents the percentage of ICT projects that fall within the respective. The percentages are also labelled.


Figures 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.8, 5.9

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. This is the average response across all directors within the respective tier of government, sector, or region to the stated question. All facilities questions were asked to directors only.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis shows the grouping of the respondent by sector or tier. The bar reflects the tier or the specific region of the respondent. The y-axis is the value of the average response to the stated question within

the specific sub-group of respondents represented by the bar. The lines that overlay the bars represent the 95% confidence interval,⁷⁰ which shows the precision of the estimate of the mean response. A wide confidence interval usually means that there is limited variation in responses (e.g. due to a small number of respondents for the question).

Each sub-plot refers to different criteria ('MIS Directorate does not have any useful data'; and 'Network problems'). The x-axis refers to the sector in which the civil servants work. The y-axis refers to the proportion of respondents within that sector of government that selected this option. Each bar reflects the percentage of civil servants within that tier of government that selected that option (Agree / Strongly Agree etc) for the respective question.

Figure 5.10

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. Each bar shows the percentage of respondents that select the respective response for that specific question, grouped by tier of government. Figure 5.10 was asked to employees only.

How to interpret the output of this graph

Each bar color refers to a tier of government: blue bars refer to federal employees; grey bars refer to regional employees; and white bars to woreda-level employees. The x-axis refers to the value of the response to the question: 'Imagine when you started your motivation was 100. What number would you say it is now relative to that?'. The y-axis represents the percentage of respondents that chose the respective value within that tier of government. So a blue bar that corresponds to 150 on the x-axis and 50% on the y-axis means that 50% of federal employees selected 150 as the answer to the question.

Figure 5.11

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016, the Ghana Civil Servants Survey (Rasul, Rogger, and Williams, 2015), the Federal Bureau of Revenue Staff Survey (Keefer, 2014) the Indonesia Public Employee Survey of Bureaucracy Reform Survey (Banuri and Keefer, 2012), and the Nigeria Civil Servant Survey (Rogger, 2010). Note that there is some variation in the question and answer choices among the surveys in different

⁷⁰ The correct interpretation of a confidence interval of 95% can be stated in terms of repeated samples: If this statistic was repeatedly calculated from numerous randomly selected samples, the fraction of calculated confidence intervals (which would differ for each sample) that encompass the true population parameter would tend toward 95%. Or, there is a 95% probability that the confidence interval from some repeated future experiment on a different sample from the same population (if appropriately selected) contains the true population parameter.

countries, so the results should be considered indicative. With overall job satisfaction, we can fairly straightforwardly compare amongst surveys in Ghana, Indonesia and Pakistan. We can make comparisons to the other countries, but this is conditional on the comparability of the concepts assessed.

How to interpret the output of this graph

Each data point represents an organization within one of the 5 countries, separated by the color / shape of the marker of the data point in the graph. The x-axis refers to the ranking of the organization, in terms of the satisfaction of its workers, out of all organizations sampled within that country. The y-axis refers to the proportion of civil servants that stated that they were satisfied with their experience in the civil service in that organization. See table 5.1 for further information.

Figure 5.12

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. This figure represents the responses to the question “What percentage of your time is used for ad hoc tasks that are not part of your main job?”. The question was asked to employees and directors only.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the percentage of time. The y-axis refers to the percentage of directors and employees who exhibit the respective percentage of time. The blue bar is a histogram which plots the exact percentage of respondents per percentage of time; the green line is a smooth version of the histogram, to show what the distribution of scores would look like if the scores on the x-axis were broken up into smaller and smaller partitions.

Figure 5.13

Methodology

This figure uses data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators to show the control of corruption in Rwanda and Ethiopia from 2005 to 2015.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the WGI indicator ‘control of corruption’, on a range from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating better control of corruption. The y-axis refers to the year and country respectively. The green bars refer to the aggregate score for the indicator. The black lines refer to the margins of error for each of the indicator values.

 **Figure 5.16**

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016 based on the time-use module. The figure aggregates responses on civil servants' use of their working time and plots the distributions of time spent on the respective activity. These questions were asked to employees and directors only.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the number of hours during a working week. The y-axis refers to the percentage of directors and employees who exhibit the respective number of hours. The blue bar is a histogram which plots the exact percentage of respondents per hours of time; the green line is a smooth version of the histogram, to show what the distribution of scores would look like if the scores on the x-axis were broken up into smaller and smaller partitions.

 **Figure 5.17**

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. The figure displays the responses to the following question: How many people would you say regularly give you tasks as part of your formal work duties? Can you describe who these people are? Are they...". The question was asked to employees and directors only. Respondents could select multiple options, reflecting all of the people that regularly give them tasks. The statistic used in the graph is the percentage of responses that correspond to each specific type of person (i.e. the total number of responses for "Directors from the organization", for example, divided by the total number of responses).

How to interpret the output of this graph

The x-axis refers to the percentage of responses. The y-axis to the type of individual. A bar of 45% on the 'Director from the organization' therefore means that 45% of responses out of all responses are within the 'Directors from the organization' category.

 **Figures 5.18, 5.19, 5.20**

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. This set of questions was asked to employees only. This is the percentage of respondents that choose a response within the bins on the x-axis, to the respective question.

How to interpret the output of this graph

Each sub-plot refers to the tier of government of the respondents. The y-axis refers to the percentage of respondents within that tier of government. The x-axis is a set of bins of responses to the question: so that if a respondent chose 17%, she would fall into the 0-25% bin. Each bar reflects the percentage of civil servants within that tier of government that responded with a value within the bin reflected in the x-axis.

Figure 5.26

Methodology

This figure uses data from the ECSS 2016. This question was an open-ended question (“What is the best thing about working in the civil service?”) asked to employees only. This is the percentage of respondents that choose a response corresponding to those on the x-axis, after having categorized all of the open-ended responses.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The y-axis refers to the percentage of employees. The x-axis is the respective response to the question. Each bar reflects the percentage of civil servants that responded with a response corresponding to the categories reflected in the x-axis.

Figure A1.1

Methodology

This figure uses data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2016 (based on data reported by each country). The figure shows year-on-year values in cereal yields in Ethiopia and in Eastern Africa as a whole, from 1992 to 2014.

How to interpret the output of this graph

The y-axis refers to the yields measured for a given year. The x-axis refers to the year. The darker blue line refers to the Eastern Africa average cereal yield; the lighter blue-grey line to the Ethiopian cereal yield.

A 3.2 Management practices

The management practices indicators are created using the items developed from the World Management Survey, detailed in the table below. The items were asked to directors⁷¹ or heads of organizations within the civil service, who are responsible for small teams of professional civil servants. The World Management Survey⁷² items are designed for management staff to identify the extent to

which core management practices are in place, along seven dimensions: targeting; monitoring; performance incentives; job roles; organization flexibility; staff involvement; and staffing, such as the identification and retention of staff. The table provides the exact item asked to each director and the type of answer that would achieve the lowest score (1) and the type of answer that would achieve the highest score (5).

Creation of indices

Each item is transformed into a Z-Score, which is a unitless measure that measures the deviation from the mean of the distribution of scores in standard deviations. Therefore, a Z-Score of 1 means that the respondent/respective organization is 1 standard deviation above the mean and a Z-Score of -2 means that the respondent/respective organization is 2 standard deviations below the mean.

With the Z-Scores for each item, the aggregate indices of targeting, monitoring, incentives, roles, flexibility, staffing, staff involvement - the standard sub-indices used in the World Management Survey - are created as means of each individual item listed within the aggregate category.

The overall management index is the mean of all individual Z-Scores of the items.

⁷¹ Also referred to as Process Owners, Managers, and Supervisors

⁷² <http://worldmanagementsurvey.org>

Table World Management Survey Indicators

Aggregation	Item	Score 1	Score 5
Targeting	Does your Directorate have a clear set of targets derived from the organization's goals and objectives? Are they used to determine your work schedule?	The directorate does not have defined targets.	Targets are clearly defined for the directorate, manager, and employee levels, and are well understood by all staff. All tasks are directly derived from the targets, which are regularly reviewed to ensure they remain on track.
Targeting	When you arrive at work each day, do you and your colleagues know what their individual roles and responsibilities are in achieving the organization's goals?	Staff do not know what their roles and responsibilities are.	Staff have a very good understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Their own roles and goals are clearly interconnected to those of their organization.
Targeting	How are targets and performance measures communicated to staff in your directorate?	Neither targets nor performance measures are communicated to staff.	Targets and performance measures are formally communicated and understood by all staff.
Monitoring	In what kind of ways does your Directorate track how well it is delivering services? Can you give me an example?	Directorate does not track performance.	Full set of indicators are tracked formally and continuously. Reviews are conducted regularly and involve representative of all directorate staff groups. The results of the review are formally communicate to all directorate staff.
Monitoring	Are you involved in performance review for your Directorate? If so, how often does this occur?	Not involved in performance review*	Weekly*
Performance incentives	How would under-performance be tolerated in your Directorate? Can you give me an example of how such a case would be dealt with?	Poor performers stay in their positions (no consequences).	Poor performers are identified through regular reviews and are put on a formal performance improvement plan immediately. This applies to all staff.
Performance incentives	Given past experience, have members of [<i>respondent's organization</i>] been disciplined for breaking the rules of the civil service?	There are no consequences for bad behaviour/ breaking the rules.	Bad behaviour/ breaking the rules is addressed through concrete action. If any employee breaks the rules, the underlying issues will be identified and rectified. This

Aggregation	Item	Score 1	Score 5
			applies to all employees.
Performance incentives	Does your Directorate use performance, targets, or indicators for tracking and rewarding (financially or non-financially) the performance of its employees?	Staff are rewarded equally (or not rewarded) irrespective of performance. Individual performance is not tracked formally.	There is a formal staff evaluation system and performance is rewarded (financially or non-financially). Rewards are given as a consequence of well-defined and monitored individual achievements. This applied to all staff.
Roles	When staff in your Directorate are given tasks in their daily work, how much discretion do they have to carry out their assignments? Can you give me an example?	How officers carry out their assignments is decided by senior managers. Officers have no say.	Officers have complete autonomy in deciding how to carry out their tasks.
Roles	Can most staff in your Directorate make substantive contributions to the policy formulation and implementation process?	Staff do not contribute to policy formulation, nor to decisions about implementation.	Management expects all staff to contribute to policy formulation and decisions about implementation (formally or informally), and considers this part of their duties.
Roles	Is the workload of achieving your Directorate's targets evenly distributed across its different employees, or do some groups consistently shoulder a greater burden than others?	A small minority of staff undertake the vast majority of work within the directorate.	The burden of the directorate's work is distributed equally among staff. Tasks are assigned in such a way that the amount of time required and the level of difficulty are balanced out so no member of staff finds him/herself overburdened.
Roles	Thinking about all the projects that your Directorate has been involved in since your appointment here, would you say that managers and supervisors try to use the right staff for the right job?	Staff are allocated to tasks randomly.	The right staff are always used for a task. Allocation of tasks is based on staffs' documented skills and competencies.
Flexibility	Does your Directorate make efforts to adjust to the specific needs and specific requirements of communities, clients, or other stakeholders?	The directorate uses the same procedures no matter what.	The directorate tailors all procedures to the specific needs of its stakeholders. The evolution of those needs results in adaptation to plans, project and policies.

Aggregation	Item	Score 1	Score 5
Flexibility	How flexible would you say your Directorate is in terms of responding to new and improved work practices or reforms?	New practices are not adopted/ integrated in the directorate.	The adoption of new ideas and practices is an integral part of the directorate's work. New practices are regularly reviewed and considered, and once adopted and integrated across the directorate within 6 months.
Staff involvement / Contribution	How do problems in your directorate get exposed and fixed?	Ad-hoc, no set process for improvement. Deal with problems as they arise without following an established procedure. Once fixed, no further action taken. No suggestions from staff	Exposing problems and suggesting solutions and improvements is part of all staffs' daily duty. Continuous improvement is part of the culture of the organization.
Staff involvement / Contribution	What kind of feedback do you get in staff meetings?	No feedback from staff.	Staff provide the feedback on which action plans will be based. Focus on both good and bad performance. Details of the meetings are recorded and communicated to all staff.
Staff involvement / Contribution	Let's say you've agreed to a follow up plan at one of your meetings, what would happen if the plan wasn't enacted?	No action taken. No changes made in the operations process.	In addition to 4, tools can be checked up and reported to the manager in charge. Meetings (formal/ informal) are held to look into the root causes of problems and preventive actions are taken for future similar task.
Staffing	Do you think the management of your Directorate think about attracting talented people to your Directorate and then doing their best to keep them? For example, by ensuring they are happy and engaged with their work.	Directorate does not put emphasis on talent	Senior management believes that attracting and developing talent is important. There is a clear system for identifying and attracting talent, developing and retaining talent.
Staffing	If two senior level staff joined your Directorate five years ago and one was much better at their work than the other, would he/she be promoted through the service faster?	No promotion system (no one in the organization has been promoted for years) The promotion system is based on tenure	Promotion system is based on performance. Organization actively identifies, develops and promotes top performers. Regular assessments, clear set of indicators and personalised career plans for individuals (regularly revised).

Notes

* This question is not score on a scale from 1 to 5, but is simply a coded response where the least frequent possible response is "Not involved in performance review" and the most frequent possible response is "Weekly". World Management Indicators based on Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), adapted to the civil service following Rasul and Rogger (2017) in Nigeria and Rasul, Rogger, and Williams (forthcoming) in Ghana. See <http://worldmanagementsurvey.org/> for further details on the World Management Survey instruments.

Image References

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